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ABSTRACT
Since the mid-1980s, Algeria has embarked on a programme of comprehensive 
financial liberalisation to establish a market-oriented financial system, and to develop 
the role of the Algiers Stock Exchange in the mobilisation of financial resources. The 
transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy meant fewer 
regulatory barriers towards local and foreign banks. This study demonstrates that 
financial liberalisation is the main force that drives the globalisation of financial 
services, followed by financial innovations and the Internet. Globalisation has 
affected the performance of the two prevalent banking models in Algeria: interest- 
based (conventional) and non-interest-based (Islamic). The benchmarks used to 
assess banking performance are: competition, profitability and efficiency. 
Quantitative and qualitative analyses show a direct link between banking efficiency 
and the globalisation of financial services. The study concludes that globalisation has 
more advantages than disadvantages to the Algerian banking sector and the Algiers 
Stock Exchange. The elimination of regulatory barriers has enabled state-owned 
banks to improve the quality of their services and to use more advanced information 
technologies. Private and foreign banks are also involved in the modernisation of the 
Algerian banking industry by launching innovative financial products and attracting 
local and foreign capital. However, this project emphasises that the removal of 
remaining regulatory obstacles would enable banks to benefit fully from the process 
of financial liberalisation, and to be active institutions in the financial market. 
Moreover, opening the Algiers Stock Exchange to large domestic and foreign 
companies would attract capital investments and boost equity trading in Algeria.
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This research project analyses the implications of globalisation of financial services 
on the performance of the Algerian banking sector and stock market. This entails 
determining the main components of globalisation and how banks have responded to 
them. The study identifies globalisation of financial services as a process, which 
allows free trading of financial services and enables banks to compete and improve 
their profitability and efficiency. This, however, is only possible in the presence of 
financial liberalisation, financial innovations and advances in information technology 
such those of the Internet. We focus our analyses on the difficulties encountered by 
conventional (interest) and Islamic (non-interest) banks during the transition from a 
centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one, and what are the possible 
solutions to resolve them.
This study is motivated by the recent developments in the Algerian banking 
industry and stock market since the initiation of financial liberalisation in the 1990s, 
which contributed to the entry of foreign banks and to the emergence of private banks 
in the national financial market. Another motivation is the creation of an Islamic bank 
in Algeria, El-Baraka Bank, which operates according to sharia principles of lending 
and borrowing.
We have endorsed the argument that many barriers to domestic and foreign 
financial institutions are removed under the free market economy, reflecting the 
phenomenon of globalisation. The restructuring of the national banking sector has 
accelerated the interaction of supply and demand for financial products among the 
users of the financial system. Banks become willing to diversify their portfolios and 
to benefit from the economic liberalisation.
This study defines globalisation of financial services as a phenomenon that allows 
market forces to replace administrative mechanisms of financial resources 
mobilisation. 1 The result is a decline in the role of the government and an increase in 
the autonomy of financial institutions. Taking this definition into account, we have 
argued that globalisation of financial services is driven by three major forces: (1) 
financial liberalisation; (2) financial innovations; and (3) the Internet.
The liberalisation of national financial markets dismantles direct governmental 
control on banks' lending and borrowing. This enables foreign banks to compete with 
local banks for a market share. Likewise, financial innovations increase the number 
of financial products that facilitate the penetration of financial markets such as those 
of Algeria. New financial instruments are used in meeting the demand of domestic 
and foreign investors, hi addition, the Internet has dramatically broadened banking 
businesses in the past decade. Many banks provide their services through the Internet
1 There is no single definition that explains exclusively the phenomenon of globalisation. Gurley and 
Shaw (1960) noted that changes occur in the financial sector when new institutions, products or 
markets emerge. Anneart (1999) stressed that globalisation of financial markets has mainly been 
caused by technological advances, by financial liberalisation and by institutionalisation. Walter and 
Smith (1999) indicated that banking performance appears highly sensitive to globalisation; this makes 
financial markets unreliable, thanks to the many financial institutions involved in them. Masson (2001) 
pointed out that globalisation reflects an increase in the mobility of capitals, trade, individuals and 
information. He also noted that advances in information technology and economic stability facilitate 
the process of globalisation.
to achieve economies of scale and scope. Therefore, it is believed that financial 
liberalisation, financial innovations and the Internet are the main cause of 
globalisation of financial services in Algeria.
We are aware of previous studies on the Algerian financial markets, such as those 
of Jbili et al (1997) and Nashashibi et al (1998). In their study, they argued that the 
slow economic growth in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia was due to poor mobilisation 
of financial resources (Jbili et al, 1997). Before the financial reforms, banks' funds 
were mainly used to finance government expenditures and state-owned enterprises. 
The amount of credit that went to the private sector was very small because of 
preferential lending rates and restrictions imposed on banking activities. Banking 
competition was also limited because of the restrictions on foreign banking entry, 
high specialisation and controls on capital account.
Mckinnon and Shaw (1973) noted that the order of economic liberalisation is a 
means to improve the mobilisation of financial resources because funds are used to 
finance high yield investments, and this contributes to a decline in the cost of 
borrowings. Financial liberalisation also results in an increase in the number of 
savings instruments and a decline in the risk of holding financial assets due to a rise 
in market liquidity.
Negative real interest rates and excessive regulations caused a sharp decline in 
savings and investment rates. Therefore, financial reforms were introduced to set up a 
market-based financial system. This was achieved by removing constraints on 
banking lending and borrowing, trade liberalisation and privatisation. Algeria's state- 
owned banks enjoyed a thirty-year banking monopoly, during which time the 
government forbade competition from foreign or private banks, but this changed with
the liberalisation of the national financial market. Facing competition from Algerian 
private banks and foreign banks, state-owned banks have had to adopt new lending 
policies, develop their information technologies, and improve the speed and the 
quality of their services to boost confidence with their clients. The growing network 
of emerged banks forces state-owned banks to improve their management and to 
develop new financial products. This study analyses the changes in banking activities, 
organisations and personnel during and after the financial liberalisation. It also 
examines the performance of the Algiers Stock Exchange, which is part of the 
financial liberalisation programme initiated by the Algerian government in the 1990s. 
Non-banking financial institutions are excluded as they are underdeveloped and 
because they are undersized compared with banking institutions.2
The research uses a single country case study (Algeria) because of its unique 
approach in liberalising its financial market. "Clearly, there are risks in making 
generalisations about the growth performance of the region (Middle East and North 
Africa) as a whole because each of the 24 economies has had its own experience, 
which in some ways remains unique" (Abed and Davoodi, 2003: 6). Also, at 
institutional level, a report entitled "The Emperor Has No Growth", produced by a 
centre for Economic Policy Research claimed that implementing universal rules for 
capital flows and government reforms is a mistake (Weisbrot, Naiman and Kim, 
2000).
2 Algeria has four national insurance companies: (1) Societe Algerienne d'Assurance; (2) Compagnie 
Algerienne d'Assurance et de Reassurance; (3) Compagnie Centrale de Reassurance and (4) 
Compagnie Algerienne des Assurances Transport. Societe Algerienne d'Assurance insures non- 
industrial activities; Compagnie Algerienne des Assurance et de Reassurance concentrates on 
industrial risk insurance coverage; Compagnie Centrale de Reassurance specialises in reassurance and 
foreign risk coverage; and Compagnie Algerinne des Assurances de Transport holds an exclusive 
monopoly on maritime, aerial and land insurance (Benhalima, 1998).
As in Armijo (1999), it is expected that financial liberalisation would reduce the 
role of the state in managing savings and investments. 3 Researchers anticipate that as 
the government withdraws from the financial sector and as foreign players participate 
in the formerly closed national market, competition among different categories of 
banks will improve the quality of services offered to their customers. 4 In particular, 
new private banks and reputable foreign banks will pressurise state-owned banks to 
increase the range of their services. Researchers also predict that the stock exchange 
will eventually play a major role in promoting savings and investments.
Before the financial liberalisation, banks were unable to monitor their borrowers 
or prevent them from funding poor investments (Thakor, 1998). In Algeria, state- 
owned banks accumulated a large amount of non-performing loans, which weakened 
their portfolios significantly. Worse still, loss-making state-owned enterprises became 
unable to service their debts and many of them went bankrupt. However, researchers 
expect that recapitalising state-owned banks and privatising state-owned enterprises 
will enhance their performance and promote their efficiency (McKinnon, 1993). Our 
study gives a detailed analysis of micro- and macro-level factors that affect banking 
performance in Algeria. In this study we argue that globalisation of financial services 
improves banking performance, which is measured using three benchmarks: (1) 
competition; (2) profitability; and (3) efficiency.
Financial liberalisation is the most important factor behind the rise of globalisation 
of financial services in Algeria, for four main reasons. First, it removed many
3 "In a globalized world, traditional territorial borders have become so porous that individual 
governments cannot take actions to regulate businesses, especially those relating to banking and 
finance" (Arnold and Sikka, 2001: 476).
4 In our sample, we divided banks into two categories: interest and non-interest banks. We classified 
banks according to their ownership and their mode of financing.
regulatory obstacles towards foreign banking entry. Second, it reduced the 
government's role in the banking sector through the elimination of various obstacles 
on state-owned banks' lending and borrowing. Third, it contributed to the emergence 
of new private banks. Four, it facilitated capital movements and allowed local banks 
to operate on both domestic and international levels.
How a country emerges into the global market depends on its distinctive 
economic, social, cultural and geographic features. In Algeria, oil exports remain the 
main source of government revenue, at about a quarter of GDP. 5 Foreign debts have 
declined from USD33.421 billion in 1996 to USD28.014 billion in 1999 (Callier, 
Abdallah and Joly, 2001). 6 In 1999, the Algerian population reached 30 million and 
the reported unemployment rate was 29.2 per cent (Callier, Abdallah and Joly, 
2001). 7 Culturally, Western lifestyles greatly influence Algerians' behaviour, notably 
in urban areas (Encyclopaedia of the Orient Online, 2003). Geographically, Algeria is 
the gateway between Europe, Africa and the Arabic world (Arab Banking 
Corporation Annual Report, 1999). Although political risks during the 1990s caused a 
decline in foreign direct investments, the government has since embarked upon a 
programme of political and economic reform, (including economic liberalisation with 
the guidance from the International Monetary Fund), to attract foreign capital and to 
improve the social environment (Nashashibi et al, 1998). Results have been positive, 
especially in the banking sector, where many new private and foreign players have 
entered the market.
5 Industry is the largest economic sector, at 39 per cent, followed by transport at 21 per cent and 
housing at 20 per cent. The service industry accounts for only 9 per cent (Callier, Abdallah and Joly,
2001).
6 The debt services increased from 30.3 per cent of exports in 1997 to 39.5 per cent in 1999.
This chapter has three sections. The first section examined the background and 
motivation to the study. The concept of globalisation is defined in the context of 
financial liberalisation and advances in information technology. The second section 
explains the study's rationale. The final section identifies the study's implications.
In this study, we argue that globalisation has changed the banking industry both
o
structurally and technologically. Policy makers no longer entirely determine the 
shape of the banking industry; financial deregulation has removed inhibiting 
obstacles to free trade; and information technology, having accelerated the speed of 
economic integration, continues to impact the structure and activity of financial 
institutions. So sweeping are these changes that researchers have found it difficult to 
fully comprehend them.
Before the financial reforms, the state had entire control of what is called 
'strategic' sectors, which were receiving generous subsidisation. Preferential lending 
rates and excessive control on commerce and foreign exchange were also the norm 
before the reforms. This made the public sector grow at a faster rate than the private 
sector. State-owned enterprises were forced to achieve a given level of outputs to 
receive financial support from the government. The tools used by authorities to 
reduce the effects of open inflation were price control, subsidisation and foreign 
exchange control.
7 50 per cent of the population are under 20 years old and the growth rate is 2.1 per cent.
8 "For economists, the global economy has emerged from business decisions and strategies" (Filipovic, 
1997:2).
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Administrative interest rates and large intervention by the government in credit 
allocation were typically used to ensure the stability of the financial system. Preferred 
interest rates and direct credit were applied to make funds available to priority 
sectors. Direct credit and banking refinancing were also adopted by the central bank 
because of the absence of a money market. The result is high segmentation within the 
banking industry and very limited competition between the state-owned banks.
The role of the financial sector was to collect public savings at low cost and to use 
the funds raised in financing government expenditure and projects by state-owned 
enterprises. The bond and equity market were non-existent and a development bank 
was created to meet the financial needs of medium- and long-term investments.
After the introduction of financial liberalisation in the 1990s, Algerian banking 
regulations have changed in three main ways. First, private and foreign players have 
been allowed to enter the national financial market. Second, state-owned banks have 
gained extensive operational autonomy since the initiation of financial liberalisation. 
Third, new financial products have emerged in the domestic market immediately after 
the entry of foreign banks and the set up of private banks. This study examines how 
these factors have affected the structure of each banking group: (1) state-owned 
banks; (2) foreign banks; (3) private banks; and (4) the Islamic bank.
Eliminating economic, social, political and technological obstacles has allowed 
foreign banks to set up and operate in Algeria. 9 These trends have both positive and 
negative implications: "going global" has helped banks diversify their portfolios and 
increase their market share, but the entry of foreign players into the national financial 
market has also raised fears about the future of local banks. Because of this,
8
policymakers have introduced structural and institutional reforms to improve the 
financial position of state-owned banks. This research will examine the three most 
important parts of financial liberalisation: (i) interest rates; (ii) recapitalisation; and 
(iii) privatisation. 10
Scholars agree that foreign banks benefit the financial markets of developing 
countries (Bonin and Leven, 1996). 11 The advantages they bring include capital, 
experience, skills and advanced management. By providing innovative products, 
encouraging consolidation, and developing services, foreign banks strengthen the 
local financial market and motivate local banks to become more healthy institutions. 
In addition, foreign banks transfer knowledge and technology to the host country, 
which helps cut the costs of conducting financial transactions. However, the 
competitive advantage of foreign banks over local banks can cause market instability 
because depositors and borrowers move to foreign banks (Knight, 1998). Local banks 
often need a long time to improve their financial conditions; this is due to 
management problems and risks associated with their financial instruments. 12
The impact of structural reforms and fiscal sustainability on the process of reforms 
is addressed in this study. Stable macroeconomic conditions encourage policymakers 
to reform the financial sector. Sustainable fiscal balances and low inflation rates are 
mechanisms to avoid negative real interest rates and to reduce the risk of holding
9 A thorough analysis on the characteristics of global financial markets is presented in Chapter 2.
10 McKinnon (1973) pointed out that privatisation is one of the major reasons for the breakdown in 
financial restructuring. Many scholars, such as Bonin and Leven (1996) and Doukas, Murinde and 
Wihlborg (1998) endorse this argument.
11 See for instance, Abarbanell and Bonin (1997), Bonin and Leven (1996) and Fink et al (1998).
12 Azzam (1999) argued that local banks can become stronger through consolidation or mergers. 
Consolidations reduce operating costs and therefore improve organisational efficiency.
financial assets. The study examines the relationship between macroeconomic 
variables and the process of financial reforms.
This study also considers the impact of globalisation on the performance of the 
non-interest bank (El-Baraka Bank) as it forms part of the banking sector in 
Algeria. 13 Under the rules of Islamic finance, banks cannot pay interest on deposits; 
this is different to conventional banking practice, in which banks use interest rates to 
attract savings and to manage their funds. However, the ultimate objective of both 
interest and non-interest banks is to increase societal wealth. Globalisation allows 
non-interest banks to improve their business and to penetrate financial markets such 
those of Algeria. 14
  Chapter 2 provides a literature review, presenting influential papers that explore 
how globalisation of financial services has changed the structure of the banking 
industry. Topics covered include financial liberalisation, financial innovation and 
the Internet. This chapter also incorporates scholarly analyses of non-interest 
banks lending and borrowing mechanisms.
  Chapter 3 traces the history of Algeria's financial system from independence to 
the present day, comparing the organisation of the Algerian banking system 
before and after financial liberalisation. We pay special attention to the past
13 We divided banks into interest and non-interest types to compare the two banking models. We 
explain the characteristics of non-interest banks in detail in Chapter 4.
14 In the past decade many non-interest banks opened representatives and subsidiaries in large financial 
centres such as London, New York and Frankfurt.
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decade. This chapter covers all measures implemented by the Algerian 
government to liberalise the national financial market. 
• Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of the two prevalent modes of Algerian 
banking, namely interest and non-interest. We also discuss the effects of 
globalisation of financial services on their profitability, and examine the 
competition between the two banking models. 
• Chapter 5 deals with the research methodology. It discusses the qualitative and 
quantitative methods used in this study as well as research limitations. Problems 
encountered during the research field and in gathering primary data are also 
presented in this chapter. 
• Chapter 6 is the core part of the study. It examines how each banking category 
has responded to financial liberalisation and to the emergence of new financial 
products. The correlation between the macroeconomic framework and the process 
of reforms is discussed, and the role of the Internet in the development of the 
national market is analysed. Also, the impact of financial reforms on banking 
competition and profitability is discussed. Finally, the performance of the Algiers 
Stock Exchange is assessed as part of the financialliberalisation process. 
• Chapter 7 addresses the study's concluding remarks and policy recommendations. 
First, it states the applications of the study to the Algerian banking industry and 
stock exchange. Second, it shows what is learned from this study. Finally, it 
identifies proposals for further research. 
11 
This study makes a contribution to the literature on the banking industry and stock 
market developments in Algeria. Previous studies, such as those of Jbili et al (1997) 
pre-dated the opening of the Algiers Stock Exchange for trading in 1999. Besides, 
those studies were on a group of selected countries, such as the Maghreb region. 15 In 
general, little attention has been paid to countries such as Algeria, perhaps because of 
the lack of data or the high political risk involved in conducting studies there during 
the 1990s (banks' senior managers, 2002). Given this lack of attention, this study 
offers an opportunity to highlight the changes that have occurred in the Algerian 
financial market since the initiation of financial liberalisation in 1990.
Previous studies also hesitated to address the issue of Islamic banking in Algeria. 
Therefore, this study takes the opportunity to examine the simultaneous effects of 
globalisation of financial services on conventional and Islamic banks, in terms of 
competition and profitability. The results show how conventional and Islamic banks 
are performing to increase their market share and to boost their profitability. This 
includes an examination of their mode of receiving funds and financing in Chapter 4.
In this study we first ask what are the main forces that drive the globalisation of 
financial services in Algeria? Second, we ask what are the problems encountered by 
interest and non-interest banks during the transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market-oriented one. Third, we ask what measures could improve the 
Algerian banking industry and stock market performance. Fourth, and most
15 There are three countries that form the Maghreb region: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.
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importantly, we ask how banks could survive the pressure of globalisation of 
financial services.
The findings achieved in this research can be used by policymakers as guidance 
for further financial reforms in Algeria and by banks to improve their performance. 
The Algerian financial market is considered to be in transition because Algeria, 
formerly a socialist country that kept all banks under state ownership, has been 
engaged since 1990 on a programme of financial liberalisation. In a modern 
economy, it is also a disadvantage to isolate domestic financial markets from foreign 
ones. Finally, foreign banks are concerned with developments in Algeria, as a place 
to diversify their portfolios and to increase their market share.
The next chapter explores the different schools of thought on globalisation and its 
implications for the financial markets of the former socialist countries. It includes 
reference to the most influential papers on financial liberalisation, financial 
innovations, the Internet and the non-interest banking model, and examines how 
globalisation of financial services impact the banking industries of the former 
socialist countries in terms of competition and profitability.
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This chapter examines globalisation of financial services from various scholars' 
points of view, reviewing papers on a topic-by-topic basis. The benchmark used for 
the selection of author is the scope of their studies. We analyse the characteristics of 
a financial system in a centrally planned economy, then study the changes that 
occurred in the structure of non-interest and interest banks caused by differences 
between the two banking models. We synthesise the views of these scholars to 
produce a coherent overall picture.
In the former socialist countries, the government owned all financial institutions 
and did not allow private ownership of banks. Nationalisation and rigorous control of 
domestic banking operations made the socialist banking sector highly centralised 
(Shaw, 1973). These monopoly practices also restricted the integration of financial 
markets. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, almost all socialist countries introduced 
financial liberalisation in order to open their financial sector to private and foreign 
ownership. Programmes of financial liberalisation dismantled the barriers that 
previously inhibited local and foreign financial institutions (Bonin and Wachtel, 
1999), producing increased numbers of private and foreign bank branches,
representatives and subsidiaries. As these programmes went into effect, 
governmental intervention in the financial sector decreased dramatically.
Banks use innovative financial products to acquire new market share locally and 
internationally (Harrington, 1992). Three factors enable banks to introduce new 
financial instruments: technology, money and the institutions' internal organisation. 
Silber (1975) noted that money is the primary financial instrument used by banks in 
conducting their daily transactions. Money is also used as a means to create other 
financial products. Financial innovation produces products that may be traded 
internally and across international frontiers, and demand for the new instruments 
assists the process of globalisation. New products also enable banks to lower their 
running costs (Silber, 1975: 2). 16
The Internet provides both bankers and consumers of financial services with 
information about banking services. Banks now offer almost all their services 
through the Internet, allowing customers to make balance inquiries, to pay bills, to 
transfer money between accounts, and more (Jun and Cai, 2001). Internet banking 
has been growing rapidly in recent years, notably in developed countries, where it 
has had enormous influence on banking operations and personnel (Hughes and 
Stone, 2002). Analysts predict that e-banking will continue to grow and that this 
growth will drive banks to perform in a more global network (Oxford Analytical 
Citibank, 1999).
Financial liberalisation, financial innovations, and the Internet permit interest 
banks to compete in host countries' financial markets and non-interest banks may 
now also enter European and American markets. The number of foreign banks
16 On financial innovations see: Copelman (1996) Mullineux (1996) and Quian and Rose (1997)
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offering Islamic financial products has also increased dramatically. Because Islamic 
and conventional banking models use different financial techniques and products, 
analysts anticipate competition between interest and non-interest banks (El-Ashker, 
1987). This competition will add new products to the financial market, products that 
will affect banks' balance sheets and ultimately market behaviour. Non-interest 
banks have attempted to modernise their operations by introducing new instruments 
that meet sharia rules. They have also tried to convert Western financial instruments, 
such as zero coupon bonds, into Islamic instruments by eliminating interest rates and 
by keeping the bond's nominal value. 17
Islamic banks account for less than one per cent of worldwide assets. Their 
capacity to penetrate financial markets is limited because of their low capital, and the 
small number of non-interest banks (176 worldwide) is insufficient to meet the 
financial needs of more than one billion Muslims. However, researchers anticipate 
that the removal of regulatory constraints on non-interest banks entry into Western 
financial markets will help them expand in coming years (Fox, 1996).
The non-interest banking model is based on sharia law, in which profit- and risk- 
sharing are the key concepts of the financial system (Warde, 2000). In the interest 
banking model, by contrast, banks aim to maximise their shareholders' value by 
investing in creditworthy projects (Al-Omer and Abdel-Hak, 1996). Some of the few 
financial products that fit with sharia rules are musharaka (partnership/joint- 
venture), istisna (manufacturing contract) and mudaraba (profit and loss sharing).
17 Zero coupon bonds are bonds in which there is no interest payment during the life of the bonds. 
Investors purchase zero coupon bonds at a deep discount from their face value that is the value of a 
bond at the date of maturity. When the bond becomes due, investors receive their initial investment 
plus accumulated interest. The issuers may still have to pay interest to local income tax, as in the 
USA. But, usually zero coupon bonds are exempted from tax. In almost circumstances the maturity of 
zero coupon bonds exceeds ten years and their price tends to fluctuate in the secondary market.
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Most securities are not acceptable because they involve payment or collection of 
interest (Parigi, 1989). Another difference between the two banking models is that 
non-interest banks may in certain circumstances work to satisfy social needs, but 
interest banks operate only to make profit (Warde, 2000).
Scholars offer different interpretations of globalisation's impact on financial 
markets of countries in transition. Their views are influenced by many factors such 
as their educational background and the sample chosen for their studies. This 
literature review tries to cover the most influential papers.
In developed countries, the process of financial liberalisation started in the 1960s and 
1970s when banks in the former socialist countries were still under state control 
(Morison, 1999). Not until the financial liberalisation programmes of the 1980s and 
1990s did those countries develop market-oriented banking systems.
Two factors illustrate financial market concentration in a centrally planned 
economy. First, the government generally ensured that a few banks hold the majority 
of financial assets. Second, the government nationalised existing foreign financial 
institutions and implemented regulations to prevent foreign competitors from 
entering the national financial market (Knight, 1998: 14).
Consider some weaknesses of the socialist banking model. Centrally planned 
economic regimes had no capital markets, which meant that governments could not 
issue sizeable bonds to the public. The banking system was also weakened by ceiling 
interest rate placed on deposits and loans, and by lack of competition from foreign
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financial institutions and from the private sector. McKinnon (1993) noted that to 
improve the banking sector and to prevent credit from going to non-creditworthy 
enterprises, governments should stop using monetary instruments to draw money 
from local banks. The government should continue this practice until it has 
eliminated all non-performing loans. "Starting off with a highly centralised, but 
"passive" state-owned banking system, the socialist economies must move 
vigorously at the outset of liberalization to harden the system of money and credit" 
(McKinnon, 1993: 6).
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) stated that capital control and high reserve 
requirements are the main cause of financial depression in less developed countries. 
Therefore, it is necessary for those countries to remove all those obstacles, to 
eliminate all restrictions on capital inflow and outflow, and to open the domestic 
market to foreign investors.
Administrated interest rates and bad debts have negatively affected state-owned 
banks' profitability and efficiency (McKinnon, 1993: 44). McKinnon stressed that 
interest rates need to be positive on both loans and deposits, and emphasised that 
banks should promote payment mechanisms to encourage savings and foster banking 
assets. 18
In the former socialist countries, interest income could not cover interest expenses 
plus administrative charges. 19 Despite the effects of interest rate regulation, bank 
managers never requested different financial rules because volatile interest rates
18 Price-level volatility usually contributes to unstable interest rates and exchange rates, which leads to 
increased borrowing and lending risks by deposit-taking banks.
19 Banks should put an end to the credit to the enterprises that do not pay loans and their interest in 
their maturity date. The default rate on exorbitant loans can be substantial (McKinnon, 1973: 74).
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would have negatively affected banking competition and earnings (McKinnon, 
1973).
Centrally planned economies also saw poor mobilisation of financial resources 
(Shaw, 1973). Governments used bank funds to finance their expenditures and state- 
owned banks were obliged to hold government securities. The result was a high unit 
cost of state-owned banks' financial assets, a cost exacerbated by the difference 
between the lending rate and the borrowing rate. Large-scale government 
intervention in the financial sector ultimately caused a scarcity of capital, an effect 
contradictory to the financial authorities' putative objective  i.e. providing capitals 
for investments (Shaw, 1973: 88-9).
Long-term direct finance was non-existent in almost all former socialist 
countries, which instead financed government projects through the treasury (Shaw, 
1973). Some countries had stock exchanges, but their operations were limited to 
issuing securities by the government and by foreign trade corporations.20 Long-term 
securities were also hampered by complex accounting and financial legislation.
Mismanaged investments also contributed to the socialist era's poor financial 
record. Most bank-financed projects were not profitable, meaning that loans were not 
repaid on time (if at all). Moreover, the scarcity of capital encouraged banks to 
restrict their lending. Shaw stresses that financial depressions discouraged financial 
liberalisation because such situations give more monopoly power to national banks 
(Shaw, 1973: 92).
20 In Algeria the stock exchange was absent and state banks were the dominant in the financial sector.
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Capital and inter-bank markets were absent in all former centrally planned 
economies, and non-financial institutions were not allowed to hold government 
bonds or to trade private firms' shares. All of these factors caused a misallocation of 
domestic financial resources.
Socialism's financial authorities seemingly remained convinced that high interest 
rates, capital scarcity, direct control on investments, and subsidised government 
projects could ensure national financial success (Shaw, 1973). However, bad 
economic and social conditions adversely affected savings, investments, and growth; 
the ceiling interest rate on loans and deposits made return on financial assets for 
state-owned banks negative; and governmental intervention weakened the financial 
sector. "Effective low ceiling on real loan rates intensify risk aversion and liquidity 
preference on the part of intermediaries" (Shaw, 1973: 86).
Governments used bank deposits to finance specific activities, then protected 
those activities with subsidies. Furthermore, poor credit decisions negatively affected 
banks' portfolios (McKinnon, 1973: 69). The logic of liberalisation should prevent 
such self-finance and allow banks to fund only profitable investments.
Limitations on lending, consumers' risk-averse preferences, ceiling interest rates 
and high banking charges seriously impeded competition in the socialist banking 
sector. The sector did not achieve economies of scale and scope due to the absence of 
competition among state-owned banks, and no mechanisms existed to determine the 
lending costs and risk associated with investments. "In the absence of a free market, 
where credit would have been rationed by price - the price reflecting the cost of 
funds and the risk of loss - credit was largely rationed by perceived quality" 
(Morison, 1999: 38).
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The problems encountered during the centrally planned economy urged financial 
authorities to introduce the process of financial liberalisation. Abiad and Mody 
(2003) constructed an index for financial liberalisation. The index was formed using 
six indicators: (1) directed credit/reserve requirements; (2) interest rate controls; (3) 
entry barriers and/or lack of pro-competition policies; (4) restrictive operational 
regulations and/or lack of prudent regulation; (5) the degree of privatisation in the 
financial sector; and (6) the degree of controls on international financial transactions. 
They used data of thirty-five countries, from 1973 to 1996. Countries were classified 
into four groups: fully repressed; partly repressed; largely liberalised; and fully 
liberalised. Following their analyses, they concluded that countries supporting 
reforms are benefiting more than those who oppose them. Initial reforms also make 
further reforms essential to achieve government goals of financial liberalisation. 
Other factors influencing the decision makers to introduce further reforms are: the 
sequence of reforms in the neighbouring countries; the International Monetary Fund 
programme of financial liberalisation; trade openness; balance of payment deficit; 
and the decline in interest rates.
Drazen and Easterly (2001) found that hyperinflation delays the progress of 
financial liberalisation and makes policy-makers reluctant to produce a coherent 
agenda of reforms. Hyperinflation causes microeconomic imbalances such as decline 
in the value of banks assets. Rajan and Zinglas (2002) noted that trade openness and 
foreign capital movements are the two main driving forces of financial reforms.
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Helleiner (1999) emphasised five aspects of financial liberalisation. First, 
financial reforms are inevitable in countries where non-performing loans account for 
a large proportion of bank credit. Second, financial liberalisation must be 
implemented gradually. Third, financial reforms must abolish direct credit and 
ceiling interest rates. Fourth, financial liberalisation requires macroeconomic 
stability. Fifth, reforms should inject liquidity into national banks to alleviate the 
burden of non-performing assets.
Reformers should set up a time-frame for financial liberalisation, taking into 
account the degree to which government regulation has inhibited banking networks' 
growth, and examining how banks' capital adequacy, assets, and liabilities have 
fluctuated over time. Banks also require effective internal management and attentive 
external supervision for a successful transition to a free-market environment 
(Helleiner, 1999).
Financial liberalisation results in a market-based system where the government 
exercises only modest control over the financial sector. Depending on the national 
financial system's features, financial authorities can enact financial liberalisation 
programmes gradually or very quickly. Most countries have preferred a step-by-step 
approach to financial liberalisation (Oxelheim, 1995: 28), which is usually more 
successful than introducing reforms overnight (McKinnon, 1993: 4).
Oxelheim (1995) divided financial liberalisation to two categories, internal and 
external. Internal financial liberalisation necessitates removing four factors: 1) 
control over local financial institutions' activities; 2) interest ceilings on deposits and 
credit; 3) government intervention in the financial sector; and 4) taxes on financial 
institutions. External financial liberalisation focuses on eliminating exchange rates
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and capital control, removing restrictions on cross-border financial operations, and 
abolishing multiple exchange rates and taxes on foreign financial transactions.
Pill and Pradhan (1995) claimed that financial liberalisation requires a non- 
inflationary environment. Many countries have found that conducting programmes of 
liberalisation in inflationary economies has negative effects on the banking industry 
(Pill and Pradhan, 1995). In fact, banks' assets decline steadily during the process of 
liberalisation in hyperinflationary countries.
Financial liberalisation has five common factors: abolishing foreign exchange 
control; eliminating credit control; opening domestic financial markets to foreign 
participation; dissolving barriers inhibiting local financial institutions; and 
liberalising money and capital markets. All these courses of action allow banks to 
transfer funds across frontiers and to establish niches in domestic and foreign 
markets.
Jbili et al (1997) assessed the sequence of financial sector reforms in the three 
Maghreb countries: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. They stressed that non-financial 
variables, such as those of structural reforms and fiscal policies affects savings, 
investments and growth. This argument is based on a study by Gurley and Shaw 
(1960), in which they pointed out that economic development is a means to increase 
the availability of capitals in the financial sector.
High inflation rate and fiscal imbalances make economic growth less sensitive to 
financial sector reforms. A stable macroeconomic environment helps authorities to 
reform the financial sector with great precaution. Sustainable fiscal balances and low 
inflation rates are tools to avoid negative real interest rates, to make financial 
variables more informative and to reduce the risk involved in holding financial
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assets. Jbili et al (1997) said that financial sector reform needed to be implemented 
even if the macroeconomic conditions were not in favour of the reforms as this may 
improve economic stability within the long-term.
Macroeconomic imbalances in the 1980s forced all the three Maghreb countries to 
initiate financial sector reforms (Jbili et al, 1997). Financial authorities introduced 
price controls and posed restrictions on trade and payments to reduce the effects 
caused by fiscal and current account deficit. This was followed by structural reforms 
under the support of the International Monetary Fund. However, monetary 
imbalances were not restored because of the large amount of loans extended to 
priority sectors in Tunisia and to monetise fiscal deficits in Algeria and Morocco.
Inflation increased dramatically during the early years of the reforms, but did not 
exceed the annual rate of 15 per cent. Reserves also declined substantially to almost 
a month of imports in Algeria and Tunisia and to a minimum of a week in Morocco 
(Jbili etal, 1997).
Jbili et al (1997) examined the process of financial reforms in Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia from 1970 to 1995. They said that the methods followed in reforming 
the financial sector were similar in the three countries. This included: (1) liberalising 
interest rates; (2) removing direct credit; (3) adopting market-based mechanisms in 
financing the state budget; (4) strengthening the monetary policy; (5) opening new 
markets and launching new financial instruments; (6) reinforcing banking 
supervision and financial rules; (7) boosting banking competition; and (8) 
liberalising capital account. The aims of the reforms were to reduce the role of the 
government in the financial sector, to improve financial resources mobilisation and 
to develop market-based monetary policy instruments. Jbili et al (1997) noted that
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the scope of reforms was less broadened in Algeria than in Morocco and Tunisia, 
where financial authorities were also involved in the structuring of bond and equity 
markets.
The sequence of financial sector reforms had been influenced by issues of 
macroeconomic stabilisation, such as those of fiscal budget (Jbili et al, 1997). In 
Algeria, the substantial amount of fiscal losses generated by state-owned enterprises 
made commercial banks continue to use preferential credit financing. Fiscal losses 
also caused negative effects on the liberalisation of interest rates as well as banking 
competition.
Jbili et al (1997) examined the quantitative side of financial reforms by measuring 
the relationship between financial indicators, which are applicable to the process of 
reforms and to the non-government saving rates. Their aim was to analyse if the 
reforms had positive effects on non-government savings rather than evaluating the 
country saving rate as this was subject to other indicators such as per capita income 
and demographic aspects.
The financial variables included in Jbili et al study are: (1) real interest rate; (2) 
the ratio of M2 over GDP; (3) credit to the non-government sector in per cent of 
GDP; and (4) reserve money to deposits. The financial variables were used as 
indicators of the progress obtained within the financial sector because of the process 
of reforms. They selected three different periods for their investigation: (i) the entire 
period (1970-1995); (ii) before the reforms and (iii) after the reforms. Quantitative 
measures were made before and after the financial reforms to analyse the correlation 
between non-government savings and main financial variables. Dummy variables 
related to non-financial factors such as drought and variables that may affect directly
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non-government savings such as per capita to GDP were also excluded in their 
investigation. Per capital and non-government disposable income were presented 
differently in the regression analyses of Morocco and Tunisia. The regressions found 
by Jbili et al were almost similar to the coefficients of the financial variables. But, 
they emphasised the impact of financial sector reforms on the savings rate without 
the inclusion of other factors, which may have had similar effects.
The lack of data influenced the result and scope of Jbili et al (1997). Data on 
credit to the private sector were not fully available, especially for Algeria. Another 
factor that may cause bias is that banks can be pressurised to meet the financial needs 
of state-owned enterprises. Private enterprises and households savings, which form 
part of the non-government saving rates, are not separated; this can cause problems 
in the quality of the data, because state-owned enterprises savings' trends may differ 
from those of households. For instance, state-owned enterprises savings may decline 
because of the increase in their losses after the rise in real interest rates. On the other 
hand, the increase in real interest rates may escalate household savings because 
incentive effects are superior to those of income effects. Jbili et al (1997) also 
emphasised the difficulties in identifying suitable financial variables for quantitative 
assessment of the progress achieved because of the reforms.
Factors affecting banking performance at the micro-level were also not fully 
discussed in Jbili et al (1997), as the main focus was to assess the sequence of 
reforms on non-government savings rate. They stressed that the volume of 
intermediation, return on savings and the effectiveness of intermediation increased 
after the creation of a market-based financial system. But, they did not examine how 
banks operated after the financial reforms to accelerate their intermediary role
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between savers and borrowers, and also how the entry of foreign banking affected 
the financial markets of the three countries.
The first component of financial liberalisation is the elimination of administrative 
interest rates. Matutes and Vives (2000) and Stiglitz (1994) stated that interest rate 
ceilings help banks avoid destructive competition. In highly competitive conditions, 
high-deposit interest rates increase the cost of capital and lower investments. Low 
interest margins stimulate banks to monitor their borrowers carefully. Researchers 
therefore conclude that ceiling interest rates prevent many constraints on investments 
(Stiglitz, 1994). 21
Sarr (2000) examined the impact of interest margins on the market-oriented 
banking sector. He found that in an open market banks seem to exploit profit 
maximisation to cover their service fees.22 Sarr also argued that banks with large 
deposits could offer attractive lending rates. Economies of scale and non-bank 
services also drive the marginal cost of deposits by reducing banks' lending and 
borrowing rates. He concluded that in a liberalised banking sector, deposits do not 
reflect financial deepening because banks know how interest rate changes affect their 
deposits. Offering higher interest rates on savings accounts increases banks' 
operating expenses and thus reduces their profit margin.
Bandiera et al (2000) used capital account liberalisation, bank ownership, interest 
rates, directed credit, reserve requirements, prudential regulation and deregulation of
21 Interest margin is the spread between the rate charged on loans and the rate paid on deposits 
(Demirgu'9-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998).
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securities markets to form an index for financial liberalisation. The data span from 
1970 to 1994. They noted that the relationship between real interest rate and savings 
is negative and significant in Ghana and Indonesia. The short-term impact of 
financial liberalisation on savings also varies across countries: positive and 
significant in Turkey and Ghana, negative and significant in Korea and Mexico.
Bandiera et al (2000) confirmed the existence of liquidity constraints, but without 
emphasising on the role of financial liberalisation in alleviating them. The results of 
the Euler equation indicated that in most cases the impact of financial liberalisation 
on credit allocation was small. They concluded that real interest rate has no direct 
impact on savings and the implications of financial liberalisation vary across 
countries.
Usually, the liberalisation of interest rates raises costs and lowers profits 
(Humphery and Pulley, 1997). 23 The borrowing rates increase substantially during 
financial liberalisation leading to decline in banks' profit margin. Banks react to 
shifting interest rates by cutting costs (often by reducing the numbers of branches 
and workers), using floating-rate loans,24 raising fees on deposits, and extending 
credit to high-risk borrowers. Banks will also shift costs onto their borrowers and 
may become involved in securities activities as an additional cost-transference 
measure. 25 Banks will also adjust their capital to moderate the effects of interest rate 
liberalisation (Humphery and Pulley, 1997).
22 Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1995) noted that profit maximisation boosts the network 
size, lowering long-term credit rates as a result.
23 In the 1980s, interest rate deregulation increased costs and lowered profits of many USA banks.
24 Global interest rates are measured either on floating or a fixed-rate basis. Under floating interest 
rates and variable future costs, the net present value of loans change slightly. Under fixed interest 
rates and fixed costs, the net present value of loans may raise or decline drastically.
25 Large banks often enjoy high profits because of technological advantages; small banks are more 
likely to see higher profits as a direct result of improved business conditions.
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Oxelheim (1995) noted that banks yield a small amount of earnings in markets 
with a low interest rate margin. The margin on borrowers' loans fall because of 
increased liquidity and reduced credit rationing. In a free market economy, most 
investors pay lower lending rates and depositors receive higher interest rates on their 
savings than they would in a centrally planned economy (Oxelheim, 1995).
Hanohan (2003) examined the effects of financial liberalisation on money market 
and bank interest rates (wholesale rates). He found that the process of liberalisation 
has resulted in an increase in the real and nominal interest rates. Banks spread also 
escalates as financial liberalisation progresses. The removal of interest rates controls 
makes rates dependable on market forces, which force deposit rates downwards and 
lending rates upwards. Theoretically, real interest rates reflect nominal interest rates 
adjusted by inflation. However, in practice, there are other factors that influence real 
interest rates including the followings: propensity to save, marginal efficiency of 
capital, level of risk and country monetary policy.
Jbili et al (1997) noted that the adoption of step-by-step interest rate liberalisation 
in the aftermath of high administrative interest rates was vital for the success of 
financial reforms in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In 1990, the Algerian financial 
authorities placed similar lending and borrowing rates on the public and private 
sectors, and their commercial papers were given the same standards of refinancing. 
Four years later, limits on banking spread were in place instead of ceilings on 
lending rates. In December 1995, limits on banking spreads were eliminated. Real 
interest rates remained negative until 1995 due to a sharp increase in inflation after 
the liberalisation of price controls. In Morocco, authorities started by raising 
administrative interest rates and eliminating the subsidisation of interest rates to
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priority industries. Liberalisation of interest rates was completed in the first instance. 
Limits on banking spread were in place instead of ceilings on lending rates. 
Exclusion was given to credit extended to exports and to small- or medium-size 
enterprises. The limits imposed on lending and deposit rates were also removed. 
Exceptions were made for small savings and sight deposits.
Unlike Morocco, Tunisia did not liberalise lending rates to priority sectors in the 
early part of its financial liberalisation (Jbili et at, 1997). Instead, term deposits rates 
of less than three months were liberalised and special saving accounts rates were 
linked to the money market rate of the previous month. Spread for lending rates was 
given up to 3 per cent points above the money market rate (except for credit related 
to priority sectors). In the second stage, preferential rates for priority sectors were 
raised, but exceptions were made for the agricultural sector, with just a modest 
increase. Lending rates for priority sectors were liberalised, albeit limits on deposit 
rates were fixed at two per cent on sight deposits and two per cent above the money 
market rate for savings deposits.
Khan and Sunhadji (2000) emphasised that the availability of capital would not 
necessarily lead to high economic growth. The increase in real interest rates, which 
accelerates household savings, can lead to over-borrowing and a decline in the 
quality of credit. Brock and Rojas-Snarez (2000) also found evidence that spreads in 
Latin America do not fulfil international standards.
Rock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) found evidence of a positive relationship between 
spreads and non-financial costs such as wages. Another factor with direct impact on 
spreads is provision for bad debts. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) said that the 
increase in the capital used by banks as a precaution from risky loans results in high
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spreads. The holding of extra capital would make banks pay more taxes. Meeting the 
expected capital ratios would also force banks widen the spread between the lending 
and the deposit rate. Finally, Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) argued that the absence 
of accounting standards and unsuitable risky asset classification makes the capital to 
asset ratio have little influence on spreads.
Alleviating constraints on banking lending is the second criterion used in assessing 
the process of financial liberalisation. Mishkin (2001) noted that financial 
liberalisation improves accountability and transparency within the banking sector 
while removing liquidity barriers in financial markets. Bekaet, Harvey and Lundblad 
(2001) used panel and aggregate data analyses to examine the impact of financial 
liberalisation on banks' borrowing in Turkey. They found a one per cent increase in 
output growth rates of domestic banks after liberalisation of financial markets. In 
their conclusion they emphasised a sound regulatory and supervisory system, using 
international reporting standards, to benefit fully from the process of economic 
liberalisation. Johnson (2000) pointed out that it is essential for banks to have 
adequate information about factors such as consumer behaviour and market risk of 
the host country. Foreign banks should also understand the host country's economic 
and political conditions, the size of its local and foreign financial institutions, its 
policies on financial deregulation, its local business culture and its market length.
Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2000) said that alleviating credit controls and 
liberalising interest rates would encourage banks with moral hazard to invest in risky 
projects. The new regulations give more autonomy to those banks to engage in
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various activities and to take high risk. Therefore, they recommended swift 
restructuring of the banking system to avoid an escalation in banks' losses.
Financial liberalisation brings capital into the local financial market, encouraging 
local banks to fund highly risky projects (Sikorski, 1996). This process can continue 
until moral hazard forces banks to cover their losses with discount credit. Financial 
authorities normally use discount rates or reserve requirements to reduce the lending 
rate, but if the discount policy fails, banks will use central bank liquid assets to 
continue lending (Sikorski, 1996: 178-9).
Sundararajan and Balino (1991) stressed that a well-managed banking structure 
avoids concentrating financial power and allows banks to offer competitive lending
*) f\
and borrowing rates. Moreover, Parker (1998) stated that in global financial 
markets, authorities need to separate out control, relationships, market segments and 
protection, and need to strengthen the relationship between financial institutions, 
borrowers and depositors.
Demetriades and Fattouh (1999) argued that financial liberalisation generated 
unproductive credit to countries such as South Korea.27 Local banks used 
international financial markets to finance domestic investments, but incomplete and 
unclear information about the financed projects made this credit highly risky in the 
short-term. Further lending to those projects caused large banking losses and 
ultimately financial shock to the whole system. Unproductive credit occurs in a soft 
budget constraint economy where borrowers and lenders expect high return. Long-
26 In a market economy interest rates movements depend on anticipation of foreign interest rates and 
exchange rates; therefore it is also essential to pay attention to international rates.
27 Unproductive credit means that loans went to unprofitable projects and eventually became non- 
performing loans.
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term changes in economic conditions lead to moral hazard, and increase the number 
of non-performing loans.
Although local banks may use foreign credit to meet the high demand for loans, 
currency devaluation during financial liberalisation can aggravate local investors' 
financial positions, making it difficult for them to service their loans. As a 
consequence, banks' losses escalate. McKinnon and Pill (1998) noted that market 
failure seems to be the norm in countries where credit institutions are not well 
integrated within the domestic financial system. To minimise the possibility of long- 
term financial shock, it is necessary to liberalise the financial sector adequately 
(Demetriades and Fattouh, 1999).
Liberalisation of financial markets enables banks to serve local clients in the host 
country, to penetrate foreign financial markets and to provide new financial services. 
Foreign players compete with local banks and increase their market share through 
investment banking and leasing. Large market coverage also allows foreign banks to 
increase their earnings (Walter, 1988: 102-3).
Davis (1983) pointed out that in the first stage of financial liberalisation, foreign 
banks provide basic financial services such as international trade and foreign 
exchange. The foreign banks' first objective is to meet clients' financial needs at a 
low price, but increased competition and demand for financial products (such as 
syndicate loans) stimulate them to offer a variety of banking solutions.
Other barriers confronting foreign banks include a small number of locations, a 
limited category of consumers with whom foreign banks can deal, business
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constraints, and inadequate linkage to international financial markets. Foreign banks 
prefer to offer their services to large companies, which are based in industrial zones. 
Foreign banks also open few branches in the host country in order to reduce their 
operating expenses (Walter, 1988: 135-6).
Johnson (2000) pointed out that it is essential for banks to have adequate 
information about factors such as consumer behaviour and market risk in the host 
country. Foreign banks should also understand the host country's economic and 
political conditions, the size of its local and foreign financial institutions, its policies 
on financial deregulation, its local business culture, and its market length.
Usually, the number of local banks declines after financial liberalisation because 
domestic banks cannot compete with foreign financial institutions (Oxelheim, 1995: 
28). Most local banks in developing countries use rudimentary technologies, can 
provide only basic financial products, are undercapitalised, and often have poorly 
trained employees. This means that reformers need to strengthen local financial 
institutions before opening developing markets to foreign participation. Coleman 
(1996) noted that local banks need market power to protect their market share 
nationally and internationally. Market power includes high capital, efficient 
management, staff training and experience, and suitable information technology.
Because financial authorities must ensure that local banks can compete with 
foreign banks (Bonin and Wachtel, 1999: 95), the government should inject extra 
liquidity into state-owned banks and eliminate previous credit allocation techniques. 
This helps local banks effectively examine investors' behaviour (Bonin and Wachtel, 
1999:94).
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Usually, local banks are less competitive than foreign banks because of their 
inadequate services, their costly loans, and their inferior deposit interest rates. 
Introducing new products in the host country can be profitable for foreign banks, 
meaning that domestic banks must improve their services to an international level.
Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) discovered that national income 
has no impact on foreign banks' asset share. On the one hand, dissimilarities in assets 
share are due to other factors, such as 'foreign penetration'. On the other hand, the 
overhead/total assets of foreign banks is high in developing countries due to 
information drawback, and low in developed countries because foreign banks have 
substantial wholesale activities (Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998: 7).
In developing countries the net interest margin of foreign banks is higher than 
that of local banks (Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998). The multiplicity 
of financial rules and motives for doing business abroad explain this difference. For 
instance, foreign banks may prefer to engage in wholesale activities or to fund 
particular consumers in the host country. Meanwhile, developing countries place 
some limits on banks' credit for example, countries with high concentration of 
state-owned banks have non-commercial conditions for credit distribution. In 
addition, market inefficiencies and banking scheme deficiencies cause high interest 
margins in developing countries.
Liberalisation of financial markets enables banks to serve local clients in the host 
country, to penetrate foreign financial markets and to provide new financial services. 
Foreign players compete with local banks and increase their market share through 
investment banking and leasing. Large market coverage also allows foreign banks to 
increase their earnings (Walter, 1988: 102-3).
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Geographic and governmental restrictions discourage providers of financial 
services from offering competitive products, forcing banks to offer their clients less 
favourable instruments. Furthermore, banks are obliged to deliver the existing 
financial products instead of introducing new ones. In any case, it is expected that the 
geographic expansion of foreign banks will help local banks to improve the quality 
of their services.
For example, during the early years of financial liberalisation, the Polish 
government restricted foreign banks' entry to allow local banks to develop their 
business (Abarbanell and Bonin, 1997) and to avoid customers leaving local banks to 
take advantage of the foreign banks' better services. However, the newly established 
banks were unable to service the credit needs of large Polish companies. Generally, 
the Polish authorities have concentrated on strengthening local banks through 
recapitalisation, privatisation and consolidation (Abarbanell and Bonin, 1997).
In Hungary, financial authorities opened the market to foreign participation. 
Simultaneously, the government recapitalised state-owned banks to make them more 
attractive to "strategic foreign financial investors" (Bonin and Wachtel, 1999). In the 
Czech Republic, the government opened the market to foreign banks, which 
provided new products to large businesses. This has contributed to a sharp increase 
in the market share of foreign banks in that country. Therefore, authorities are asked 
to strengthen the financial position of state-owned banks before opening the market 
to foreign banks participation to avoid large decline in their market share.
In operating across borders, banks engage in a variety of activities. Walter (1988) 
divided bank services in the host country into four categories: conducting traditional 
international commerce; providing loans and letters of credit to foreign borrowers;
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providing loans to governments and corporations; and carrying out an international 
securities business this includes trading options and swaps in the host country. 28 
Walter stresses the importance of maintaining permanent contact with borrowers, of 
assessing the level of risk in the country, and of evaluating credit sufficiency in each 
type of credit. Because of the risks involved in international lending, banks should 
conduct a thorough technical examination of project financing before advancing 
credit. Walter also noted that banks need good sources of information and a good 
allocation of financial resources to avoid risky financial ventures in the host country.
Engwal et al (2000) pointed out that foreign banks' operation costs tend to be 
higher during their first few years in a new market because foreign banks take a long 
time to understand the host country's financial culture. They have argued that the 
market share of foreign banks increases more in the long term than in the short term. 
Engwal et al also stressed that foreign banks' market share expands more quickly in 
countries with a trade deficit. On the other hand, Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) 
noted that foreign banks' liabilities alter frequently, requiring foreign banks to 
strengthen their relationships with customers in the new markets. Bergstrom, 
Engwall and Wallerstedt (1994) found that foreign banks that have previous clients 
in the host country are more secure than those that started from ground zero.
Varying interest rates across borders allow foreign banks to finance investments 
in developing countries without paying great attention to risk levels in their 
economies. Accordingly, unpredictable financial crises can arise. For example, 
during the South East Asian financial crises, many borrowers found themselves
28 Option-type contracts enable the investor to buy (call option) or sell (put option) a real financial 
item at a certain price called strike and on a certain date. In swap-type contracts the two counterparts 
agree to exchange a real or financial item, determined with reference to the price of say, currencies or 
interest rates, according to pre-determined rules (Heath, 1998).
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unable to repay their outstanding debts and global banks lost huge amount of funds 
as a result (Brimmer, 1998).
Peek and Rosengren (2000) pointed out that foreign banks tend to add branches 
in the host country to benefit from economies of scale when lending to domestic 
investors. The physical presence of foreign banks forces local banks to lend to 
individuals and small and medium enterprises; meanwhile, foreign banks meet the 
financial needs of large enterprises, local or foreign.
They also noted that governments use bank funds to finance particular projects 
according to their yearly economic plan (Peek and Rosengren, 2000). Usually, banks 
that finance those projects pay low taxes on their annual earnings. Therefore, every 
change in a government's financial plans will directly affect foreign banks' lending 
policies in the host country.
Foreign banks offer new management and information technology to local 
firms, enabling them to improve their productivity (Peek and Rosengen, 2000). 
Because most global banks are top-class financial institutions in their home country, 
their reputations and their ability to raise new funds from international financial 
markets can help prevent domestic financial shock (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2000). On 
the other hand, the entry of foreign banks can negatively impact the host country's 
financial sector in two main ways: first, most state-owned banks are less competitive 
than foreign banks; second, financial authorities have less control on the market 
when global banks carry new financial mechanisms into the host country.
Assessing accounting data from banks and macroeconomic data from eighty 
countries for the period 1988-95, Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) 
analysed the size and influence of foreign banks in each financial market. Comparing
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interest margins, taxes paid, overhead expenses, loan loss provisioning and 
profitability, and foreign banks' market share in local markets, they found that 
foreign banks in developing countries have higher interest margins, greater overhead 
expenses and better profitability than local banks. They explain these findings by 
citing the rising market share of foreign banks and the declining cost of financial 
transactions.
Several researchers have emphasised that opening markets to the foreign 
participation increases efficiency, enhances competition and promotes financial 
resource allocations.29 The entry of foreign banks has forced domestic banks to 
modernise their operations and to increase their liquidity (Levine, 1996). Using 
Terrell's study of financial markets, Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) 
found that the countries that admit foreign institutions have lower gross interest 
margins, lower business costs and lower pre-tax profits.
The fourth component of financial liberalisation is banking recapitalisation and 
privatisation. Usually, transitional countries use government securities, such as long- 
term bonds, to eliminate non-performing loans. While foreign financial institutions 
and donor countries funded Poland's securities, the public and the treasury bore the 
cost in Hungary (Bonin and Wachtel, 1999). Proceeds then went to banks to help 
them improve their financial position and avoid moral hazards. To further facilitate 
this process, governments must lower taxes on the earnings of state-owned banks. In 
addition, when selling shares in state-owned banks to the public, the government
29 See for example, Walter (1988), Gelb and Sagari (1990) and Levine (1996)
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must not appropriate the revenue for its own budget. Recapitalisation and 
provisioning of state-owned banks are required to meet new financial requirements 
(Bonin and Wachtel, 1999: 94-6).
Pill and Pradhan (1995) noted that financial liberalisation must remove bad debts 
from bank balance sheets. Banks can make bad lending decisions even after financial 
liberalisation because they may still be incapable of evaluating and allocating their 
credit in a proper manner. Pill and Pradhan (1995) emphasised the need to improve 
management and risk assessment by opening local banks' capital to foreign 
investors.
McKinnon (1993) stated that recapitalisation allows banks to boost their profit 
margin by reducing the amount of non-performing loans. Under the recapitalisation 
programme, state-owned banks replace their non-performing loans with government 
bonds and consequently reduce their accumulated losses. "Indeed, the bad 
(uncollectible) loans of the existing state banks may require a major recapitalization 
of both banks and enterprises before privatization or even decentralization can 
safely take place" (McKinnon, 1993: 7).
Usually, after the completion of banking recapitalisation the government sells the 
assets of state-owned banks to private investors. Abarbanell and Bonin (1997)
^pointed out that the objectives of the bank Slqski privatisation were to improve its 
credit allocation, to develop its information systems, to ameliorate its financial 
services and to increase its brokering activities. The Polish government planned to 
attract foreign investors, to raise new funds to finance the state budget, to enhance 
stock market operations and to encourage enterprise reorganisation. The government
r
undertook four measures to privatise the bank Slqski: it cleaned bad loans from the
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bank's portfolio; it provided training in management skills; it developed the bank's 
information technology; and it worked with the ING to introduce new financial 
products. The authorities faced several barriers to their efforts, including the lack of a 
clear privatisation plan and the fear of foreign banks' influence on local banks. The 
major obstacles for Polish government in the privatisation of bank Slqski were selling 
bank shares in the market and the determination of tender. Ultimately the bank's 
shares were sold to the treasury, to domestic and foreign investors, and to bank 
employees. The bidders were required to provide statements indicating their financial 
position, investment plan, and period over which they would hold shares. It was also 
obligatory to designate the number and the price of shares. Bank management 
improved significantly after privatisation, the bank expanded its network, and bank 
business practices improved. International Nederlanden Group's involvement also 
enhanced the bank's expertise in lending and borrowing (Abarbanell and Bonin, 
1997).
Abarbanell and Bonin (1997) stressed that the Polish government privatised small 
banks before large ones. The banks selected for privatisation were financially 
prudent and had sound management. Auditors analysed banks' portfolios and foreign 
investors' interest in buying their assets to ensure the success of banking 
privatisation.
Kornai (2000) argued that there are two ways to privatisation, gradual (strategy 
A) and quick (strategy B). Under strategy A, the state sells profitable enterprises at 
reasonable price to private or foreign investors, and liquidates loss-making 
enterprises. Under strategy B, the state sells companies at low prices to facilitate a
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rapid transfer to a market economy. Kornai pointed out that in the 1980s most 
countries preferred strategy A.
Bonin and Wachtel (1999) noted that shock-therapy privatisation quickened the 
process of selling state-owned banks assets to private and foreign investors in 
Hungary. Assets of state-owned banks were sold by using special vouchers issued by 
a government agency. They concluded that private ownership has contributed 
positively to the development of the Hungarian banking sector as banks have 
obtained sustainable growth in their assets.
The main objective of financial liberalisation is to increase banking competition and 
profitability. McKinnon (1993) noted that abolishing usury constraints encourages 
moneylenders to extend their credit and hence promotes competition in the 
traditional credit market. Loans need to be available for all classes of borrower and 
the expected rate of return on deposits should be increased to reduce money supply 
in the market.
Brock and Suarez (2000) found that financial liberalisation has contributed to 
decline in banks' spread and profitability in India. The indicators used in explaining 
the scale of intermediation and profitability included the following: operational costs, 
non-performing loans, priority sector lending, type of deposits and investment in 
government securities. The empirical results showed that acceleration in competition 
has lowered the spreads and profitability of the selected banks. The entry of foreign
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banks has lowered industry concentration, which led to a decline in banks' 
intermediation costs and profitability. Another factor that had direct impact on 
banks' performance according to their study is type of ownership. Their final 
assessment suggested that improved efficiency and ability to respond to market 
forces would boost the performance of Indian banks.
Sarr (2000) examined the impact of interest margins on the market-oriented 
banking sector. He found that in open markets, banks seem to exploit profit 
maximisation to cover their service fees. Sarr also argued that banks with large 
deposits could offer attractive lending rates. Economies of scale and non-bank 
services also drive the marginal cost of deposits by reducing banks' lending and 
borrowing rates. He concluded that in a liberalised banking sector, deposits do not 
reflect financial deepening because banks know how interest rate changes affect their 
deposits. Offering higher interest rates on savings accounts increases banks' 
operating expenses and thus reduces their profit margin.
McKinnon (1993) noted that abolishing usury constraints encourages 
moneylenders to extend their credit and hence promotes competition in the 
traditional credit market. Loans need to be available for all classes of borrower and 
the expected rate of return on deposits should be increased to reduce money supply 
in the market.
Historically, competition tends to reduce instability in the banking industry and 
lower market risk helps banks make better lending decisions. Schuler (1992) argued 
that interest rates on deposits and loans are similar in both market-oriented and 
centralised banking systems, but that free-market economies oblige banks to promote 
their services, to offer innovative financial products, and to open new branches. The
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result is a decline in financial transaction costs and an increase in the volume of 
investments (Dowd, 1992: 3-5).
Schuler noted that removing restrictions on banks makes their activities more 
sophisticated. "Invisible-hand process can result in a sophisticated banking system as 
the product of step-by-step evolution whose origin stretch all the way back to barter" 
(Schuler, 1992: 8). However, small banks cannot survive in the new market if their 
capital is low. They may need to consolidate to become competitive and to benefit 
from economies of scale.
To avoid falling bank profits, financial authorities should scale up local banks 
and abandon constraints on new financial products. Financial liberalisation forces 
banks to pay "market rate" to remain competitive, and this increases their costs. Most 
small banks withdraw from the market because they are unable to pay the market 
rate. Cooper (1984) noted that continued competition in the credit market may cut 
costs for consumers, dramatically lowering banks' profits.
Researchers anticipate that globalisation of financial services fosters banking 
sector profitability. Demirgu9-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) used net interest margin, 
after tax return on assets, and after-tax return on equity to measure the profitability of 
their selected banks. They observed that in financial markets where banks have high 
capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, the franchise value30 is low, but lending is high 
compared with banks' total assets. Analysing market concentration (assets of three 
largest banks / total banking assets) and foreign bank entrance (foreign bank assets / 
total bank assets), they found that local banks seem to have higher market 
concentration than foreign banks.
30 Banks become fragile during the financial liberalisation when they achieve low franchise value.
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Demitgu9-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) noted that financial liberalisation lowers 
the profit/return on equity ratio of existing banks. In contrast, the return on assets and 
the net interest margins do not change. Increases in the saving rate are balanced by 
higher lending rates. Liberalisation also increases banking capitalisation and 
decreases liquidity (which adversely impacts profitability), but long-term asset 
allocation remains constant. Foreign banks penetration is greatest in less 
concentrated financial markets because of low bank franchise values. Table 2.1 
shows the impact of financial liberalisation on bank margins, capital, deposit 
allocation, liquidity and profit, during the transition and in the long-term.
Table 2.1: The level of banks' margin, capital, deposit allocation, liquidity and profit 
during the transition and in the long-term
During the transition
In the long-term
Bank margins
High
Stagnant
Capital
High
Stagnant
Deposit 
allocation
High
Stagnant
Liquidity
High
High
Profit
High
Stagnant
Source: Demirgu9-Kunt, and Detragiache (1998)
Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) discovered that foreign banks 
pay lower taxes than local banks in developed countries, but higher taxes than local 
banks in developing countries, where they also have lower provisions for losses. 
Claessens, Demirgiic-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) stated that the host country's 
taxation policy impacts foreign banks' net profit. Another factor that directly affects 
foreign banks' net profit is the cost of capital. They concluded that foreign banks 
earn higher net profit in developing countries than in developed ones.
The relation between overhead/total assets with the net margin/total assets and 
before-tax profits/total assets demonstrates two facts: first, banks attempt to reduce 
their overhead expenses; second, they endeavour to maximise their before-tax
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profits. Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga argue that increased inflation and 
higher real interest rates escalate banks' net margin, before-tax profits and overhead 
costs. The findings of Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) are 
summarised in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: The level of foreign banks' overhead costs, interest margins, tax payment 
and profitability in developing and developed countries
Foreign banks in 
developing countries
Foreign banks in 
developed countries
Overhead costs
High
Low
Interest margins
High
Low
Tax payment
High
Low
Profitability
High
Low
Source: Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga (1998: 7-10)
Profitability in global financial markets is based upon "astute management" on 
both sides of the balance sheet. Assets and liabilities are affected by liquidity risk, 
the allocation of financial services, the stability of the financial system, and high 
leverage ratios in every particular market (Walter, 1988: 35). Therefore, altering 
market features changes the profitability of market players.
The imperfect competitive banking sector responds to high demand for loans by 
decreasing credit and by increasing the interest rate spread. Higher interest rates may 
prevent some borrowers from servicing their debts; meanwhile, depositors may 
invest in other markets and generate a run on the whole banking system. The result is 
a decline in banks' deposits and credit (Knight, 1998: 14).
Knight (1998) stressed five factors that promote competition in the banking 
sector and reduce financial market fragility. First, governments should stop using 
banks' funds to finance their expenditures. Second, authorities should improve the 
foreign exchange market to avoid significant foreign exchange rate fluctuations.
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Third, banks must inform lenders and borrowers about their financial strength. 
Finally, capital has to move freely across borders.
The number of foreign banks may influence competition in the financial sector, 
especially if local banks take steps to protect their market share before admitting 
technologically advantaged foreign banks. In countries with high barriers towards 
foreign entry, the "penetration measure" is nil. Meanwhile, foreign banks are well 
represented in countries with low financial barriers.
Increased competition lowers the cost of financial transactions, which encourages 
banks to take high risks on their assets and to become more innovative. However, 
direct governmental interventions in the financial sector prevent banks from 
exploiting the economies of scale and scope and cause marketplace inefficiency 
(Cooper, 1984: 197).
The substantial number of foreign banks operating in open financial markets has 
contributed to a fall in the price of financial services and therefore to lower profits 
for local banks. Banking competition increases the market share of 'oligopolistic' 
financial institutions. However, authorities can impose restrictions on market 
management, which can prevent new banks from extending their market share 
(Laralde and Tarazi, 1998: 140-1).
Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) concluded that the entry of 
foreign banks increases competition in the national financial market and boosts 
banking profitability. However, this depends on the number and size of foreign banks 
operating in the host country. In markets with many sizeable foreign banks, banking 
competition tends to be high, mostly because foreign banks are involved in large- 
scale banking activities.
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The second objective of financial liberalisation is to improve banking efficiency. 
Shaw (1973) stresses that financial liberalisation adds financial intermediaries 
between savers and investors, increasing investment efficiency and reducing the cost 
of borrowing. Increased savings allow banks to attain economy of scale, which in 
turn allows banks to diversify their portfolios, reduce their costs, and improve their 
operational efficiency. Shaw (1973) used the following equation to explain the 
relationship between savings and banking efficiency:
M / P = F (Y, y, d-7i); (8M/P) / (8d-7i) > 0. (1) 
Where: M/P = Money Balance in the central bank 
Y = represents the Real Income
y = reflects the Cost of Holding Money
d = the Nominal Deposit Rate
7i = the Real Deposit Rate
Shaw stressed that the nominal deposit rate less the expected rate of inflation 
induces the real cost of the monetary system. Real deposit rate is the primary 
indicator of real money. "Income represented by growth is real money accrues either 
to the monetary system or to money holders depending on the explicit deposit rate 
that the former pays to the latter and on the rate of inflation" (Shaw, 1973: 23). 
Deepening allows real money and physical investment to be the determinants of total 
savings. Growth in real money, which increases as a result of price deflation or 
deposit rate, induces the real income. Meanwhile, the rise in real deposit rate results 
in money deepening. This is to be achieved through the increase of money demand to
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income ratio. Shaw concluded that "variations in nominal money that do not affect 
real deposit rate are neutral, to be sure, and the rate of inflation does not matter if 
nominal deposit rate is adopted to it" (Shaw, 1973: 38).
In case of stagnant growth, the price of inflation rate equals the income growth. 
Consequently, the nominal deposit rate is determined by subtracting the rate of return 
on physical investment from the income growth. Shaw (1973) noted that monetary 
authority has the legitimacy to collect inflation tax even if the money holders are not 
receiving any return on their savings. Therefore, the money to income ratio declines 
and the revenues collected as inflation-tax falls below the increase in economic 
welfare.
Increased savings make banks more likely to fund projects; in turn, these 
investments increase banks' earnings and boost their annual growth. The process 
continues as savings deposits increase. 31 Kapur (1986) stated that financial 
liberalisation produces higher interest rates this will both encourage saving and 
increase the quality of investments. Thus the banking sector expands, depositors 
enjoy high interest rates, and borrowers have permanent access to investment 
financing.
Bonin and Leven (1996) claimed that banking efficiency has five determinants. 
First, competition between banks results in low interest rates on deposits and loans. 
Second, banks offer variety of financial instruments and develop new products. 
Third, the financial market in which banks operate is stable and liquid. Fourth, the 
payment system is well developed and financial resources are allocated adequately. 
Fifth, financial transaction costs are low. They also pointed out that an efficient
49
market-oriented banking sector requires the government to withhold direct control 
over banks' operations and participate only in developing financial markets. 
Privatisation thus ends government intervention in the banking sector and allows 
state-owned banks to select their borrowers on the basis of market criteria. 32
Fink et al (1998) argued that developed information systems and market 
confidence can enhance the efficiency of financial markets. In transitional countries, 
market uncertainty makes people afraid to use financial institutions, and depositors 
may prefer to keep their savings under the mattress. "Inter-organisational" problems 
contribute to this atmosphere of uncertainty. To boost consumer confidence, state- 
owned banks should terminate their relationship with bad debtors; Fink et al (1998) 
suggested creating an independent agency to control lending and to facilitate stock 
trading among foreign players.
State-owned banks are weak; hence they are unable to influence the efficiency of 
private companies and state-owned enterprises.33 Because asymmetric information 
and small financial markets have weakened financial institutions' efficiency in 
transitional countries, international organisations such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank should help those countries implement effective financial 
policies. Policymakers are already required to adopt clear privatisation plans, and 
Fink et al (1998) emphasised that "privatisation of the large former state-owned 
banks has to take place with strong involvement of renowned foreign banks".
Defective financial products negatively impact efficiency and financial resources 
allocation in the banking sector (Blejer, 1999: 388-9). As a result, authorities must
31 Some researchers argue that the Shaw and McKinnon model of financial repression is incomplete. 
For example, Sikorski said "The primary weakness of Shaw's model is the absence of many 
behavioural mechanisms specifying the working of the banking system" (Sikorski, 1996: 69).
32 We regard a state-owned bank as private when the state's stake is less than 50 per cent of its capital.
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encourage foreign banks to bring new and modern financial products into the 
domestic market. However, technology, economies of scale and reputation will 
always favour foreign banks when they enter developing countries; these competitive 
advantages can destabilise local banks and threaten the domestic banking industry.
To develop a strong financial sector, the authorities must first ensure that the 
banking industry is functioning adequately; once this has been accomplished, they 
should improve the capital market. These steps will enhance the efficiency of 
financial resources allocation. Furthermore, the authorities should reform lending 
mechanisms and control risks; they can do this by managing banks' assets and 
liabilities and by auditing their loan portfolios (Mullineux, 1998: 23-4).
The amount of competition in the banking sector affects banking efficiency. 
Imperfect competition in developing and transition economies means that banks play 
a small role in mediating between savers and borrowers. Comparing a competitive 
banking sector with a monopolistic one, Knight (1998) found that all banks in a 
perfectly competitive banking sector have a small proportion of deposits, which can 
be achieved at a similar rate of return on lenders' funds. High demand for credit and 
low deposits prevent the monopoly bank from matching the maturity of competitive 
banks' assets and liabilities. The monopoly bank attempts to maximise its profits by 
paying low deposit rates and by charging high borrowing rates (Knight, 1998: 9-12). 
Claessens, Demirgii^-Kunt, and Huizinga (1998) used net interest income/total 
assets (net margin/to) to calculate bank efficiency and banks' before-tax profits/total 
assets (before tax profits/to) to calculate bank profitability. Before tax profits/ta 
equals net margin/ta plus non-interest income/ta minus overhead/ta minus loan loss
33 Low liquidity prevents local firms from raising funds that could finance their projects.
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provisioning/ta. The relation between overhead and a bank's net interest margin 
reflect the bank's ability to cover its business costs. The relation between before-tax 
profits and overhead reflects the bank's capacity to transfer its costs to its clients. 
Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) also used the following equation to 
measure the banking efficiency:
Alijt = a + vj/Fsjt + \|/iBit + vj/jXjt + Zijt (2) 
Where: lijt = the dependent variable for domestic bank i and country] at time t
Fsjt = the market share of foreign banks in country] at time t
Bit = bank variables for bank i at time t
Xjt = variables for country j at time t
a = constant
i|/, \j/i and \j/j = coefficients
Zijt = the error term
The efficiency of financial intermediation is positively correlated with the market 
share (Fsjt) of foreign banks. Foreign banks tend to have high efficiency in 
developing countries because of their technological advantage over domestic banks. 
"The efficiency of bank intermediation can be measured by both ex ante and ex post 
spreads" (Claessens, Demirgu"9-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998: 6). The difference between 
interest rates charged on loans and those paid on deposits form the ex post spread. 
The ex ante spread is determined by the expected risk and return from banks' 
investments. Country variables include taxation, loan loss provisioning and 
overheads. Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) found that foreign banks 
pay less tax and have low loan loss provisioning and overheads in developing 
countries. The volume of loans and deposits depends on ex ante and ex post spread,
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which also alters according to the tax rates, loan loss provisioning and overheads. 
Claessens, Demirgu"9-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) concluded that foreign banks have a 
significant efficiency advantage in developing countries, and this has been reflected 
by a relatively high profitability. They also noted that the scale of banking 
investments is driven by the taxation system rather than by the quality of services 
provided in domestic and foreign banks.
Claessens, Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) stressed that the entry of foreign 
banks increases competition in the national financial market and promotes banking 
efficiency. However, this depends on the number and size of foreign banks operating 
in the host country. In markets with large numbers of sizeable foreign banks, banking 
competition tends to be high, mostly because foreign banks are involved in large- 
scale banking activities.
Engbarth (1997) pointed out that foreign banks are squeezing local banks into 
new operations and changing their strategies. In Taiwan, for example, the incumbent 
Chinatrust Commercial Bank is handling the challenge by improving its retail 
banking, splitting its banking services into retail and corporate divisions, expanding 
the bank's network locally and abroad, and engaging in securities activities 
(Engbarth, 1997).
Although banks need to diversify their loans according to the risk, arena and 
business category, several barriers hamper lending in a small economy. For instance, 
high specialisation in the banking industry and deposit-taking constraints make it 
difficult for banks to adequately diversify their portfolios.
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Consistent with "contestable market" 34 principles, local banks will continue to 
perform in the same manner even after new competitors have entered the market. 
When existing players apply "predatory behaviour," it is difficult for new players to 
gain a niche in their markets. Banks can compete over product quality, product price 
and innovations, and market segmentation usually increases as competition escalates. 
The new player has to compare the cost of entering the market to the return it can 
expect from delivering its financial services in that market.
To promote safe financial environments after the transition to a market-oriented 
banking system, governments must assist banks in monitoring their lending 
decisions, maintaining adequate international capital ratios, and imposing lending 
restrictions on highly risky projects (Demetriades and Fattouh, 1999). However, 
severe regulations can hinder the efficiency of the financial market (Walter, 1988).
Dissolving financial barriers escalates instability in the banking sector. Under 
socialism, financial regulations prevented banks from assessing the risk associated 
with their portfolios, but financial liberalisation creates moral hazards due to the 
increase in banking competition and the decline in existing banks' profitability 
(Demitgu9-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998).
To minimise the risks associated with global financial markets, new mechanisms 
for cross-boarder lending have three fundamental elements: they consider project risk
34 A contestable market is one in which financial institutions compete for control of new clients. 
"Given these conditions and the consequent need for qualitative rather than quantitative expansion, 
what seems to be required is the promotion of contestability - that is, the threat and the fear of 
competition" (Blejer, 1999: 389).
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instead of assets and liabilities structure; they arrange large loans with other 
international banks; and they analyse multinational export credit (Porter, 1993).
Ray and Tomkin (1994) divided the barriers among banks into four categories: 
political, regulatory, temporal and geographical. Currently, these obstacles are 
progressively dissolving, resulting in increased competition among domestic 
financial institutions as well as among foreign and local players. Strong domestic 
financial institutions are essential if local banks are to compete with foreign banks 
that have more experience and better technology. In liberalising financial markets, 
Ray and Tomkin (1994) said that authorities should take into account four 
fundamental elements: capital adequacy, corporate structure, bank ownership, and 
risk profile.
To avoid financial instability, banks should diversify their portfolios as much as 
possible. Walter and Smith (1999) suggested that banks should consider non- 
financial assets such as risk insurance or gold. They also said that banks need to 
assess exchange rates and liquidity risks, have high leverage ratios, and manage 
expenses efficiently to attain high profitability in global financial markets.
Three broad risks confront banks in global financial markets: credit risk, country 
risk and currency risk (Walter and Smith, 1999).35 Credit risk depends on banks' 
portfolio diversification and the extent of their exposure to direct foreign investment. 
To minimise those risks, banks are required to identify their consumers' claims, to 
clarify all cross-border loans immediately, and to classify the host country according 
to the degree of exposure (Walter and Smith, 1999).
35 Credit risk occurs when borrowers fail to pay the principal and interest in a timely manner. Country 
risk emerges when foreign government fail to make required debt payments on a timely basis or to 
comply with conditions of international agreements. Finally, banks face currency risks when exchange 
rate fluctuations affect their investments' value.
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Changes in business cycles, international interest rates, exchange rates and 
commodity prices reduce firms' profitability and affect borrowers' ability to repay 
both interest on their loans and the principal itself. Increased capital inflows 
combined with poor credit risk assessments can also heighten banks' exposure to 
risky loans and foreign exchange fluctuations.
Banking across international frontiers involves a variety of risks. Anneart (1999) 
stated that in a global financial market where all assets are traded by financial 
institutions, risks that affect different markets segments are correlated. Market 
segmentation is less evident in open financial markets, where there is high demand 
for financial services (Lewis, 1993). Lewis also claimed that in highly regulated 
financial markets, consumption depends on capital market output.
The fragility of the global financial system (because of floating exchange rates 
and markets risks) affects banks' earnings. Borrowers' inability to repay loans can 
also destabilise financial markets in general and banks in particular (Porter, 1993). 
Banks should assess credit risk and arrange loans with international banks properly 
(Porter, 1993: 59-60).
The literature shows that financial liberalisation plays a major part in 
globalisation of financial services. It dissolves many regulatory barriers that local 
and foreign banks faced in the former socialist countries, and it promotes 
marketplace competition and efficiency. Many scholars36 argue that financial 
liberalisation has enabled banks to diversify their portfolios and to boost their profit 
margin. However, banks are still facing various risks in global financial markets. 
Banks need to be aware of risks associated with lending money to domestic or
36 See for instance: Claessens, Demirgus-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) and Peek and Rosengren (2000)
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foreign investors such vigilance is necessary to avoid financial crises and economic 
instability.
New financial products have increased banks' liquidity and enhanced their financial 
assets. Banks penetrate new markets with these products to achieve economies of 
scale and scope. Advances in information technology have also enabled banks to 
lower the costs of their financial transactions. Computer systems let banks transfer, 
record and store financial information inexpensively (Cooper, 1984: 190-3). The 
overall result is a decline in banks' operating expenses and an increase in their profit 
margin.
One of the methods used by financial institutions to respond to increased market 
risk is to introduce new financial instruments. They also use those products to hedge 
against interest-rate fluctuations and foreign exchange rate risks. Advances in 
information technology make new products less costly and more liquid. Market 
transparency and bank auditing give market participants incentives to innovate.
Information technology has changed the management structures of financial 
institutions and integrated markets. Parker (1998) anticipated that banking costs will 
continue to fall due to advances in information technology, but warns that new 
technology does not always protect banks from market shocks. Hence he 
recommended adequate control, good internal organisation and cautious lending 
policies (Parker, 1998: 16).
Edey and Hviding (1995) noted that technological advances reduce the costs of 
trading financial assets across the globe. New information technologies also
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encourage financial institutions to expand their operations to financial centres. The 
aim of such expansion is to diversify into innovative financial products. This process 
is growing speedily because of the emergence of a centralised market-oriented 
financial system in former socialist countries (Bonin and Wachtel, 1999).
Banks use computer technology to offer their services globally and to receive 
deposits from foreign clients. However, the integration is not complete; in fact, most 
global integration takes place in developed countries and in wholesale activities. 
Credit market restrictions on foreign banks reduce the scale of financial integration 
in developing countries.
With computerised financial systems, banks can do business across frontiers with 
fewer restrictions. Harrington (1992) noted that innovation fosters competition in 
financial markets and vice versa; therefore banks need to be effective and well 
capitalised to face any unexpected competition. He stated six main causes for 
financial innovation: high competition in financial markets; advances in information 
technology; lower cost of financial transactions; structural changes in financial 
markets; new laws; and financial internationalisation (Harrington, 1992: 53).
The fast growth of international trade and other industries contributes to 
increased demand for financial services (Blake, 2000). High demand for innovative 
financial products can also result from petrodollar reserves, macroeconomic 
imbalances and high rates of saving in countries such as Japan. Blake (2000) pointed 
out that financial innovation results from increased or decreased supply or demand in
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the financial services market. 37 Every financial system depends on financial 
products, selling mechanisms, claims and market structure (Blake, 2000).
Blake (2000) also argued that technology, financial constraints and regulation 
induce financial innovation. Technology creates new opportunities for banks to 
develop their borrowing and lending capacities. 38 Authorities want to enhance 
competition and innovation in the banking sector without negative consequences on 
the financial system. To find acceptance in the market, new assets should have 
attractive characteristics. Unregulated institutions can change the components of 
their assets and create new instruments (Blake, 2000: 49).
Many financial centres have implemented new financial products and tactics. 
Likewise, computer systems allow banks instant access to other financial markets 
across the globe. These developments let investors and borrowers reduce their 
market risk; they also raise the liquidity and promote the creditworthiness of 
financial institutions (Porter, 1993: 342).
Porter (1993) stressed that banks have declined steadily as a source of liquidity. 
Many investors and borrowers can now meet their financial needs through capital 
markets. 39 As a consequence, the demand for services such as short-term loans has 
declined, and banks have responded to these demand-side changes by penetrating 
new markets and by offering new products.
Banks are expanding their focus beyond traditional banking activities. Certain 
banks have become specialised in some operations such as financing foreign trade. In 
developed countries, banks have moved into off balance-sheet activities, mergers and
37 Financial innovations also contribute to changes in wealth and customers' tastes. Other reasons for 
innovation are the business and political cycles.
38 Financial innovations must respond positively to financial regulations.
39 In developing countries such as Algeria, capital markets are underdeveloped.
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acquisitions, securities operations and long-term investments. "If the pace of change 
and innovation continues at its recent rate it seems likely that the impact on banks in 
the coming years will be both expensive and dramatic" (Porter, 1993: 343).
Financial liberalisation and financial innovation are directly interconnected. 
Removing strict financial rules assists banks in penetrating new markets and offering 
their services there; correspondingly, financial innovations force authorities to relax 
regulations in the financial market. For example, dismantling interest rate control has 
encouraged innovations such as swaps and options.
Innovation and liberalisation can have negative effects on the banking industry. 
Both boost the number of players and the amount of financial instruments in the 
marketplace. Financial institutions are obliged to reduce their prices, meaning that 
their profit margin declines (Cranston, 1990). "But extensive deregulation has 
certainly not proven to be a penacea for the banking industry and there are claims 
that the process of deregulation and innovation on the part of banks has had a 
negative overall impact on banking stability" (Cranston, 1990: 345).
The global financial market is based on economies of scale and scope. Economy 
of scale means offering a variety of services in a particular market. Economy of 
scope means diversifying financial products in more than one market segment and 
linking these segments together. Economies of scale and scope leverage strategies 
applied by banks in the financial services industry, where operating simultaneously 
in many financial markets decreases the risk taken on by institutions and boosts the 
rate of return on each product. In addition, information technology is required to 
build strong links between the financial segments.
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Banks' financial products are designed to meet the financial needs of the 
specified market (Davis, 1983). In addition, banks' organisation depends on their 
clients and products. Global banks are often more concerned about consumer values 
and about product promotion. Profitability comes as a secondary objective when they 
enter new markets (Davis, 1983: 18-9).
Davis (1983) noted that international commercial banks use consulting and 
other international activities to penetrate markets that have many banking and non- 
banking institutions. Their financial expertise and their corporate relationship with 
clients help them increase their market share. To be more successful, however, they 
need to promote their internal and external management as well as their global 
banking relationships. The returns from international banking products depend not 
on asset and liability prices but on market competition, the ability to cover losses, 
and the ability to earn extra value.
Davis (1983) also stated that international capital markets play a primary role in 
creating new financial instruments and in transferring those products to other local 
markets through international banks. He emphasised that banks in the new 
environment need to provide high-value products to satisfy their clients' needs.
Interest-rate volatility and the emergence of sophisticated financial instruments 
drive consumers to new services and to new ways of banking. Technological 
advances have affected the supply side of financial markets by decreasing the cost of 
producing and delivering financial instruments (Walter and Smith, 1999). On the 
demand side, both non-interest and interest banks have increased their liquid 
products offerings (Davis, 1983).
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Research shows that financial innovations have played a great part in 
globalisation of financial services in transitional countries (Davis, 1983). The 
demand for foreign banks' new financial products in the host country has increased 
gradually (Blake, 2000). On one hand, this has increased the level of market 
integration and lowered local banks' market share (Davis, 1983). On the other hand, 
the emergence of new banks has encouraged state-owned banks to introduce 
innovative financial products that allow them to be competitive in the local market 
and to avoid sharp declines in their profit margins.
The Internet, a global system of computer networks, first appeared in 1969 under the 
name "Advanced Research Projects Agency Network" in the United States (PBS 
Online, 2003). At present, about 13 million servers are linked to the Internet across 
the globe, 99 per cent of which are located in advanced countries (CSE Online, 
2003). Many banks use the Internet to offer services for both domestic and foreign 
consumers. "At an advanced level, Internet banking is called transactional online 
banking, because it involves provision of facilities such as accessing accounts, funds 
transfer and buying financial products or services online" (Karjaluoto, Mattila and 
Pento, 2001: 348).40 The Internet also helps banks penetrate other financial markets 
without requiring their physical presence in those markets. The Internet links all 
financial market participants across the globe.
40 See also Sathye (1999)
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Chart 2.1 : The Internet population users worldwide, 1999 (million)
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Chart 2.1 shows that 95 per cent of Internet users are based in Canada, the USA, 
Europe and Asia/Pacific. In developing countries, Africa and the Middle East still lag 
behind South America, with fewer than two million Internet users in 1999 (2 per cent 
of the Internet population). This can be attributed to underdeveloped 
telecommunication systems and also to lack of investment in new technologies such 
as the Internet. Therefore, governments in developing countries are required to 
increase their spending on sophisticated technologies to raise the number of 
telephone lines and to make the Internet accessible to large numbers of individuals 
and companies.
Miklaszewska (1998) identified four roles for the Internet in a modern banking 
industry. First, it facilitates financial transactions between banks and their 
consumers. Second, it gives financial institutions permanent access to financial 
information. Third, the Internet connects a bank's head office to its branches. Finally, 
electronic banking (e-banking) lets customers check their account information, pay 
bills, transfer funds between accounts and perform other functions. Customers will 
soon have access to additional services such as online stock and bond trading 
(Miklaszewska, 1998: 283).
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In recent years, technologists have focused on making the Internet more secure 
for financial transactions. As a result, analysts expect that banks will provide more 
financial services through the Web. Citibank and Chase Manhattan already offer all 
their services through their Web sites (Miklaszewska, 1998: 284). However, local 
banks in developing countries often struggle to provide Internet services, primarily 
because these countries lack Web design specialists and have only a few available 
telephone lines.
The Internet increases banks' efficiency and helps them reduce the cost of 
producing and delivering financial services. The Internet also alters the pricing 
strategy of the banking product. Banks price their products at the right level for the 
'electronic market'. The price of financial services is usually lower through the 
Internet than in the branch (Jun and Cai, 2001); this has made the Internet an 
attractive banking environment for clients. As profit margin decreases, new products 
are delivered through new channels, retail services and securities being the main 
areas of change. Global banks also use the Internet to expand their activities and to 
earn new market share (Oxford Analytical Citibank, 1999).
Banks are required to improve the value of their products, which will allow them 
to generate higher earnings. Consumer loyalty is also essential because "the global 
nature of the Internet makes it possible for a bank to attract consumers from a wider 
client base than that afforded by its branch network" (Oxford Analytical Citibank, 
1999: 3). The Internet also informs consumers of changes in the prices of financial 
instruments (Oxford Analytical Citibank, 1999).
The Internet has the potential to reduce banking costs due to the absence of 
expenses such as salaries, building maintenance, and other equipment. Booz-Allen
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and Hamilton (2002) found that 84 per cent of the USA banks spend less than 
USD25,000 to set up an Internet site. The cost of establishing a traditional branch is 
USD 1.5 million and USD2 million plus other expenses to keep it running. The 
Internet allows banks to achieve economies of scale and to reach a high banking 
standard. Global usage of the Internet also helps banks penetrate other financial 
markets and earn a niche in those markets. This is despite the fact that the fixed costs 
to set up Internet banking remain high.
The Internet improves two essential factors in global banking businesses: time 
and location (Oxford Analytical Citibank, 1999). The time needed to access bank 
services through the Web is extremely short. The Internet is also available 
everywhere in the world. As a result, Internet technology has globalised the banking 
industry; many banks use e-banking to expand their market share abroad.
The Internet enhances competition in the banking sector. Many non-banking 
institutions also offer their services through Internet channels. Banks also face severe 
competition on the lending side from global markets. Moreover, financial service 
clients may obtain information about products (e.g., pricing and characteristics) 
through the Web. This increases transparency and reduces the cost of financial 
instruments. Therefore, banks have to apply different mechanisms for pricing their 
products (Oxford Analytical Citibank, 1999).
The Internet gives financial institutions various opportunities to conduct internal 
and external financial transactions. It enables banks to introduce international 
payments. It also helps banks cut time, money and risk. Many transactions can be 
done through the Internet. Availability of data through the Internet helps banks and 
consumers reduce risk-taking in their financial transactions (Banker, 2000).
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Table 2.3: Branch closure in the UK: 1995 - 2000
Name of Bank
Northern Rock
Halifax
National Westminster
Abbey National
Lloyds TSB
Alliance & Leicester
Barclays
Bank of Scotland
Woolwich
Bradford & Bingley
Cheltenham & Gloucester
Royal Bank of Scotland
HSBC
Total: All Banks
Branches
1995
156
1,203
2,215
1,004
2,858
397
2,050
411
462
246
231
687
1,701
13,621
2000
76
832
1,643
755
2,200
309
1,727
352
402
222
210
648
1,668
11,044
No of Closures
80
371
572
249
658
88
323
59
60
24
21
39
33
2,577
Reduction %
51.3
30.8
25.8
24.8
23.0
22.2
15.8
14.4
13.0
9.8
9.1
5.7
1.9
19.0
Source: Building Society News, 2001
As shown in Table 2.3, the number of bank branches will decrease as electronic 
distribution channels become more popular. Internet also enhances the delivery of 
large range of financial products. These improve banking efficiency by facilitating 
payment processing. The goal is to attain high value-added products. "The Internet 
plays a vital role in the key challenges facing Financial Services Institutions today. It 
provides a tremendous opportunity for Financial Services Institutions to reduce 
transaction costs, exploit new markets, and roll products much faster than was 
possible via traditional channels" (Banker, 2000: 4).
The major problem facing Internet banking is the physical delivery of cash. 
Clients regularly receive financial information through banks' Web sites. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to make a physical delivery of cash through the 
Internet. Clients also require instant access to products' prices and financial 
information. "The very concept of the end-of-day is meaningless in the world of e- 
commerce, where customers may be anywhere in the world and demand consistent 
and instant levels of services" (Banker, 2000: 6). Banks should promote innovation
66
and speed to become more competitive. The Web must also complement branch 
services, meaning that products offered via the Internet have to describe how they 
supplement or replace services available inside the branch.
Table 2.4: Advantages and disadvantages of the electronic banking in developed and 
developing countries
Advantages of the e-banking Disadvantages of the e-banking
Low costs (particularly fixed costs). 
Cross-border expansion. 
High franchise value. 
Strength link with customers. 
Market share growth. 
Financial information potential. 
Simple to access.
  New competitors.
  Complicate services valuation.
  Development costs.
  Low security.
Source: Salomon Smith Barney (1999: 5)
Various obstacles confront online banking in transitional economies (Gurau, 
2002). First, Internet connections are inflexible and long lasting. Second, there are a 
limited number of personal computers (see: Appendix IV). Third, individuals do not 
know about services offered via the Internet. Four, there are no clear and complete 
regulations governing online banking. Finally, local banks have a bad reputation in 
the market and also adopt poor development strategies.
E-banking assists globalisation of financial services, especially in developed 
countries where the number of Internet users is high and business culture is well 
developed. In developing countries, e-banking is still in its infancy and needs major 
improvements. Nonetheless, researchers predict that e-banking will expand quickly 
in both developed and developing countries and that this will change the structure of 
financial markets (Salomon Smith Barney, 1999).
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Although Muslims have practiced Islamic financial rules since the fifth century 
(Mawdudi, 1950), the first study of Islamic financing did not appear until the mid- 
twentieth century.41 Political influence in countries such as Pakistan and the 
development of Islamic banking ideas among Muslim economists have contributed 
to a growing literature on Islamic finance. In the past two decades, many Muslim and
42non-Muslim researchers have conducted investigations into Islamic banking.
In Mohammed's time, financial transactions were simple. There were no capital 
flows and no banks; the only markets were those for commodities. Transactions were 
based on trust between the purchaser and the supplier (Islamic Finance Online, 
2000). The money market raises new concerns for Muslims, who have attempted to 
adapt Islamic financing paradigms to the international securities market.
Table 2.5: The number of non-interest banks that make positive net profit, negative 
net profit or zero profit (N/A) in eight separate regions
South Asian countries
African countries
South East Asian countries
Middle Eastern countries
Gulf
Europe + America
Asia (others)
Australia
Total
Positive net profit
46
23
24
20
19
6
1
1
140
Negative net profit
4
7
7
1
1
-
-
-
20
N/A
1
5
-
5
1
3
1
-
16
Total
51
35
31
26
21
9
2
1
176
Source: Banker, 2000d
From this table, we see that 80 per cent of non-interest banks make a positive net 
profit. This means that most non-interest banks are profit-making institutions; they 
are able to grow due to the large scale of available business opportunities. Loss-
41 See for example Siddiqi (1983), Ahmad (1952) and Mawdudi (1950)
42 See for instance Al-Omer and Abdel-Hak (1996), Mills and Presley (1999) and Warde (2000)
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making banks are mostly based in African and South East Asian countries; in those 
regions, 87 per cent of banks do not make profits (Banker, 2000c). This is because 
the financial markets in those regions are underdeveloped and the demand for 
Islamic financial products is low (Banker, 2000c).
Table 2.6: Paid up capital, total assets, reserves and net profit of Islamic banks in 
2001
Paid up capital 
thousands USD
7,333,079
Total assets 
thousands USD
147,685,002
Total deposits 
thousands USD
112,589,776
Reserves 
thousands USD
3,075,526
Net profit 
thousands USD
1,238,241
Source: Banker, 2000d
From Table 2.6 we see that the net profit/total assets of non-interest banks are 
extremely small. This means that their return on assets is low. Reserves 
(USD3,075,526,000) are about 2.6 per cent of total deposits and paid up capital 
(USD7,333,079,000) is about 5 per cent of total assets. Therefore, most non-interest 
banks are required to raise their reserves to promote financial stability and to 
increase their paid up capital to meet international standards (Banker, 2000c).
It has been argued that the main difference between non-interest banks and 
interest banks is "the time value of money" (Moore, 1998: 248-50). The function of 
both banking models is the same, i.e., to act as an intermediary between savers and 
borrowers. In an interest banking model, the interest rate determines the yield on 
financial instruments. Whereas, the non-interest banking model uses profit- and loss- 
sharing criteria to distribute net profits to the bank, to depositors, and to 
entrepreneurs. Another dissimilarity between the two banking models is that interest 
banking model maintains a creditor-debtor relationship among banks, depositors and
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borrowers, but in non-interest banking model the relationship is principally a 
partnership.
Universal accounting standards and developed financial market are needed to 
protect non-interest banks from global financial market risks and to improve the 
wholesale market, including the money and inter-bank markets (Moore, 1998). 
Likewise, it is essential to promote communication between non-interest banks. The 
religious acceptability and high return from assets help non-interest banks generate 
large deposits (Moore, 1998). For example, in El-Baraka Bank of Algeria, total 
deposits increased from AD2,881,000 in 1996 to AD6,967,000 in 2000 (El-Baraka 
Bank Annual Reports, 1996-2000). The methods applied to invest those assets are 
still traditional, however, and need improvement.
Gafoor (1995) stressed that non-interest banks' asset evaluation is not an easy 
process. Usually, authorities are obliged to send groups of experts to assess non- 
interest banks' financial positions. However, Islamic banking portfolios are based on 
venture capital, thus it may not be possible effectively to assess their investment 
risks. Gafoor also noted that taxation on non-interest banks is unlike to those of 
interest banks. The interest is "passive income"; depositors receive extra funds 
without taking risks with the bank or with borrowers. Profit is an earned income. 
Moreover, most non-interest banks are involved in financing commercial activities 
that are taxed twice; this substantially affects their profitability (Gafoor, 1995).
Non-interest banks open both savings and investment accounts. In an investment 
account, the bank applies a profit- and loss-sharing mode of financing (Gafoor, 
1995). The return is a percentage of the profit, in accordance with an agreement 
made between the depositors and the bank, and between the bank and the borrowers.
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Gafoor also stressed that most non-interest banks guarantee the nominal value of 
saving account deposits. Depositors can withdraw their money at any time and may 
hold a chequebook. The advantage of non-interest banks is that bankers and 
borrowers share responsibility for depositors' funds. Profits have to be distributed 
between stakeholders according to the first agreement. Gafoor suggests that non- 
interest banks should provide both short- and long-term loans to exploit the market 
fully. It is also important to add services charges onto loans. These charges allow 
banks to cover their administration expenses and to boost their profit.
Nowadays, non-interest banks provide heterogeneous financial services such as 
equity, project financing, letters of credit, securities safekeeping, funds transfer, 
investor advice and project management (Warde, 2000). Certain Islamic financial 
institutions offer derivatives, insurance and fund management. The Research and 
Training Institute plays an important part in introducing new products.
Non-interest banks can use urf (custom), darura (overriding necessity) and 
musharaka (the general interest) to create new financial products (Warde, 2000). It is 
also possible to make conventional instruments, such as zero coupon bonds, conform 
to Islamic law. Islamic law allows financial products that do not include interest 
(ribd), but forbids investment in prohibited products such as wine and pork.
Warde (2000) said that non-interest banks are applying 'mark-up schemes', 
which are against profit- and loss-sharing principles. High-risk, short-term schemes 
that require collateral and anticipate profit are unacceptable. Another criticism is that 
several non-interest banks transactions are similar to those of interest banks. The 
difference between the two banking models is the length of time for which non-
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interest banks held a commodity. Nowadays, many non-interest banks are changing 
their pricing strategies to comply more exactly with Islamic rules of financing.
Profit- and loss-sharing modes of financing mean that instead of lending to 
borrowers at fixed interest rates, a bank forms a partnership with the borrower. 
Mudaraba (sleeping partnership) and musharaka (long-term equity) are the two 
forms of this mode of financing. A bank has a proportion of its profit generated by a 
borrower. Warde said that depositors and bankers in this financing scheme associate 
their loyalty with the success of the project. Besides, entrepreneurs focus on the 
project's long-term profit instead of debt servicing; this reduces the rate of default on 
investments (Warde, 2000, 135-6).
In mudamba, rabb al-mal (the money owner) put his funds under the possession 
of a mudarib (managing trustee) according to an agreement. The managing trustee 
receives part of the profit at the end of the operation, but not in a lump sum or 
guaranteed return. He is not responsible for the loss of capital. The bank also holds 
the managing trustee operational risk. There are two different positions on the 
allocation of profits generated from mudaraba transactions. Hanafls and Hanabalis 
claim that capital should be returned to the money owner, after which profit can be 
shared. Malikis and Shafiis argue that a bank must distribute profits when operations 
have been completed; capital has to be repaid afterwards (Warde, 2000).
Non-interest banks also involve in commodity and foreign exchange markets. 
These activities are allowed under sharia rules, although non-interest banks cannot 
deal with government or corporate bonds because they include interest rates. Equity 
investments are acceptable, according to most scholars.43 However, equities are
43 See for instance, Parigi (1989) and Warde (2000)
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forbidden when the company's income comes from illicit operations. Islamic finance 
rules forbid trading the equities and commodities of loss-making enterprises. 
Scholars predict that these instruments encourage investment promotion (Parigi, 
1989: 138). Some exceptions prevail; for instance, profit from forbidden activities 
(such as wine trading) goes to charities. In all circumstances, financial transactions 
must meet all Islamic rules for trading financial products.
Non-interest banks face problems of liquidity management and lack of 
innovation (Banker, 2000b). However, in large Islamic financial centres such as 
Bahrain, the Islamic banking industry seems to grow at high speed and to produce 
new products, such as the Bai-Salam Suquq and the Islamic Development Suquq. The 
former is designed for short-term investments and the latter for long-term 
investments. Nevertheless, traditional financial products still dominate the industry. 
The Bahrain Monetary Agency is playing a major role in establishing the first 
Islamic International Money Market (Banker, 2000b).
Dissimilarities in non-interest banks' financial statements may be attributed to 
differences between their accounting practices and the Sharia board explanations 
(Banker, 2000b). For example, investment accounts are registered as off balance- 
sheet items at certain banks and on balance-sheet items at other banks. Another 
dilemma that confronts non-interest banks is the absence of transparency.
Derivatives are used mostly for hedging against interest rate and exchange rate 
volatility and for managing other risks. Almost all types of derivative are forbidden 
in Islamic law because they involve gharar (uncertainty). Scholars representing the 
sharia board suggested that banks should manage derivatives smoothly to make them
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fulfil Islamic financial rules. This would entail removing elements that conflict with 
sharia rules (Warde, 2000: 139-40).
Non-interest banks can create new products by changing the structure of 
conventional banking instruments. For example, the value of bonds includes the 
principle and the fixed interest rate paid on them. Eliminating interest rate payments 
make bonds comply with Islamic law. Classic fiqh44 creates new products by 
combining two financial instruments (Warde, 2000). Interest banks can be 
innovative, even in Islamic products: in Pakistan, Grindlays45 was the first bank to 
introduce the musharaka agreement.
Warde (2000) noted that conventional banking performance is based on trial and 
error. This is why interest banks are free to select instruments that match their 
strategies. By contrast, non-interest banks' products must conform to principles set 
by sharia boards, and this prevents non-interest banks from diversifying their 
portfolios. To avoid this problem, Warde proposed that non-interest banks improve 
their lending policy and exploit all market segments that fit with the Islamic mode of 
financing.
The Sharia board is the source and guidance for non-interest banks (Ainley, 
1996), but scholars who represent the sharia board adopt different methods and 
principles. For example, some financial deals in Malaysia may not be acceptable in 
the Middle East and vice versa. This is due to different interpretations of Islamic law 
in various parts of the world. To solve this problem, uniform guidelines for Islamic 
finance are needed (Duncan, 1996: 12-3).
44 Fiqh is Islamic law as explained by scholars (Lewis, 2001). There are several schools and some of 
them are conflicting. Mainly, fiqh comprises five basic criteria: (1) analogy deduction; (2) subjective 
opinion; (3) moral or social preference; (4) inference; (5) public interest and consensus of opinion. 
45 Grindlays had total assets of USD97,35 billion in 1999 (Pandya, 2000).
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Ainley (1996) stated that most non-interest banks are concentrated in regions that 
accept Islamic modes of financing. According to the Bank Negara (Malaysia) Annual 
Report (2001), global banking exists in countries with many financial players, a 
variety of financial instruments, and a large inter-bank market. Meanwhile, non- 
interest banks mostly operate in small financial markets and trade limited financial 
products (Ainley, 1996: 13).
Non-interest banks face more global operational difficulties than conventional 
banks due to variations in financial codes from country to country (Fox, 1996: 24). 
Fox notes that uniform accounting standards are necessary if non-interest banks are 
to develop, meaning that non-interest banks need to use international accounting 
standards in preparing their financial statements.
A large amount of non-interest banks' credit is in the form of short-term loans. 
Duncan (1996) suggested introducing products that can be used for long- and 
medium- term financing; he also said that non-interest banks need to reduce 
substantial short-term lending. Because investment projects can be risky, banks need 
to analyse their investors' credit-worthiness accurately. The development of project 
financing is certainly a major step towards modern Islamic finance (Duncan, 1996).
Expected returns and risk-taking can affect Islamic banking performance. The 
return to depositors and shareholders can vary when financing high-risk, high-return 
projects. Because of this, most non-interest banks finance short-term investments that 
allow them to generate low returns and to take low risks (Zineldin, 1990). Zineldin 
presented three investment philosophies in his examination of Islamic modes of 
financing:
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1. The financial system must be market oriented. Investments should be financed 
according to demand and supply rules.
2. Demand for long-term investment accounts is low compared with the demand for 
short-term investment account.
3. The return from investments depends upon "the marginal efficiency of 
investment". The profit must be equally shared between banks, depositors and 
investors.
In his study of 16 non-interest banks, Zineldin (1990) found that the return on 
their investment deposits differed from the return on their equity. Non-interest banks 
have more autonomy in using their own capital in financing high-risk high-return 
investments than depositors' funds. Moreover, the return on long-term investment 
deposits was always higher than the return on short-term investment deposits. 
Dividends are allocated in relation to time, deposits and project profitability. Losses 
are shared between the bank and depositors. Zineldin used four ratios for measuring 
non-interest banks' profitability: average net profit, average net profit to total assets, 
average net profit to total deposits, and average net profit to total equity. The ratio of 
average net profit to total assets illustrates the risk of the project funded and its 
business sufficiency. Profitable banks always have a high average net profit/total 
assets ratio. Because non-interest banks have to perform in a "group of business 
enterprises'" that includes shareholders, depositors and entrepreneurs, profit must be 
maximised to satisfy the group (Zineldin, 1990: 212-9).
Zineldin discovered that small- and medium-sized banks are more profitable than 
large banks. This means that dealing with large assets is a difficult process for non- 
interest banks, especially when there is a mismatch between assets and return on
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investments. Interest banks, however, seem to have higher returns on their assets 
than non-interest banks when it comes to short-term lending (Zineldin, 1990: 216).
Non-interest banks generate income from the following services: return from 
direct investment, services charges, return from equity investment, financing 
commerce, trading foreign currencies, revenue from subsidiaries, earnings from the 
banks investments and firms, and zakat income (Zineldin, 1990: 213). However, 
deposits remain the main revenue source for non-interest banks.
Drummond (2000a) points out that accounting standards are unclear in Islamic 
modes of financing. "None of the contracts that are used by Islamic banks is catered 
by International Accounting Standards. For example, profit is treated in different 
manners in the Islamic banks financial statements" (Abdel Karim, 2000: 67). In 
Bahrain, profit is recorded for the whole period of the project financed. Non-interest 
banks operating in Malaysia, however, record profits after the payback period. The 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions has 
launched 16 accounting standards, including four on auditing and three on sharia 
rules. It recommends that non-interest banks should produce additional information 
about their activities. Earnings from operations that do not fit sharia code must go to 
charity (Drummond, 2000a).
The Internet has an impact on the growth of Islamic banking. For instance, 
www.islamicQ.com provides Muslims with full information about Islamic banking 
practices and products. This site and others provide important information for 
Muslims who wish to conduct their financial transactions according to Islamic rules 
(Bokhari, 2000).
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Bokhari (2000) stressed that interest banks such as HSBC Investment Bank, 
Citibank and Deutsche Bank participate in the expansion of Islamic banking. They 
offer several Islamic financial services in both Western and Muslims countries. 
These banks' goal is to extend their market share. Therefore, globalisation provides 
an opportunity for global banks to grow by offering Islamic financial products.
Bokhari (2000) also notes four factors that would facilitate the growth of Islamic 
banking. First, it is necessary to establish an Islamic central bank to act as a lender of 
last resort to the Islamic financial institutions. Second, Islamic scholars have to be 
flexible and must accommodate new products. A third factor is flexibility by Muslim 
practitioners in their approach of designing Islamic financial products. Finally, banks 
have to use their capital effectively.
Wealthy Muslims are the main source of capital for most non-interest banks. The 
exceptions are Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan and Sudan, where governments play a 
primary role in converting interest banking into interest-free banking, hi those 
countries, banks are forced to make all their services fulfil profit- and loss-sharing 
paradigms of financing.
Drummond (2000b) stressed that the absence of a money market for short-term 
assets have prevented the growth of Islamic banking. Money markets play a key role 
in meeting the short-term financial requirements of the ultimate borrowers. To 
escape this problem, non-interest banks should finance commerce through murabaha 
transactions. Drummond also argued that bonds can fund long-term projects. 
Because the non-interest banks' small market share may put pressure on their long- 
term products, it is necessary to launch money markets for secondary instruments to 
help non-interest banks manage their balance sheet effectively.
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Another criticism of the modern Islamic finance is that borrowers may escape 
paying their debts, causing inevitable escalations in banks' losses. In Malaysia, the 
authorities have induced penalties for borrowers who fail to manage their business 
properly. Regulatory standards are needed to improve non-interest banks' image 
across the globe.
Medium- and long-term investment financing accounted for less than ten per cent 
of Islamic banking activities in 1988. Gafoor (1995) claimed that Islamic financial 
products are unsuitable for long-term financing because of delay in capital recovery. 
Long-term projects also bear high market risks; thus non-interest banks need to be 
experienced in assessing investments.47
Gafoor (1995) noted that the government is one of the major borrowers from 
Islamic banks. Governments use banks' funds to finance their expenditures, 
consumption or projects. Usually, the return from state projects is low. Therefore, a 
government may delay repaying its debts, resulting in increased losses for non- 
interest banks.
Wilson (1990) drew a distinction between banking competition in Islamic 
countries where there is more than one non-interest bank, such as Egypt, and in 
countries where there is only one non-interest bank, such as Jordan. In the former, 
non-interest banks compete with each other, but in the latter non-interest banks 
compete with conventional banks. He found that interest banks are more competitive 
in deposit-taking than non-interest banks. He also noted that depositors are uncertain 
about the future of their funds. He claimed that clients base choices on available
46 "The possibility of fraud is there but we have to differentiate between fraud and genuine losses to 
understand Islamic finance" (El-Khalifa, 2000).
47 Non-interest banks recover their capital in instalments.
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information about credit conditions. From the consumer's perspective, the process of 
selecting a good bank is a complex one because bank data can be confusing. 
Depositors also have difficulties analysing bank data (Wilson, 1990: 19-25).
Wilson argued that non-interest banking competition may relate to the business 
financed. "The issue of competition in Islamic banking not only encompasses the 
structure of the banking sector itself, but also the rest of private sector business" 
(Wilson, 1990: 30). Banks usually have a competitive advantage in activities 
financed through murabaha or ijara leasing; in murabaha equity, a bank has to 
categorise companies according to its stake in each of them.
Despite non-interest banks' working capital structure, their market power is still 
low because most companies in the Islamic world use their retained profit for 
expansion. In case of joint ventures between a bank and a company, the possibility of 
losing large assets to liquidation is often high if the joint venture goes bankrupt 
(Wilson, 1990: 30-1).
Wilson stresses that competition is a key element for improving innovations, 
reducing prices, and enhancing business control. On the other hand, he advises non- 
interest banks to minimise their market risk to boost domestic financial market 
stability and to enhance financial innovation. Newly created financial instruments, 
however, must satisfy the Islamic sharia board (Wilson, 1990: 31-2).
El-Ashker (1987) compared the market strength of three banks: the National Bank 
of Egypt, the Islamic International Bank for Investment and Development and the 
Financial Islamic Bank for Investment. He used two criteria for that comparison: 
capital structure and financial ratios. He found that the non-interest banks have
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higher credit components than interest banks (El-Ashker, 1987: 174).48 The ability to 
provide credit differs from one non-interest bank to another depending on the bank's 
capital cost. Non-interest banks also had low loans-to-total-assets ratios during their 
early years of their operations in Egypt (El-Ashker, 1987).
Banks' cash resources have been influenced by their own credit strategies. The 
Financial Islamic Bank for Investment had the highest cash-to-total-assets ratio; the 
National Bank of Egypt had the lowest. The National Bank of Egypt bore more 
investment operations than the two Islamic banks. Because of the Financial Islamic 
Bank for Investment's and the Islamic International Bank for Investment and 
Development's involvements in trade financing, their long-term investments are 
minimal. El-Ashker argued that interest banks hold a large proportion of government 
bonds, which contravenes Islamic financial principles; he also claimed that the profit 
and loss sharing mode of financing is inadequate for long-term investments with 
prolonged payback periods (Al-Ashker, 1987).
The aim of applying financial ratios is to evaluate the efficiency and the 
profitability of the interest bank in comparison to the two non-interest banks. El- 
Ashker split the financial ratios into seven groups. The first ratio was net profit 
before tax/total assets, which measures the return on total assets. He discovered that 
the two non-interest banks have low profitability margins. On the other hand, their 
capital turnover ratio seems higher than that of the conventional bank. The third ratio 
is total revenue/total assets. The two non-interest banks seem to have higher revenue- 
to-total-assets ratios than the interest bank.
48 Non-interest banks have the capacity to afford more credit in comparison to their capital resources.
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El-Ashker also found that interest banks have higher banking-service-revenues- 
to-total-revenue ratios than non-interest banks. He noted that this is due to 
dissimilarities in the structure of each mode of financing. Non-interest banks use 
more than 95 per cent of their funds to finance commerce and small businesses. 
Securities trading accounts for a small portion of non-interest banks' activities (El- 
Ashker, 1987: 181-2).
The third group of financial ratios evaluates the ratio of deposits to total assets. It 
shows that the interest bank has lower deposits-to-total-assets ratios than the 
Financial Islamic Bank for Investment and the Islamic International Bank for 
Investment and Development. The fourth group of ratios indicates the relationship 
between a bank's financial ability and its lending effectiveness. El-Ashker claimed 
that non-interest banks give more lending facilities to their borrowers than interest 
banks, which invest part of their funds in securities. The National Bank of Egypt 
holds a greater amount of long-term finance, of which government bonds account for 
the largest part. The ratio of equity participation to total assets is higher in the 
Islamic International Bank for Investment and Development than in the National 
Bank of Egypt and the Financial Islamic Bank for Investment.
The fifth group comprises net profits after tax/equity capital and net profit after 
tax/paid up capital. It measures the shareholders' benefit from banking activities. El- 
Ashker argued that the absence of interest-rate income in Islamic finance means that 
shareholders receive more revenues in interest banking model than in non-interest 
banking model. Non-interest banks' earnings were also affected by zakat49 (El- 
Ashker, 1987: 183). The sixth group, which measures banks' liquidity, encompasses
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two ratios, cash and net bank due/total deposits and cash net bank due/current 
deposits. El-Ashker found that the Islamic International Bank for Investment and 
Development and the National Bank of Egypt are more liquid than the Financial 
Islamic Bank for Investment when total deposits are taken into consideration. 
However, the second ratio suggests that non-interest banks are more liquid than 
interest banks. Group seven evaluates the ratio of bank lending to total funds. It 
demonstrates that non-interest banks and the interest bank use a greater proportion of 
their deposits and equity to finance their operations (El-Ashker, 1987).50
El-Ashker used those financial ratios to demonstrate that non-interest banks are 
more competitive and efficient than interest banks in both lending and borrowing. 
"The religious enthusiasm of all parties concerned seems to represent a major factor 
behind the success of the banks, a factor which is reflected in what has become 
known as the resurgence of Islamic economics" (El-Ashker, 1987: 185).
The literature shows that globalisation of financial services has affected Islamic 
banking performance positively in both home and host countries. Non-interest banks' 
market share has grown rapidly in the Islamic world where there is high demand for 
non-interest financial products. Non-interest banks, such as E\-Baraka group and 
Radjhi, also trade their products in foreign markets such as the United Kingdom and 
the United States. Conversely, several interest banks now offer Islamic financial 
products. Altogether, the non-interest banking model has entered a new era in which 
non-interest banks compete directly with interest banks.
49 Zakat is an amount of money paid by wealthy people or other institutions to individuals who are in 
financial difficulties in the Muslim population (Lewis, 2001).
50 El-Ashker (1987) claimed that mark-up should be ignored so as to link lending capacity to financial 
resources. The amount paid will reduce the amount of cash at the bank.
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During the past decade, many scholars have studied the effects of globalisation on 
the banking industry. 51 The literature has shown that financial liberalisation, financial 
innovation and the Internet are the major factors behind this phenomenon. These 
three elements have changed banks' structures and activities. As a result, banking 
competition and efficiency have increased for both local and foreign banks.
Scholars agree that replacing a centralised financial system with a market- 
oriented financial system improves the allocation of financial resources. Foreign 
bank entries encourage existing local banks to improve their services and to 
modernise their operations. Nonetheless, the profitability and market share of local 
banks declined after financial liberalisation; this happened because of competition 
from foreign banks, which were in a better position in terms of technology and clean 
balance sheets.
Researchers share the opinion that financial liberalisation can promote banking 
efficiency in transitional countries (see, for example, Bonin and Leven, 1996; 
Oxelheim, 1995). Globalisation removes barriers to both local and foreign players 
and improves economies of scale and scope in the banking sector. Additionally, it 
reduces the government's role in the banking industry, something that improves 
banks' fund mobilisation and lending mechanisms.
State-owned banks need to be recapitalised and privatised to improve their 
services (see for instance, Bonin and Wachtel, 1999). Recapitalisation enables state- 
owned banks to reduce the amount of non-performing loans in their portfolios 
(Helleiner, 1999). On the other hand, lending money to loss-making enterprises must
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cease immediately (Shaw, 1973). The removal of the existing lending constraints 
helps state-owned banks to make good lending decisions and to improve their 
financial performance.
Scholars also concur about the role of financial innovation in integrating financial 
markets. The lack of innovation by local banks in many developing countries   
because of low technology and strict financial regulations   encourages foreign 
banks to offer new instruments that are more sophisticated and less costly (Davis, 
1983). These products create dynamism in the financial market and provide 
borrowers and lenders with many options when they are placing their funds. The 
positive response of individuals and corporations to new products helps banks 
penetrate new financial markets.
Few papers have studied the impact of e-banking on globalisation of financial 
services. Those papers determine the benefits of selling financial services through the 
Internet (Miklaszewska, 1998). They demonstrated that the Internet enables 
individuals and investors to access banks' products from anywhere in the world 
(Oxford Analytical Citibank, 1999). They also show how the Internet helps banks cut 
their costs and speed up their financial transactions.
The literature review has also shown that non-interest banks are growing steadily, 
especially in Muslim countries (Ainley, 1996). As a result, the competition between 
non-interest and interest banks has gradually increased. Muslim scholars have urged 
the sharia board to adopt a more flexible approach that would allow non-interest 
banks to launch new products and to become more competitive in domestic and 
foreign financial markets (Warde, 2000). They have also emphasised the need for
51 See for example, Armijo (1999), Buelens (1999), Campbell (1996) and Chen (1998)
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uniform accounting standards to evaluate non-interest banks' assets and liabilities 
(Duncan, 1996).
Many scholars52 noted that globalisation of financial services has contributed to 
an increase in banking profitability and competition. However, the experience of 
countries such as Malaysia shows that local banks' profit margins decline after 
financial liberalisation (Brimmer, 1998). To avoid a large drop in their earnings, 
local banks must improve their technology, staff training, capital and portfolio 
diversification to compete with those of foreign banks.
In a global economy, banks must boost their asset productivity to achieve 
economies of scale and scope. They need to extend credit to only high-return and 
low-risk businesses. They should develop securities activities, reduce low- 
performing assets, offer quality services, and cut costs. In addition, they should adopt 
"risk-adjustment returns" by using high-earning assets to foster capital distribution 
and increase "risk-adjusted returns" (Oxford Analytical Citibank, 2000: 3). They also 
need to improve "internal risk management" to ensure appropriate use of capital and 
thereby improve capital efficiency. The high net interest margin is important in 
modern retail financial services. Reducing non-performing assets and shifting to non- 
interest income are also necessary measures. Profitable banks tend to produce high 
revenues from their capital and assets. Consequently, they need to boost revenue 
growth, to deduct low-yield assets and to reallocate the composition of their assets 
(Oxford Analytical Citibank, 2000).
The next chapter analyses the developments in the Algerian banking industry 
since independence. This comprises four successive periods: (1) before independence
52 See for example, Levine (1996); Peek and Rosengren (2000)
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(1830-1962); (2) immediately after gaining independence (1962-68); (3) during the 
socialist economic regime; and (4) the transition to a market-oriented banking 
system. To fulfil the research aims, we focused our examination on the transitional 
period, i.e. 1990 onwards. This enabled us to analyse the changes that occurred in 
banking industry and stock market during and after financial liberalisation.
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This chapter analyses the institutional framework of the Algerian banking industry, 
showing its characteristics before and after independence. It also examines how 
financial liberalisation affected each banking group operating in Algeria. 53 The 
removal of restrictions such as interest rate ceilings and direct government 
interventions in state-owned banks' operations are expected directly to affect banking 
competition, profitability and efficiency (Benhalima, 1998).
Algeria is a former socialist country in which more than 90 per cent of the banking 
sector is owned by the state. After the country gained its independence in 1962, 
financial authorities implemented a centralised financial system, nationalising all 
foreign banks to create a monopolistic banking sector where all banks were owned by 
the state. State-owned banks' funds were used to finance state-owned enterprises and 
government expenditures, and the Ministry of Finance played a major role in 
mobilising financial resources. This situation remained unchanged until 1990, when 
the government first initiated its programme of financial liberalisation.
The Algerian banking sector has had four development periods (Benhalima, 1998). 
The first period was before independence, i.e., before 1962. hi this period, the
53 The increased number of private and foreign banks operating in Algeria can be attributed to financial 
liberalisation.
Algerian financial market was under the control of colonial banks, which fell into 
four categories: issuing, peoples (populaire), deposit and merchant banks. The second 
phase lasted from 1962-68. In this period, foreign banks dominated the national 
financial market. These banks were taken over by the newly established state-owned 
banks: Banque Nationale d'Algerie (BNA), Banque Exterieure d'Algerie (BEA) and 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie (CPA). The authorities also established a development 
bank, Banque d'Algerie de Developpement (BAD) to finance long-term investments. 
In the third period, 1968-90, all foreign banks were nationalised and replaced by 
state-owned banks. In the 1980s the government set up two new state banks, Banque 
de Developpement Local (BDL) and Banque de I'Agriculture et de Developpement 
Rural (BADR). The final phase, from 1990 onwards, took place after the Algerian 
authorities had initiated financial liberalisation. As a consequence of this move, 
several foreign and private banks moved into the Algerian financial market. 
Authorities also established the Algiers Stock Exchange and privatised state-owned 
enterprises, which transferred to joint-stock companies - "des societe par actions". 
Currently, only four companies are trading their shares on the Algiers Stock 
Exchange (Ministry of Finance, 2002).
There are three main categories of banks: domestic, foreign and Islamic (non- 
interest). These differ in their structure, activities and market share. State-owned 
banks still have a 90 per cent market share, and are followed by Algerian private 
banks and foreign banks. However, foreign banks' market share has grown steadily 
over the past five years and the sole non-interest bank, El-Baraka Bank, has likewise 
expanded its business by opening new branches and attracting new customers.
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The Algerian financial market is small in terms of number of players and volume 
of financial transactions.54 The government-controlled state-owned banks through the 
Ministry of Finance and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie. hi 1990, 80 per cent of state- 
owned banks' loans went to state-owned enterprises (Khalaf, 2000). Because the 
country had no stock exchange, the government had used the development bank to 
finance long-term investments. There were two forms of investments: centralised and 
decentralised.
In 1990, the new Law on Money and Credit led to various changes in the structure 
of the Algerian banking sector. The law allowed for the creation of private banks and 
for the establishment of foreign banks' branches in Algeria (Benhalima, 1998). The 
Bank of Algeria granted seven licences to private banks during the period 1990-2000 
(Bank of Algeria, 2000). It also granted many licences to foreign banks such as the 
Natexis El-Amana Bank and the Arab Bank Corporation. Nevertheless, only a few 
foreign banks opened branches in Algeria during that time because of political 
instability. In the past two years, Algeria has become more politically stable and this 
has encouraged other foreign banks to set up business in the country (Ministry of 
Finance, 2002). Analysts predict that the increase in the number of private banks and 
the appearance of new financial products will encourage local banks to modernise, 
their services and to learn from the experience of well-developed banks such as 
CitiBank and Societe General d'Algerie (SGA). Likewise, the withdrawal of the 
government from the banking sector will enable state-owned banks to reduce their 
bad debts and to improve their lending mechanisms.
54 There are 19 banks operating in Algeria: 6 state-owned banks, 7 Algerian private banks, and 6 
foreign banks (Bank of Algeria, 2003).
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There is currently only one non-interest bank in Algeria, El-Baraka Bank. It 
provides limited Islamic financial products such as musharaka, murabaha and 
mudamba, but has a monopoly on these financial instruments because no other 
financial institution offers similar products. El-Baraka Bank has only eight branches 
across the country, two of which are in the capital (El-Baraka Bank Annual Report, 
2001). 55
Foreign banks are the main providers of e-banking services in Algeria. Although 
large local banks have their own Web sites, they do not use the Internet to sell their 
products. Only 100,000 people in Algeria (0.3 per cent of the population) are Internet 
users and only 1.5 per cent of Algerian enterprises have their own Web sites (El- 
Watan, 2000). 56 Consequently, the Internet has a minimal impact on the Algerian 
financial market.
Modern banking began in Algeria in the mid-nineteenth century (Ernest-Picard, 
1930). The French authorities established many commercial and merchant banks to 
facilitate the financing of commerce (Rossignoli, 1973). 57 Those banks operated only 
in major cities; they did not serve rural areas. Some projects acquired credit through 
issuing, deposit or merchant banks; people's banks funded small firms; and the 
Caisse de Credit Agricole Mutuel served the financial needs of the agricultural sector.
55 In 1998, El-Baraka Bank employed 234 staff.
56 The Algerian government has opened the Internet services market to foreign competition. These new 
firms are trying to increase the number of users, but the process is still slow.
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From 1851 to 1880, the French authorities attempted to promote savings and to 
combat usury in the new colony (Ernest-Picard, 1930). The colony's strategic 
geographical location and its natural resources gave French authorities an incentive to 
establish Algeria's first bank, Banque d'Algerie. The roles of the Banque d'Algerie 
were to improve credit mobilisation, to encourage capital inflows into the colony, to 
enhance trade, and to extend credit to industry and agriculture in order to develop the 
economy. In the 1850s, the French government had also planned to establish a stock 
exchange in Algeria (Rossignoli, 1973).
Before 1880, the Banque d'Algerie portfolio included only secured loans 
(Rossignoli, 1973), but in the 1880s and 1890s the bank extended many loans to the 
agricultural and housing sectors to facilitate the increasing numbers of Europeans 
who entered Algeria during that period.58 The result was a sharp decline in the bank's 
assets. After the World War II, the French authorities decided to nationalise the 
Banque d'Algerie to boost its financial position and to improve its management. The 
bank was also given more authority in supplying credit to the economy. 59
The first French merchant bank to establish its network in Algeria was the Credit 
Algerien. In its first phase, it funded property acquisitions, and in its second phase it 
specialised in financing infrastructure. The second bank that offered services to 
investors was the Banque Industriellepour I 'Algerie et de la Mediteranee. It provided 
financial advice to investors in agriculture, commerce and industry; assisted other
57 The Algerian banking system was an integrated part of the French banking system until 
independence (Rossignoli, 1973).
58 Most of these newcomers were involved in farming (Rossignoli, 1973).
59 The Banque d'Algerie never acted as a central bank under French colonial rule because of financial 
rules adopted by the French government. For instance, French commercial banks were refinancing 
themselves through their parent banks in France. French banks were also not obliged to obtain 
financial ratios, as was the case in France (Rossignoli, 1973).
92
Algerian financial institutions with credit evaluation; and issued shares and bonds for 
companies and the government (Rossignoli, 1973).
After the World War II, French authorities in Algeria adopted policies to promote 
credit mobilisation and to strengthen France's financial link with the colony 
(Rossignoli, 1973). The plan also reinforced French control over credit allocation and 
deposit collection. Two committees were established in 1948 and several financial 
rules were initiated in 1947. 60 The role of the committees was to verify all banking 
decisions and to analyse banks' practical problems.
The French banks that entered Algeria after the World War II took over almost all 
Banque d'Algerie activities, especially those related to the agricultural sector and to 
commerce. France's large public and semi-public credit institutions were also 
involved in various lending activities in the 1950s, although those institutions were 
forbidden to open branches in the colony.
The Caisse de Credit Agricole Mutuel and the Societe Agricoles de Prevoyance 
managed credit to the agriculture sector. The Caisse de Credit Agricole Mutuel 
extended short-term loans and the Societe Agricoles de Prevoyance granted short-, 
medium- and long-term loans as well as receiving deposits from farmers. Benissad 
(1980) pointed out that short-term credit was commonly used in financing the 
agriculture sector. In fact, 43.7 per cent of the credit went to the agricultural sector, 
and 86 per cent of loans were short-term. Benissad (1980) noted that the colonial 
organisation of credit to the agricultural sector was based on notions of social and 
economic dualism.
60 The two committees were the Comite d'Organisation Profesionelle (professional organisation 
committee) and the Comite de Credit (credit committee).
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During colonisation, the Algerian market was entirely linked to the French market. 
The Banque d'Algerie had almost no influence on the market; the Treasury, acting 
through the issuing banks, met the colony's financial needs. The Conseil National du 
Credit (National Credit Council) served as the Algerian credit market's supervisory 
institution. To maintain economic stability, the council controlled liquidity ratios, 
personnel, inter-bank activities, and competition. It also granted licences for banks to 
operate in Algeria and for mergers (Rossignoli, 1973).
Outside the franczone, foreign exchange transactions controlled and capital 
outflow restricted (Rossignoli, 1973). Countries within the franczone were obliged to 
adopt fixed foreign exchange rates. Although capital flowed freely inside the 
franczone, capital movements took place by means of an advance account. The 
Banque d'Algerie had to open two accounts at the Banque de France. The first 
account showed daily financial transactions between Algeria and France. The second 
account was used when the first account had a deficit balance.
Before 1962, banks operating in Algeria fell into four categories: commercial 
banks, merchant banks, credit institutions and development banks (Rossignoli, 1973). 
French commercial banks had a network of 409 branches: 149 in Algiers, 154 in 
Oran, 83 in Constantine, and 23 close to oil regions in the Sahara. European investors 
entirely controlled the activities of those banks, and credit was extended in the form 
of short- or medium-term loans. There were three merchant banks: Credit Algerien 
(established in 1881), Banque Industriellepour I'Algerie et de la Mediterranee and 
the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. The first was engaged in funding real estate 
property and infrastructure. Banque In dustrielle pour I'Algerie et de la Mediterranee 
operated as an advisory body for commercial and private companies. The third bank
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was particularly involved in financing commercial and industrial businesses. Credit 
institutions did not have branches in Algeria. They mostly extended medium- and 
long-term loans to industry companies, funded local authorities, and funded the 
rediscount bills of commercial banks. The only development bank was the Caisse 
d'Equipment pour le Developpement de I'Algerie, which mainly financed large public 
and private companies (Rossignoli, 1973).
Many European investors left Algeria immediately after independence was declared 
on July 5, 1962. This had negative implications on the national economy as whole 
and on the banking sector in particular. Credit to the public and private sector 
declined dramatically because of the fall in the amount of deposits held at French- 
owned commercial banks and credit institutions (see Table 3.1). To improve the 
mobilisation of financial resources and to obtain control over the national banking 
sector, the Algerian financial authorities established several state-owned financial 
institutions and nationalised almost all foreign financial institutions. Both measures 
led to the creation of a state-owned banking sector and to the disappearance of 
foreign players.
From 1962-65, the financial authorities established three credit institutions. The 
people's banks also continued their market activities with financial support from the 
Algerian government, but they were obliged to lend to priority sectors designated by 
the state. The small savings banks and the Caisse Nationale d 'Epargne closed down 
after a central savings bank, the Caisse Nationale d'Epargne et de Prevoyance
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(CNEP), was set up in 1964. CNEP was established to fund housing, and to provide 
"social credit" and credit for domestic authorities (Benissad, 1980). 
Table 3.1: The French commercial banking network in Algeria in 1962
Bank
Credit Fonder d 'Algerie et de Tunisie^
Compagnie Algerienne de Credit et de Banque**2
Credit Lyonnais
Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et 1 'Industrie d 'Afrique
Societe Generate
Societe Marseillaise de Credit
Credit Industriel et Commercial
Comptoir National d 'Escompte de Paris
Credit du Nord
Barclays Bank
Worms et Cie
Total
Number of branches
133
131
61
45
18
8
8
4
2
2
2
414
Source: Rossignoli (1973)
Both people's banks and foreign banks suffered large financial losses in the years 
after independence.63 Their deposits lowered significantly: after the departure of 
European businessmen and staff, households' deposits decreased from 20 to 5 billion 
old francs. As a consequence, several banks closed down and others required state 
assistance to continue their operations. The number of foreign banks declined from 18 
in 1962 to 7 in 1968 (Rossignoli, 1973).
Before the nationalisation of the banking sector, the Banque Centrale d'Algerie 
(BCA) did not control credit flows and market liquidity. Foreign banks had a 
monopoly on both functions. However, the government policy of reducing foreign 
banks' market share increased the BCA's role as a "bankers' banker," and gave the 
BCA more control over internal and external credit flows. BCA granted many 
medium- and long-term loans to the agricultural sector. It also acted as an
61 The Credit Fonder d'Algerie et de Tunisie granted medium- and long-term credit to different sectors 
of the economy.
62 The Compagnie Algerienne de Credit et de Banque financed only trade and profitable businesses.
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intermediary between the domestic comptoirs d'escompte (discount house) and 
farmers. This contributed to better allocation of credit to the agricultural sector.
The credit that went to the agricultural sector constituted more than 60 per cent of 
total loans (Rossignoli, 1973). This was because most investments were within the 
farming industry. Other industrial sectors were underdeveloped and included only a 
few factories. Industry and trade respectively received less than 20 and 15 per cent of 
the credit. Of the available industrial credit, more than 50 per cent went to the energy 
and metallurgy industries (Rossignoli, 1973). The departure of European staff led to 
the closure of many factories and to a decline in trade volume, and it took a long time 
for the new state to build its own industry (Benissad, 1980). The production of the 
remaining factories declined substantially because of progressive deterioration in 
management and decrease in the source of financing.
The government founded the Caisses Algerienne de Developpement in 1963 for 
financing public investment and infrastructure. After 1966, the Caisses Algerienne de 
Developpement specialised in funding direct public investments. The bank used 
national and foreign financial resources to meet the financial needs of its borrowers. 
In the period between 1962 and 1968, investments in the public and socialist sector 
were also financed through the state budget and commercial bank loans (Benissad, 
1980).
Government banking policy from 1962 to 1968 contributed to high banking 
specialisation. The minister of finance, Kaid Ahmed, pointed out that state-owned 
banks' role was to collect financial resources and to use those resources to fund the
63 The managers of people's and foreign banks were Europeans and their operations were with French 
companies.
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economic planning operations designated to each bank (Ministere de I'Information, 
1967: 14-5).
After 1968, all of the banks were merged into three large banks that operated under 
the control of the central bank. However, two foreign banks continued their activities 
in Algeria: the Banque Populaire Arab and Compagnie Fran$aise de Credit et de 
Banque. The remaining foreign banks gradually decreased their activities because of 
nationalisation. Financial regulations forced those banks to close their branches, 
which were then taken over by the new national banks.
Foreign banks also extended credit to farmers, but after 1968 the Banque 
Nationale d'Algerie (BNA) became the only bank to specialise in financing the 
agricultural sector. Farmers were obliged to open their bank accounts with BNA. The 
BCA moved to other duties, which included direct lending to the government and 
making payments conjointly with public funds.64 According to Article 62 of Algeria's 
Financial Law, the BCA is a financial institution owned by the state. It is responsible 
for the supervision of the banking system and the management of foreign exchange
reserves.65
During the socialist economic regime, the government's objectives were to boost 
investments, to control capital movements, and to ensure the success of political 
adjustments (Benissad, 1980). Socialist policies also included controlling foreign
64 The aim of this new banking policy was to meet the financial needs of growing public sector.
65 See Benissad (1980) and Rossignoli (1973)
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exchange, centralising funds towards national enterprises, controlling consumer credit 
and supporting central bank interventions on agricultural credit.
Individuals and almost all state-owned enterprises were obliged to open their 
accounts with BNA, which was also the main source of funds for most industries (the 
hydrocarbon sector was an exception). About 75 per cent of BNA's loans were short- 
term credit; Banque Exterieure d'Algerie (BEA) made medium- and long-term loans 
to companies operating in the energy and metallurgy industries. That BNA had the 
lion's share of both short- and long-term loans, with more than 80 per cent of the 
market, and the largest network in the country, with 73 branches in 1969, explains 
why BNA had the largest market share, followed by BEA and Credit Populaire 
d'Algerie (CPA) (Rossignoli, 1973).
The main roles of state-owned banks were collecting deposits at low interest 
rates and financing government expenditures and state-owned enterprises' projects. 
This meant that interest rates on deposits and loans were negative in real terms. Banks 
were also forced to lend to particular sectors of the national economy such as 
agriculture and real estate. The BCA provided the commercial banks with liquidity by 
rediscounting their bills at fixed rates.
Foreign exchange activities were strictly regulated by the central bank, which was 
the only financial institution permitted to hold foreign currencies. The absence of a 
real foreign exchange market prevented foreign investors from bringing their capital 
into Algeria. Likewise, local investors were unable to operate in foreign markets 
because of the tight control on capital transfers.
Self-managed enterprises obtained credit through the remaining foreign banks, 
which only extended credit to solvent enterprises. Insolvent enterprises continued to
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operate only because they had state help (Benissad, 1980). By the late 1960s, these 
dramatic changes in the financing of self-managed enterprises had created confusion 
around distributing credit to those enterprises. 
Table 3.2: State-owned banks' operations during the socialist economic regime
Bank
Banque Exterieure d'Algerie 
(BEA)
Banque Nationale d'Algerie 
(BNA)
Credit Populaire d 'Algerie 
(CPA)
Caisse de Credit Municipal 
d'Algerie
Caisse Algerienne de 
Development
Activities
  Finances national companies in industry, especially 
hydrocarbon. 
Enhances transactions with foreign countries. 
Finances foreign trade.
Finances government projects. 
Finances public enterprises. 
Finances the agricultural sector.
Finances small to medium public enterprises, hotels, fisheries 
and craftsmen.
  Provides credit to individuals "social loans". Functions as a 
traditional pawnshop.
  Mobilises loans from national and international banks. 
  Facilitates credit to small and medium enterprises. 
  Manages bonds and foreign investments and assets.
Source: Rossignoli (1973)
The scope of public investments started to grow quickly when the government 
initiated its first quadrennial plan (1970-73). Under this programme, control on 
capital flows was reinforced considerably. To cope with new economic conditions, 
the financial authorities adopted three ways of financing their economic planning: 
medium-term loans from commercial banks, long-term loans granted by the BCA and 
Ministry of Finance, and borrowing from international financial markets, hi 1975, 
self-financing became permissible and 1978 saw the creation of another means of 
financing, the development grant. Despite these efforts, capital was only available for 
priority projects, which were almost non-profit making.
State-owned enterprises were more concerned with production than profitability 
(Benissad, 1980). As a consequence, they had negative growth in real terms. Despite 
this, state-owned banks continued to fund their projects under the government
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programme of economic development and employment. Over time, the loans that 
went to those enterprises became non-performing and started to appear in state-owned 
banks' balance sheets.
Households in the Algerian financial system were placing their deposits in the five 
commercial banks or with the state-owned savings bank, Credit Nationale d 'Epargne 
et de Prevoyance (Benhalima, 1998). In the main, currency was the only financial 
instrument used by households to conduct financial transactions. However, 
households were not allowed to hold treasury bills.66 To maintain low market risk, 
Algerian financial law also required households' funds to be channelled into 
unproductive investments (Beltas and Jones, 1993).
Almost all investments were by the state, and the private sector was small. 
Investment decisions were based on the budgetary policy of the government rather 
than on the productivity of the project (Benhalima, 1997). It was also compulsory for 
banks to finance projects selected by the government; concerns about their 
profitability were not admissible (Benhalima, 1997).
Authorities adopted two methods of mobilising local financial resources. First, the 
government used state-owned banks to collect savings. Second, the treasury issued 
investment bonds in two categories: 5-year maturity at 5 per cent and 10-year 
maturity at 6 per cent (Rossignoli, 1973). Pension funds and insurance companies 
were required to hold those bonds. State-owned enterprises were forced to keep their 
deposits and accumulation depreciation in a treasury account opened specifically for 
companies' deposits.
66 Households were powerless to purchase several financial assets and the demand for their services 
was limited.
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Four separate accounts were opened to receive deposits: comptes de cheque 
(cheque account), comptes courant (current account), bons de caisse (certificate of 
deposits) and comptes a echeancefixe (fixed-term account). The comptes de cheque 
was opened for individuals and the comptes courants for people engaged in 
commerce, farming or industry. Both of these were current accounts. The two other 
accounts were certificat a term fixe (fixed-term certificates) and depot a term fixe 
(fixed-term deposits).
State-owned banks rarely traded government securities, which were mainly in the 
form of public treasury bonds. State-owned banks mostly granted credit in the form 
of overdrafts on current accounts. Guaranteed loans were used only in foreign 
transactions. The Finance Act of 1971 also prevented state-owned banks from 
extending consumer credit. 67
In the 1970s, the relationship between state-owned enterprises and state-owned 
banks was strengthened to monitor the distribution of credit to the national economy. 
State-owned enterprises were obliged to submit their business plans to the state- 
owned banks. Credit to state-owned enterprises was granted based on the 
government's annual financial plan, and the Ministry of Finance had authority to 
modify the amount of credit extended to state-owned enterprises.
After 1971, various mechanisms limited competition in the banking sector 
(Benissad, 1980). First, in the absence of private banks, state-owned banks had a 
monopoly on funding industries and on collecting savings. Every enterprise was 
required to deal with one commercial bank. Second, credit arrangements between
67 Companies had no right to lend to each other. The exception was trade credit.
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state-owned enterprises were forbidden (Benissad, 1980).68 Both regulations enabled 
state-owned banks to observe state-owned enterprises' financial adaptability and to be 
the only source of their funding. Second, the Algerian financial market was closed to 
foreign competitors and current and capital account transactions were strictly 
controlled.
State-owned enterprises were operating according to the government's plans for 
employment and consumer prices, and were not concerned about productivity and 
profitability. This resulted in a decline in state-owned enterprises' capital output 
ratios. The increase in the state budget deficit due to declining oil revenues led to a 
fall in the amount of subsidies the government extended to the public sector. State- 
owned enterprises became unable to service their debts and non-performing loans 
began to augment. These non-performing loans caused an imbalance in the state- 
owned banks' balance sheets. The sudden decline in oil prices in 1986 made matters 
worse, and non-performing loans accounted for a high proportion of commercial 
banks' assets. To reduce the pressure on state-owned banks, the government initiated 
financial liberalisation in the 1990s (Benhalima, 1998).
The financial liberalisation programmes introduced in the 1990s had the following 
goals: (1) to decrease the government's role in the financial sector; (2) to organise 
local savings; (3) to introduce market-oriented banking mechanisms; (4) to improve 
banks' solvency; and (5) to enhance competition in the banking sector (Jbili et al,
68 The consequence was the absence of inter-enterprises debt (Benissad, 1980).
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1997). The Law on Money and Credit of 1990 was the first step to be taken by the 
Algerian government to remove many barriers towards domestic and foreign banks. It 
reduced the role of the state in the banking sector and also gave the central bank full 
authority to manage the financial sector. The law enabled both private banks and 
foreign banks to operate in parallel with state-owned banks. It also allowed state- 
owned banks to select their borrowers and to enter other businesses.
The aim of the financial restructuring initiated by the government in the 1990s was 
to set up a sound institutional framework. The Ministry of Finance withdrew 
gradually from funding the national economy, although exceptions were made for 
"strategic" sectors such as hydrocarbons and infrastructure (Benhalima, 1998). The 
authorities also allowed banks to finance a variety of industries and to select their 
borrowers. Starting in 1993, the commercial banks' refinancing came directly from 
the money market.
The government implemented several programmes to restructure the financial 
sector. First, direct lending to state-owned enterprises and the treasury was gradually 
removed to enable banks to improve the quality of their credit. Second, new 
procedures for financing the government budget reduced the amount of funds used by 
banks to finance government expenditures.69 Third, the Treasury ceased its 
involvement in financing state-owned enterprises, and in 1994 state-owned banks 
were given more autonomy in managing their credit to the economy. Fourth, 
authorities abandoned the compulsory holding of treasury bills by state-owned banks. 
However, state-owned banks still have a significant proportion of treasury papers on
69 The government budget deficit is now financed on a market basis and direct credit has been reduced 
dramatically.
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their balance sheet, and Credit Nationale d'Epargne et de Prevoyance has continued 
to finance public housing.70
To promote competition among local banks, authorities opened the national 
financial market to private participation. In 1990, the government also abandoned 
rules that obliged state-owned banks to finance "priority sectors". These measures 
have contributed to a steady increase in competition between state-owned and non- 
state-owned banks. Nevertheless, the high specialisation of state-owned banks and 
their small number has impeded competition in the market.
Third, Algerian authorities adopted gradual interest rate liberalisation. The process 
started in 1990, when administrative interest rates on credit were eliminated for both 
private and public sectors (Nashashibi et al, 1998). Interest rates on deposits were 
totally liberalised by the end of 1990. In 1995, the authorities ended the banking 
spread method of lending and allowed banks to offer competitive lending rates.
Ceiling interest rates on credit were the norm during the 1990s. The consequence 
was a negative interest rate in real terms. Besides, the dramatic increase in inflation 
was not reflected by a change in the interest rate. In 1994, authorities removed the 
ceiling rate on credit and fixed the interest rate spread at 5 per cent to avoid collusion 
between commercial banks (Nashashibi et al, 1998). The decline in the inflation rate 
since 1996 has also led to a positive interest rate.
Fourth, capital account transactions have been liberalised to improve competition 
in the financial market, to mobilise foreign exchange resources, and to facilitate the 
movement of foreign direct investments into the country (Nashashibi et al, 1998). hi
70 In 1995, the government used new auction methods to trade treasury bonds in the money market. All 
financial institutions are allowed to purchase those bonds.
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April 1994, the government abandoned barriers preventing the use of foreign 
exchange. However, restrictions on residents' capital were continued to avoid capital 
outflows from Algeria.
Fifth, the government replaced non-performing loans with bonds (Nashashibi et 
al, 1998). The first bonds were issued in 1992-93 and they accounted for about 23 
per cent of GDP. The treasury used external debt rearrangement to pay back most of 
those bonds. In 1994, an audit of state-owned banks' balance sheets showed that all 
banks except BNA needed injections of capital. In 1995, CPA and BEA received 
AD 10 billion under a programme of recapitalisation. In 1997, the financial authorities 
issued the second loan-bond swap for the benefit of BADR, BNA and CNEP. 71 Those 
bonds accounted for 8.5 per cent of GDP and they were not serviced in cash (Iradian, 
Bazzoni and Stefania, 2000). In total, between 1991 and 1997 the government 
injected AD 168 billion into state-owned banks to cover the losses that resulted from 
foreign exchange and from previous loans to state-owned enterprises (Iradian, 
Bazzoni and Stefania, 2000).
Sixth, commercial banks arranged new credit terms for the benefit of profit- 
making state-owned enterprises. Meanwhile, many short-term overdrafts were 
replaced by medium-term loans. Enterprises applying for those loans were required to 
have equity participation from banks, performance contracts, and proof of 
commercial viability. 72 Extending the maturity date of loans helped state-owned 
enterprises to stay alive and thus avoided job losses (Nashashibi et at, 1998).
71 The interest rate on those non-negotiable bonds was fixed at 10 per cent. BADR accumulated large 
amounts of non-performing loans to the pharmaceutical and food agencies.
72 These are used to monitor the financial strength of state-owned enterprises.
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Because of the small size of the private sector and delays in privatisation, state- 
owned banks continue to fund public projects. Despite many accumulated bad loans, 
the government still believes that privatising those banks will cause financial market 
destabilisation and large job losses. The result is that the accumulated bad loans 
reached USD 17 billion in 2000 (Bank of Algeria, 2000). 
Table 3.3: Credit to the private sector / GDP
Algeria
Jordan
Morocco
Tunisia
Turkey
1993(%)
7
61
25
54
16
1998 (%)
14.6'
73
25'
51
25'
Source: IMF statistics, July 1999 
1 Data for 1997.
The Algerian private sector received a small amount of credit, only 7 per cent of 
GDP in 1993 compared with 93 per cent extended to public sector (see Table 3.3). In 
1997, credit to the private sector was only 14.6 per cent; 85.4 per cent went to the 
public sector (IMF, 1999). However, in 1999, credit to the private sector increased 
slightly, to about 17.8 per cent. Credit to the public sector was around 82.2 per cent of 
the total credit injected into the economy (IMF, 1999).
Seventh, the government established the first inter-bank foreign exchange market 
in 1996. Since then, foreign exchange rates have been determined by market 
mechanisms. Revenues from foreign exchange activities go to local banks instead of 
to the central bank. Local banks are given the autonomy to trade both local and 
foreign currencies, but the amount traded is small and banks are obliged to fulfil 
foreign exchange regulations.
Eighth, the secondary market for treasury bills opened in March 1998. It included 
two categories of securities, short-term treasury bills with maturity between 13 and
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52 weeks, and medium-term treasury notes with 2-year maturity. Those securities 
were traded twice a week. Only primary dealers, Specialistes en Valeurs du Tresor, 
have the right to trade securities. The small numbers of traded securities and market 
dealers have weakened the market substantially.
The new law phased out direct financing of the government budget deficit. 
Instead, the government established an auction market to sell treasury bonds to 
financial institutions. Another source of government budget financing was the central 
bank. However, insurance companies and pension funds are still obliged to hold 
certain government papers. It is extremely important to develop new long-term 
financial products within the auction market. This helps the government fund its 
expenses without resorting to central bank funds.
Ninth, after 1994 the authorities initiated further financial restructuring to improve 
commercial banks' accounting standards. All banks are required to meet the 
capital/risk-weighted asset ratio including non-interest banks. In 1995, the 
government introduced new financial rules for provisioning, risk concentration and 
loan classification (Nashashibi et al, 1998). The new regulations oblige banks to 
record overdue interest payment as income and to make provisions for off-balance 
sheet items.
Another stage in financial liberalisation is the entry of foreign banks into the 
national market. Almost all branches opened by foreign banks are located in five 
cities: Algiers, Oran, Constantine, Annaba and Hassi Messoud. 73 They follow their 
customers, who operate in those areas. Those cities also have more developed
73 Algiers is the capital of the country. Oran, Constantine and Annaba are the three other major cities. 
Hassi Messoud is the main oil region of Algeria.
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telecommunication systems compared with other regions. Foreign banks also attempt 
to strength links with multinational companies in those regions.
The entry of foreign banks into Algeria has contributed to the launch of new 
financial products. For example, in August 1999, Citibank announced a new 
instrument called 'banque a distance' (Agence Algerienne d'lnformation Online, 
1999). This instrument allows clients to access their accounts from a distance. It was 
the first financial product that allowed Algeria's financial service customers to access 
their accounts instantly and directly, to conduct all their banking operations 
(including foreign transactions) from a distance, and to access their credit accounts 
from a computer station. Banque a distance also helps Citibank's clients increase 
their efficiency and quicken their financial transactions.
Techniques adopted by foreign banks are different from those of local banks. For 
instance, Citibank's strategic orientation in North Africa provides its clients with 
innovative financial products and enables wealthy customers and large companies to 
access modern financial services (Citibank, 2000). Banks from the Gulf, such as the 
Aran Banking Corporation and the Arabic Bank, have been engaged mostly in 
financing trade and small businesses (Arab Banking Corporation Annual Report, 
1999). It has been found that almost all foreign banks' activities are with large 
national and foreign companies (interview notes, 2001). For example, Citibank deals 
only with the energy companies Sonatrach and Sonelgas, and with the 
pharmaceutical sector (financial executive, Citibank, 2001).
Algerian private shareholders have stake in the capital of foreign banks such as 
SGA and Arab Banking Corporation (ABC), 28 and 20 per cent, respectively (Ghiles, 
1999a). The only foreign bank whose entire capital belongs to its parent company is
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Citibank. It has been also discovered that foreign banks have small capital compared 
with state-owned banks (see Table 3.4). This has a negative effect on foreign banks' 
lending potential (interview notes, 2001).
Table 3.4: Foreign banks' source of capital in Algeria
Citibank. 
(USA)
Natexis. 
(France)
SGA. 
(France)
ABC. 
(Kingdom of Bahrain)
Parent 
Company
AD 1.2 billions 
(100%)
AD400 millions 
(80%)
AD305 millions 
(61%)
AD828.1 millions 
(80%)
Private 
Shareholders
-
AD 140 millions 
(28%)
AD236.6 millions 
(20%)
Other 
Shareholders
AD 100 millions 
(11%)
AD55 millions 
(11%)
AD 11 8.3 
millions (10%)
Total
AD 1.2 
billions
AD500 
millions
AD500 
millions
AD1.183 
billions
Source: Chiles (1999a)
Almost all foreign banks operating in Algeria are highly profitable (Agence
Algerienne d'Information Online, 2001). For example, the Natexis Amana (France) 
earned USD 1.06 million in 2000, while the capital of the bank was only USDS 
million. The Arab Banking Corporation (Kingdom of Bahrain) had capital of USD20 
million and generated USDS.31 million in profit during the same year. The only 
foreign bank that made a loss during the accounting year 2000 was SGA (France) 
(Agence Algerienne d'Information Online, 2001).
The Algiers Stock Exchange began operating in July 1999 (IMF, 2000). The role of 
Algiers Stock Exchange is to facilitate the privatisation of state-owned enterprises 
and to improve the mobilisation of financial resources. Currently, the four listed 
companies' shares float at about 20 per cent of their capital. Brokers (Intermidiaries
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en Operations de Bourse) operate as guarantors of each transaction because of 
absence of legal contract enforcement and poor standardisation. The stock market 
valuation company (Societe de Gestion de la Bourse des Valeurs) controls the trading 
of shares and the securities and exchange commissions (Commission d'Organisation 
et de Surveillance des Operations de Bourse) have a duty to enhance transparency in 
the market and to protect market dealers.
The Algiers Stock Exchange was established in three stages. In the first stage, 
which took place between 1988 and 1992, the authorities set up the society for stocks 
and shares (Societe des Valeurs Mobiliers). The capital of the Societe des Valeurs 
Mobiliers in January 1988 was USD54,100. The role of the Societe des Valeurs 
Mobiliers was to organise trading of stocks and shares. In the second stage, which 
lasted from 1992 to 1998, the Societe des Valeurs Mobiliers faced several problems, 
such as insufficient capital and a change of its designation to a stock market valuation 
company (Bourse des Valeurs Mobiliers). In February 1992, the Bourse des Valeurs 
Mobiliers capital was raised to USD427,523. The delay in increasing the BVM 
capital had obstructed its operations.
The Societe de Gestion de la Bourse des Valeurs controls the stock exchange 
operations (Commission d'Organisation et de Surveillance des Operations de Bourse, 
1998). It manages the negotiation system of shares, mobilises financial transactions 
within the stock exchange, organises operations concerning compensation for share 
trading, and promotes market transparency. The mode of functioning of the Societe 
de Gestion de la Bourse des Valeurs is entirely automatic. It assists intermediaries to 
reduce risk, conduct large transactions, reduce costs and quicken transactions 
(Commission d'Organisation et de Surveillance des Operations de Bourse, 1998).
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The Societe de Gestion de la Bourse des Valeurs, the company managing the 
Algiers Stock Exchange, claims that the market is performing successfully. Certainly, 
stockholders have received high dividends on their shares. After a good business year 
(1999), the Eriad Setifpaid a dividend of AD100 per share to its shareholders. The 
pharmaceutical group Sai'dal also paid high dividends to its shareholders. The high 
performance of listed companies will encourage other companies to trade their shares 
in the Algiers Stock Exchange (Ihsan, 2000). Under the new government programme 
of privatisation, state-owned enterprises have the right to go public (article 15 and 25 
of order number 15-22, 26 August 1995).
The delay in the privatisation of state-owned enterprises has hampered the 
Algiers Stock Exchange (Disan, 2000). The Societe de Gestion de la Bourse des 
Valeurs selected a few companies to trade their shares in the market, but none of 
them has been subscribed yet except the hotel El-Aurassi. These delays 
notwithstanding, it is expected that 20 companies will enter the market in the near 
future. Those companies' applications have not been officially accepted because of 
managerial and technical problems.
The analysis in this chapter has shown that financial liberalisation is the fundamental 
driving force of the financial market integration in Algeria. Financial liberalisation 
removes many regulatory barriers towards domestic and foreign banks. New financial 
rules enable state-owned banks to select their borrowers and to extend their 
operations to new markets. The establishment of the Algiers Stock Exchange is
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another result of financial liberalisation. The government also created an inter-bank 
market and a market for trading treasury bills. However, further procedures such as 
privatisation of state-owned banks are strongly required before the centrally planned 
economy can be completely transformed into a market-oriented one.
With a 90 per cent market share, state-owned banks control almost all lending and 
borrowing activities (Iradian, Bazzoni and Joly, 2000). All state-owned enterprises 
still have their accounts with state-owned banks, which remain their main source of 
funding. The small presence of foreign banks and Algerian private banks has 
negatively affected banking competition as well as investments in both public and 
private sectors.
Banking recapitalisation has helped state-owned enterprises to clean non- 
performing loans from their balance sheet and to improve their financial strength. For 
example, the capital of BNA rose from AD4,200 million in 1994 to AD8,000 million 
in 1998, a 95 per cent increase (BNA Annual Reports). Nonetheless, the quality of 
state-owned banks' portfolios has suffered from poor lending policies and 
underdeveloped payment systems.
As previously noted, several foreign banks opened branches or representative 
offices in Algeria in the past decade (Nashashibi et al, 1998). However, their main 
activities remain concentrated in the large cities and near the oil fields in the south, 
the primary locations of large foreign and domestic companies. The small presence of 
foreign banks in the national financial market is due to the high risk they perceive in 
the country and to regulatory constraints imposed by the central bank. Operational 
obstacles also confront foreign banks, including limited financial instruments, small 
capital and the undersized banking network (interview notes, 2001).
113
Banking privatisation is on the Algerian government's agenda, but political and 
social constraints have prevented the sale of state-owned banks' assets to private and 
foreign investors (Banker, 2000a). Labour organisations also oppose the privatisation 
of the public sector, including banks, because they claim that the process will cause 
large job losses. Privatisation is considered a key factor in any programme of 
financial liberalisation, as it enables state-owned banks to improve their internal and 
external management and to benefit from the process of globalisation of financial 
services (see Michael, 1997).
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This chapter analyses the lending and borrowing mechanisms of interest banks and 
non-interest banks. It also determines the operational constraints facing the interest 
banking model and the non-interest banking model in the collection of public savings 
and the financing of investments. Profit and loss sharing is the most basic determinant 
of non-interest banks' funding allocations (Siddiqi, 1983), whereas interest banks 
apply market criteria in mobilising their financial resources (Aggrawal and Tariq, 
2000). Because interest banks and non-interest banks compete in the global financial 
market, it is important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each banking 
model and to study the impact of globalisation of financial services on their efficiency 
and profitability.
Rules that manage Islamic financial transactions are based upon four main 
sources: Quran, Hadith, Ijmaa and Qiyas.14 Although these texts are more concerned 
with psychological, sociological and anthropological issues, they also determine 
trading rules in financial markets. To improve Islamic finance and promote economic
74 Quran is Allah's (God's) words sent to Prophet Mohammed. Hadith is the verbal transmission of the 
Sunna of Prophet Mohammed words. Ijmaa is the consensus of the community. And Qiyas is based on 
analogical reason. These four sources are used to determine what is halal (permitted) or haram 
(forbidden) according to Islamic law (Schacht, 1964). For example, the trading of wine and pork are 
banned by Quran.
growth, non-interest banks need new financial mechanisms that do not violate Islamic 
rules against usury.
Interest rates encourage savings and investment, which boosts the economy and 
increases societal wealth (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). But in the Islamic world, 
religion greatly influences people's daily financial transactions. According to the 
Quran it is forbidden for Muslims to ask their borrowers to make a payment 
exceeding the principal. For this reason, Islamic scholars have deemed interest rates 
unacceptable. Muslims should receive back only the principal plus the proportion of 
the profit generated from banking activities.
The profit and loss sharing mode of financing dramatically affects the techniques 
used by non-interest banks in managing their assets and liabilities. On the other hand, 
the role of money is different in interest banking model and non-interest banking 
model. In non-interest banking model, money is invested to satisfy economic and 
social needs and to increase societal wealth (Warde, 2000). In the West, money is 
invested to create value and to increase shareholders' profits.
Historically, non-interest banks appeared in the 1970s after some Muslim 
governments, such as those of Iran and Pakistan, finally approved them (Gafoor, 
1995). 75 The non-interest banking model is based on the profit and loss sharing mode 
of financing. In technical terms, non-interest banks play almost the same role as 
interest banks: they are intermediaries between lenders and borrowers. However, 
many practical differences exist between the two banking models.76 Despite Islamic
75 Three decades later, in 2000, it was estimated that non-interest banks managed between USD 100 
and USD 150 billion, that their assets exceeded USD4,137 billion, and that their annual growth is 
almost 15 per cent (Banker, 2000c).
76 For example, under non-interest banks, the relationship among savers, investors, and the bank is a 
partnership. In investment accounts, the principle is not guaranteed as well.
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law, interest banks are widely accepted in Muslim countries. In Algeria, almost all 
banks apply the interest banking model principles of taking deposits and extending 
credit. Individuals and investors also prefer to deal with interest banks because 
deposits seem to be safer than with non-interest banks.
The globalisation of financial services opened the way for both non-interest banks 
and interest banks to compete head to head. It is anticipated that the competition 
between the two groups of banks will steadily increase and that this will affect their 
profitability. However, this will only occur if banks are highly efficient, and 
efficiency depends on banks' abilities to satisfy their clients at low cost.
To maintain high efficiency, non-interest banks offer a variety of financial 
instruments to both depositors and investors. Mudaraba (capital trust financing), 
murabaha (cost-plus profit contract), musharaka (partnership), ijara wa-iqtina (hire 
purchase contract) and ijara (leasing) are the main financial products offered by non- 
interest banks (Duncan, 1996).
In murabaha the money owner (rabb al-mal) put his funds under the care of a 
managing trustee (mudarib) according to an agreement. Depositors receive part of the 
profit on an operational basis and not as a lump sum or a guaranteed return. The 
mudarib is not responsible for the loss of capital. As a result, non-interest bank bears 
high operational risk. There are two viewpoints about the allocation of profits 
generated from mudaraba transactions. Hanafis and Hanabalis claim that capital
77
117
should be returned first to the rabb al-mal and then profit can be shared; Malikis and 
Shaflis argue that a bank should distribute profits after the completion of entire 
operations and that capital should be repaid afterwards (Warde, 2000). 78
Murabaha is used to finance short-term investments and commerce. The bank 
provides funds and the entrepreneur manages the business. At the end of the project, 
the entrepreneur should return the capital plus a proportion of the retained profit. If 
the project performed poorly, the bank loses not only the possibility of making profit 
but also loses part of the capital invested. Because the bank bears the losses, it must 
have the right to transfer ownership of goods at any time after the contract in case it 
needs to purchase properties or any other commodities for the benefit of its clients by 
means of a murabaha contract. It is also necessary that banks insist on collateral for 
large loans to reduce credit risk.
Musharaka applies to financing working capital and to equity financing. A bank 
may provide capital, audit and management assistance for the investment venture. 
The profit earned at the end of each accounting period is shared as stated in the 
agreement between the bank and its partners. 79 Musharaka can be subdivided into 
mufawada (limited liability partnership) and sharikat-e-nan (limited investment 
partnership). 80 In mufawada all partners contribute to the joint venture capital and 
have equal responsibilities for profits and losses incurred at the end of each financial
77 Mudaraba contracts can be negotiable or non-negotiable. The bank may involve itself directly in the 
project's management or may just provide sufficient funds to the entrepreneur. Usually, the bank 
provides technical advice to the entrepreneur and examines the venture accounts.
78 Hanafis, Hanabalis, Malikis and Shafiis are four Islamic schools of thought (Vogel and Hayes, 
1998).
79 It is similar to an equity market in the Western context. Shares are sold to the government, to the 
ublic or to banks, and company's assets must guarantee all shares. 
:0 The practical implication of this subdivision of musharaka is to enable investors to involve fully or 
partly in the management of the business venture.
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year. In sharikat-e-nan all partners provide funds and management, but partners do 
not guarantee each other. However, the bank and investors bear losses together and 
this can cause high systematic risk (Warde, 2000).
It is possible to combine musharaka and mudaraba contracts by investing initial 
capital on a musharaka basis and working capital on a mudaraba basis. The 
mudaraba and musharaka are unacceptable if the mudarib engage in prohibited 
activities such as gambling or wine-making. It is worth noting that the entrepreneur 
can repay the loan progressively in case of musharaka mutanikasa (diminishing 
partnership). The objective of introducing this kind of repayment is to raise the 
entrepreneur's capital share of the project.
The payment in an ijara contract (leasing) is made in advance. The leaseholder 
remains the owner of the leased assets except in "ijara wa iktian " (hire purchase 
contract) where assets are transmitted to the lessee. The asset price cannot be 
predicted because, from an Islamic standpoint, only God knows what will happen in
O I
the future. Ijara is used to finance medium-term projects. However, several 
difficulties arise with leasing. These are related to the nature of the contract, to 
procedures for measuring the return on assets, and to the method of calculating 
depreciation on fixed assets.
Another financial product used by non-interest banks is bay salam (forward sales), 
in which banks' clients pay in advance the price of commodities they will receive 
afterwards (Duncan, 1996). This instrument is used extensively in the agricultural 
sector. In istisana (manufacturing contract), the payment must be made in advance 
and commodity is delivered afterwards. The seller also has the right to negotiate the
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price of a commodity before its delivery (Mills and Presley, 1999). This is important 
to avoid confusion between the seller and the purchaser about the price of a 
commodity. The remuneration for the bank can be in the form of conduction fees or 
profit. Istisna applies to semi- and fully manufactured products; goods in their raw 
state are not eligible for istisna contracts.
Istisna is used mainly for financing long-term investments. The non-interest bank 
may own the business and charge the lessee fees based on the business's profit rate; 
or the non-interest bank may sell the business to the lessee, adding additional costs to 
the selling price. In Western countries, long-term projects are funded by various 
financial means, such as the issuance of long-term securities.
Non-interest banks also deal with commodities and foreign exchange trading. 
These activities are allowed under the sharia code of financing. But non-interest 
banks are not allowed to deal with bonds, whether issued by government or 
corporations, because they involve interest rates that are forbidden under Islamic 
financial rules. Fixed-income securities such as fixed-coupon bonds are also 
unacceptable under Islamic law. Investors may venture on activities financed by a 
non-interest bank, but Islamic law prohibits investors to engage in activities that 
cause economic or moral damage to society.82 An equity investment can also be used 
to fund a joint venture, but certain equities are not tolerable when the company's 
income comes from illegal operations such as gambling and wine trading (Mills and 
Presley, 1999). 83
81 Leasing is adopted in all operations with non-interest banks.
82 Examples of activities that cause social damage are production or trading of tobacco, arms and
drugs.
83 Equities and commodities can be adopted only if the investor's intention is to increase the economic
value or wealth of society.
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Non-interest banks offer other types of financing such as letters of credit, 
corporate finance and investment banking services. Financial innovations lead to the 
appearance of takaful (co-operative insurance) in which the bank receives funds from 
its participants in instalments and uses those funds to finance its investments. Another 
innovation is the Islamic Equity Repo that was introduced in 1999 (Brooks, 1999).
The list of interest banks offering Islamic financial products is growing steadily 
(Banker, 2000b). Examples include Citibank Islamic Investment Bank, ABN AMRO 
Global Islamic Financial Services and ANZ Islamic Investment Fund. Those banks 
have succeeded in converting many conventional products into Islamic financial 
instruments. Their long-term experience in managing banking assets and liabilities 
can be used as a means to improve Islamic finance. For commercial reasons, the new
QA
products have attracted many non-Muslim investors. They also allow interest banks 
to diversify their portfolios and to increase their market share in South East Asia and 
the Middle East.
It is illegal for non-interest banks to trade shares of companies involved in 
prohibited operations such as the production of tobacco. The same prohibition applies 
to entertainment companies, companies that receive more than 5 per cent interest 
income, companies that have dividends to total assets equal or above 45 per cent, and 
companies that have total debt to total assets equal or above 33 per cent (Zaher and 
Hassan, 2001). Islamic investors are not allowed to buy insurance products because 
they include gharar (speculation). The only acceptable insurance instrument is 
mutual insurance, and the only available product in this domain is takaful (co- 
operative insurance).
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Financial products are prohibited when they involve usury (Siddiqi, 1983). From 
an Islamic standpoint, usury occurs when a buyer of a commodity pays an additional 
amount of money above and beyond the current price (this is "riba al-fadf\ an 
increase based on difference in quality) or when he receives reward from a loan in 
advance, making any positive return (this is "riba-nasi'ah", an increase related to 
deferment). The borrower has to pay only the current commodity price. However, the 
seller can justify receiving more money if the trading of commodity achieves 
economic growth in the society. In a market economy, the interest is defined as the 
fee paid by a borrower to a lender for the use of borrowed money. For some modern 
Islamic scholars, the interest can be accepted if the money received by the bank has 
been invested and has produced a positive return (Zaher and Hassan, 2001). For 
negative returns, the investors and the bank have to share the loss.
The absence of a real Islamic inter-bank market makes non-interest banks face 
high liquidity. Non-interest banks are also not allowed to raise funds from 
conventional financial markets because of "the vagaries of interpretation by Islamic 
scholars" about the suitability of conventional financial products (Banker, 1998: 57). 
Non-interest saving products are only acceptable in markets where there is a strong 
support from Islamic scholars. Researchers representing the sharia board need to 
agree on the criteria followed by banks in selecting their financial products.
The secondary market for Islamic financial products is tiny and illiquid. Investors 
and banks cannot exploit the market potential because of the limited number long- 
term instruments that are available. As a consequence, it is critical to create new long- 
term products and to develop the current money market to improve the non-interest
84 See Brooks (1999), pp. 37-40.
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banks' liquidity.85 Providing large-scale, off-balance-sheet financial instruments 
would also enable non-interest banks to diversify their portfolios and to boost their 
liquidity.
There is a need for a uniform sharia board that discusses the worldwide 
acceptability of new financial instruments. The role of the board should be to select 
and identify new financial products that comply with Islamic financial law. This 
board could also explain these new products from both religious and economic 
standpoints.
The price of stocks is usually based on uncertainty, and this causes speculation 
(Warde, 2000). Thus, most securities trading are forbidden by the Islamic code of 
financing. Rational investors also have better information about stocks than
o/r
speculators. Speculation includes arbitrage, which is unacceptable in Islamic law 
because the arbitrageur benefits from the differentiation in the stock price but makes 
zero investments. Investing in highly risky stocks is not allowed under Islamic 
financial rules, as it is similar to gambling (Black, 1986). It is also forbidden under 
Islamic financial rules to oblige the counterpart in any business transaction to accept 
the terms of a contract. If the terms and conditions are known in advance, the contract 
is acceptable from an Islamic point of view.
Islamic investors face several problems in the stock market. First, there are no 
clear guidelines about the use of securities. Second, investors are not all equally 
informed, which makes markets less efficient. Bond trading is not allowed because 
the issuer is obliged to pay the bondholder a fixed interest rate. Replacing current
85 See Warde (2000) on how to improve investments under Islamic banking practices.
86 See Black (1986)
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bonds with "transaction based contracts" can create Islamic debt securities. For 
example, under a murabaha contract the bond issuer can buy the asset at a fixed 
price, then resell it at the original price plus profit and use the payment to pay the 
subscriber back. The issuer can pay the bondholder a proportion of the return 
generated from the company's activities and repay the nominal value of the bond at 
its date of maturity. The same can apply to preferred stock. Instead of paying a fixed 
income, the company pays the stockholder a return based on the company's profit.
Most scholars attempt to define Islamic financial principles and then create new 
financial products based on those principles. Murabaha, musharaka and mudaraba 
are examples of innovative behaviour in Islamic banks. Those products are used in 
financing small- and medium-sized projects. However, because of rapid 
developments in the banking industry, we suggest a new approach in which non- 
interest banks create innovative financial instruments by remodelling conventional 
banking products. This could be done by replacing the interest rate with fees equal to 
banking costs plus earnings on each transaction.
The source and allocation of non-interest banks' capital funds are different from those 
of interest banks. First, non-interest banks can use current account funds to offer 
short-term credit to people in financial difficulties, but lenders should not be charged 
any fees. 87 It is forbidden to use current account deposits for financing or investing in
87 In both interest and non-interest banks the nominal value of deposits is guaranteed and reserve 
requirements on them are 100 per cent. Nevertheless, the policy of banks in certain countries like 
Sweden and the United Kingdom is to pay a low interest rate on deposits held in a current account 
(Kazimi, 1986).
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securities. Second, depositors in interest banks receive interest on their savings 
accounts, whereas in non-interest banks, depositors receive part of the profit 
generated by the bank each financial year. 88 Finally, in investment accounts non- 
interest banks do not guarantee the nominal value of deposits. Instead, losses and 
profits are shared according to each depositor's proportion of the total amount 
invested in the business venture.
Islam is highly concerned about social welfare and equality (Zaher and Hassan, 
2001). This has direct effects on the allocation of financial assets and investments 
within society. The objective of establishing a new business is to create value by 
optimally allocating financial, natural and human resources. From the Islamic point of 
view, the state is required to exercise minimal control over the business entity's 
management to help banks avoid bad debts and to achieve economies of scale.
Western banks have financial obligations towards their depositors, who have
transferred the risk of holding their cash to the bank. By contrast, non-interest banks 
collect public savings because of depositors' moral consciences (Kazimi, 1986). The 
Quran obliges Muslims to donate or invest their savings in projects that benefit 
society: "O you who believe, be afraid of Allah and give up what remains (due to 
you) from riba (usury) from now onward, if you are really believers" (Quran, verse 
278).
88 Non-interest banks do not pay premiums in loss-making cases, and usually returns are higher for 
long-term deposits than for short-term ones. Savings account funds are also invested in short-term 
projects. However, the nominal value of deposits is not guaranteed in the non-interest banking model.
89 In the non-interest banking model investment accounts, holders receive interest rates and the 
nominal value of their funds is guaranteed.
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In Pakistan ° the Islamic mode of financing takes three forms: lending, trade 
financing and investment financing. 91 Bank lending takes two forms: with service 
charges and without service charges.92 Examples of lending without a service charge 
are student loans and credit to poor individuals. In trade financing the bank uses 
leasing or hire purchase contracts. Under hire purchase, the bank receives goods from 
its customers and those customers agree to repurchase the commodity over time. The 
transfer of commodity ownership can happen immediately or after a period of time. 93 
In investment financing, banks offer three different products: mudamba, participating 
term certificates and musharaka. The participation term certificate is used for 
medium- and long-term financing. By the end of each financial year, the bank takes a 
proportion of the retained profit or loss obtained from funding the project. 94
Non-interest banks are advised not to use large-scale profit and loss sharing for 
generating high earnings. Non-interest banks face high credit risks if more than 90 
per cent of their operations are based on profit and loss sharing criteria. Risk-oriented 
individuals and investors have also attempted to take advantage of the Islamic code of 
financing to access bank funds (Gafoor, 1995).
In Malaysia, Islamic financial institutions were created, but previous players have 
continued to offer conventional products (Zaher and Hassen, 2001). Instruments 
offered by Islamic players have attracted many depositors and investors. Similarly, in
90 The Pakistani government converted the interest banking model into a non-interest banking model in
1985 (Gafoor, 1995).
91 It was the case in the 1980s. Nowadays, banks in Pakistan provide several other Islamic financial
instruments.
92 The service charge equals overheads divided by total assets. Overheads are deducted from gross 
revenue and the net profit is shared on the basis of the bank's capital and deposits (Kazimi, 1986).
93 Overdrafts are available under a mark-up basis and payments take place instantly or can be
postponed.
94 For more details see Ingram (1985)
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Bahrain the banking sector is growing rapidly due to a sound regulatory system and 
high financial disclosure.
In musharaka, lenders and borrowers share responsibility for the success or failure 
of projects. Therefore, investors attempt to achieve maximum return, which reflects 
the increase in the value of the money invested. Non-interest banks' lending policy is 
to finance low-risk investments. Lenders lose their funds if projects failed to generate 
positive return. The failed investments appear to be more costly for interest banks 
than for non-interest banks, which share the loss with depositors. Non-interest banks 
bear high credit risk because of their funding paradigm, which is based on profit and 
loss sharing.
Islamic banking is designed to boost public savings and to increase the volume of 
investments in the national economy (Dudley, 1998). Sharia prohibits accumulating 
cash under mattresses and urges individuals to use non-interest banks to invest their 
savings appropriately. Non-interest banks are urged to protect depositors and lenders 
by reducing the risk of speculation in the market. Dudley (1998) noted that the 
reliability of the business venture is a means to help non-interest banks to maintain 
surveillance over investments and to reduce the level of unsecured debts.
Islamic financial institutions are advised to invest in markets with low credit risk 
and to be attentive in selecting domestic borrowers. For instance, under a murabaha 
contract, non-interest banks are asked to have collateral with the entrepreneur to 
avoid moral hazards in the financial sector. The entrepreneur must supply the bank 
with regular information about the development of the project. It is also imperative to 
fix an expected profit rate in advance.
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Baydoun and Willet (2000) noted that reports should include a value-added 
statement, a current value balance sheet, and a historic cost balance sheet. Islamic 
financial institutions are also required to explain how funds are generated and used 
during the financial year. Recent information about new financial transactions is 
important, particularly under a mudaraba contract.
Customers should be informed frequently about the development of the projects 
financed in order to boost public confidence. Under a musharaka contract, customers 
should also have the right to decide with the bank whether or not to fund a particular 
project. Usually, depositors refuse to finance risky projects, and this prevents banks 
from achieving economies of scale.
Full information disclosure is required to measure investment risk and to ensure 
that non-interest banks are financially sound. Other objectives include maintaining 
confidence in the financial market and ensuring that resources are distributed to the 
most productive investments. On the other hand, it is vital to improve the Islamic 
accounting standards, to enhance transparency, to ameliorate auditing and to reinforce 
market integration (Baydoun and Willet, 2000).
Alterations in the format of non-interest banks' financial statements are due to the 
following reasons: there is no single sharia board that determines Islamic financial 
reporting standards; non-interest banks themselves apply different accounting 
practices, and Islamic supervisory guidelines are not clear and do not cover all the 
accounting issues. To solve these problems, harmonisation of financial rules 
concerning fund mobilisation, profit allocation, cost classification, etc. is 
recommended. At the Islamic Banking Conference held in Bahrain in February 2000, 
it was emphasised that the role of the Financial Services Board is to set standards for
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an Islamic financial system and to ensure that non-interest banks are incorporating 
international standards of banking supervision (Banker, 2000e).
It has been found that most non-interest banks make imprudent long-term 
investments. Most of their loans are for short- or medium-term. It is extremely 
important to introduce long-term financial instruments to help non-interest banks to 
grow in the long run and to help them attract new customers.95 Converting existing 
conventional products can create sustainable long-term Islamic financial products.
In a global financial market, both Islamic and Western banks need to reduce their 
risk exposures in each sector they finance. Non-interest banks appear to have more 
risky assets than interest banks that are trading with debts because of the nature of the 
contract between non-interest banks and their clients. Non-interest banks' borrowers 
can escape paying their debts when the business venture yields a negative return. 
Consequently, non-interest banks are required to use equity financing to limit risk- 
taking in their investments (Aggarwal and Tariq, 2000). Usually, returns generated 
from equity investments are higher than those from fixed-return instruments.
Good risk management tools help non-interest and interest banks hedge against 
speculation and high volatility in national and international financial markets. Interest 
banks usually use interest rates as a way of managing their portfolio and liquidity. 
The same instrument is used for hedging against pricing risk. The inter-bank market 
also enables interest banks to raise funds in the short-term. This is why interest banks 
maintain higher levels of liquidity than non-interest banks.
The fund classifications used by non-interest banks are exceedingly complicated 
(Aggrawal and Tariq, 2000). There is no obvious distinction between deposits and
129
investment funds, whereas in conventional banking it is obvious that if the principal 
is uncertain, funds are not considered deposits (Mills and Presley, 1999). In theory, 
deposits held in an investment account are used to meet the financial needs of non- 
interest banks' ultimate borrowers and as a result, they are not guaranteed. But, the 
practice shows that most non-interest banks guarantee deposits in savings and 
investment accounts (El-Baraka Bank Management Report, 1998).
Securitisation is used mainly in leases, vehicle loans, mortgages, insurance and 
junk bonds. Deposits are securitised by linking the expected return to an index that 
reflects the market value of the asset. Securitisation of loans and deposits helps banks 
raise funds and reduce risk bearing assets and liabilities. However, Securitisation is 
still underdeveloped in the Islamic world; thus non-interest banks need to obtain 
technical assistance from foreign experts to create new investment products.
Co-operation between non-interest and interest banks can improve the 
performance of Islamic banking. Large interest banks have the financial resources 
and the technological tools to launch new Islamic financial products. Other 
advantages of banking co-operation include reduction in liquidity risk, promotion of 
current services, and improvements in information disclosure. Interest banks are also 
able to raise funds to finance large projects under Islamic banking principles. To 
avoid the problem of usury, the interest would not be paid on borrowed funds. 
Interest banks are also in a position to improve the image of Islamic banking in non- 
Muslim countries, which is essential at this stage of development. Citibank and 
HSBC are examples of successful interest banks that contributed substantially to 
Islamic finance.
95 See Siddiqi (1983), Aggrawal and Tariq (2000)
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Non-interest and interest banks' profitability is highly sensitive to the techniques used 
in Islamic and conventional banking models to manage financial assets and liabilities. 
In liberalised financial markets, banks are free to choose the pathway that allows 
them to diversify their earnings. On the other hand, non-interest banks use three 
methods to allocate profits. First, they share the annual net profit with entrepreneurs 
on a predetermined basis. Second, in musharaka the profits or losses are allocated 
according to the contribution of the entrepreneur and the bank in the business 
enterprise. Third, in both murabaha and mudaraba the profit is distributed according 
to the incomes generated from the business venture. This is because under murabaha 
and mudaraba contracts the bank provides capital and the entrepreneur provides 
management only.
In Islamic banking, depositors receive dividends when the bank generates positive 
return on its investments and lose part of their funds when the venture yields negative 
returns. Consequently, non-interest banks endeavour to allocate their funds to 
profitable investments this generates high returns and thus satisfies depositors. 
Earnings from non-interest banks' projects are shared among depositors, the bank, 
and entrepreneurs, as stated in the agreement.
Banks with a high volume of interest-bearing financial instruments suffer 
substantially during hyperinflation. The high inflation rate causes a sharp decline in 
banks' assets as well as increases in their losses. Non-interest banks suffer more than 
interest banks in the hyperinflationary environment. This is because interest banks
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respond to increased inflation rates by increasing their interest rates. Non-interest 
banks are advised to ask borrowers to pay extra fees equivalent to the decline in the 
value of their assets because of the increase in inflation rate.
Usually, non-interest banks' premises are not depreciated, but other fixed assets 
are depreciated in equal instalments over their expected lifetime (Haqiqi and 
Pomeranz, 2000). Depreciation must be reported as a liability and securities should be 
recorded at their market price to avoid overestimating banks' profits in the long term.
Another accounting aspect that affects non-interest banks' profitability is 
provision. Non-interest banks' bad debts usually exceed their provision for doubtful 
debts. They also have various difficulties in adequately identifying the risks 
associated with their investments. Non-interest banks are required to make provisions 
for contingent liabilities and commitments in both the short- and long-term. They 
should also assess provisions for small volume outstanding debts by taking into 
account the structure and risk of their loan portfolios.
Non-interest banks monitor their performance continuously by implementing 
suitable financial evaluation standards. Consistency in assessing loan portfolios helps 
non-interest banks to reduce their risky assets. On the other hand, non-interest banks 
need to adopt strict lending policies to improve the quality of their portfolios. For 
example, under leasing contracts non-interest banks are required to transfer asset 
ownership to the lessee before making the full payment to the bank. This is because 
under the non-interest banking model, the lessee is not obliged to make extra 
payments if the asset is lost. 96 The lessor may claim compensation for any damage
96 Usually, the return from leasing appears to be higher than in murabaha contracts.
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caused to the leased assets if there is negligence on the part of lessee (Mills and 
Presley, 1999).
The acceleration of financial market integration makes the price of non-interest 
and interest banks' tradable securities and other financial products very volatile. The 
result is a dramatic decline in banking earnings. For example, the main reasons for 
the increase in banking losses during the Asian financial crises included weak 
corporate governance, poor lending policies, and a large volume of short-term capital 
inflows (Demetriades and Fattouh, 1999). Many companies do not explicitly record 
all their liabilities, which leads them to misjudge their ability to service their debts on 
time.
The largest proportion of non-interest banks' incomes comes from musharaka and 
mudaraba contracts. Trading foreign and domestic companies' stocks accounts for 
only a small proportion of non-interest banks' incomes. In interest banks' income 
structure, the interest rate margin represents a large portion of their revenues, 
although incomes from non-traditional activities such as insurance are growing 
steadily, notably in developed countries. 97
Non-interest banks follow different methods in allocating their net profit. Some 
non-interest banks distribute their profit after deducting direct overheads from 
investment income (according to Malikis and Shafiis). Other banks subtract all 
expenses (including depreciation and wages) from investment income and distribute 
their net profit afterwards (according to Hanafis and Hanabalis). The share of savers 
in banks' net profit decreases when expenses are deducted from investment income.
97 This was the case in the UK in the 1970s. Most commercial banks were generating their incomes 
from interest rate spread. This, however, has changed because of increased securitisation.
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Depositors' share of non-interest banks' net profit is based on the amount of cash 
received from entrepreneurs (Hamat, 1994). Usually, non-interest banks raise cash to 
compensate depositors in case of increased bank charges. Under a murabaha contract, 
the purchaser has also the right to refuse a commodity on account of its poor 
conditions and thus the bank bears the loss of unsold commodities (Banaga, Ray and 
Tomkins, 1993).
It has been stressed that the cost of entering foreign markets is high. New players 
need to establish new representatives, subsidiaries or branches (Walter, 1988). It also 
takes a long time to understand lenders' and borrowers' behaviour in those markets. 
Employing domestic workers helps non-interest or interest banks to attract large 
numbers of local investors and to diversify their earnings.
New technological tools give market dealers daily access to the prices of banking 
products. Individuals and investors have greater choice and superior information 
about the market. Thus it is crucial to improve the public image of the bank in new 
markets. Banks can do this by making all delivery channels available to customers: 
the branch, the telephone, the Internet, automatic teller machines, etc. Creating new 
delivery channels also improves banks' earnings and shareholder value (Bardfield,
1998).98
Political risks, taxes and transaction costs are the main barriers confronting 
interest and non-interest banks operating in foreign markets (Walter and Smith,
1999). Exchange rate risks also lower banks' return on investments and thus lower 
depositors' share in banks' net profits. Removing foreign exchange control
98 Closing unprofitable branches and reducing the number of staff helps banks to cut their costs and 
boost their profit margin.
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constraints is a way to encourage non-interest and interest banks to increase their 
foreign currency trading and to boost their net profit.
As we have already seen, a large proportion of non-interest banks' revenues are 
generated from financing trade and small businesses. This is because non-interest 
banks are new in the market and have limited capital to finance large investments. 
Existing financial products are also unsuitable for long-term financing. Accordingly, 
co-operation between non-interest and interest banks boosts Islamic banking assets 
and transforms non-interest banks' approach to handling risk. This helps non-interest 
banks to raise their revenues, which automatically results in an increased profit 
margin.
Non-interest banks face two types of competitor: other non-interest banks and interest 
banks. Examples of direct competition between non-interest banks can be found in 
Pakistan, Iran and Malaysia, where the financial system has been almost entirely 
converted to non-interest banking. In those countries, primary lenders and ultimate 
borrowers are obliged to use Islamic financial products instead of conventional ones. 
On the other hand, in markets with mixed Western and Islamic banking models, 
depositors and investors are more sensitive to the quality of services offered by a 
particular bank than to the religious suitability of its financial products.
Non-interest banks, like interest banks, try to evade price competition and focus 
on cost competition and cost cutting. "In the bazaar or souk economy there is perhaps 
more stress on non-price than price competition" (Wilson, 1990: 32). This is because
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Islamic law lacks a clear method for calculating mark-up." In practice, most non- 
interest banks prefer to calculate their mark-up on a percentage basis. For this reason, 
non-interest banks' clients find it difficult to make price comparisons between 
different banks' financial products.
Monopolies and price fixing of financial products are unacceptable under sharia 
rules. Financial markets have to be totally open to foreign and local players. Investors 
need to be free in making decisions, but must not use manipulation to reach their 
objectives. In the present competitive environment, interest banks are also allowed to 
change the price of their financial products.
Non-interest banks are less competitive than interest banks in attracting public 
savings. This is because funds deposited in non-interest banks' investment account 
are not guaranteed, whereas interest banks guarantee deposits in current and savings 
accounts. Islamic financial practices are also unclear about the distribution of banking 
earnings. In addition, interest banks offer many more savings instruments than non- 
interest banks.
There is a positive correlation between the number of non-interest banks in the 
domestic market and the amount of banking competition, hi markets such as Algeria, 
where there is only one Islamic bank, non-interest bank competes with interest banks, 
whether they are local or foreign. Consequently, the prices of Islamic financial 
products are higher than the price of conventional financial instruments. 100 Therefore, 
an increase in the number of banks offering Islamic financial products can boost
99 The mark-up is the margin added as profit in addition to the real cost of the goods sold.
100 In markets such as Bahrain and Egypt, where there is more than one Islamic bank, the competition 
is between non-interest banks themselves.
136
banking competition in markets dominated by interest banks. This leads to a decline 
in the price of Islamic lending and borrowing instruments.
Another determinant of banking competition in the Islamic world 101 is the 
religious acceptability of the financial products. Muslims usually take into account 
whether the financial product is halal (allowed by Islamic law) or haram (forbidden 
by the sharia board). However, in regions such as North Africa depositors consider 
market criteria when selecting their financial products (interview notes, 2001).
The capital strength and size of assets of most non-interest banks are small (see 
Table 4.1). As a result, non-interest banks are less competitive than interest banks in 
funding large or long-term investments. To solve this problem, non-interest banks 
need to merge and to operate in markets where the demand for non-interest financial 
products is high in certain sectors of the domestic economy. For instance, in the 
North African region non-interest banks are advised to finance agriculture and small 
industries because of high demand for credit in the two sectors. 
Table 4.1: Capital strength and assets size of selected non-interest banks in 2001
Al Raj hi Banking & Investment Corporation
Kuwait Finance House
Dubai Islamic Bank
Shamil Bank of Bahrain
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt
Qatar Islamic Bank
Bahrain Saudi Bank
Capital Strength ($m)
1,729
614
297
248
93
92
84
Assets Size ($m)
12,999
6,628
3,206
1,316
2,473
1,115
514
Source: Banker, November 2001
The Islamic world includes fifty-nine countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, 
Surinam, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, 
Uzbekistan, Western Sahara, Yemen (Islamic World Online, 2003).
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Due to the lack of experience by managers of non-interest banks and the absence 
of clear Islamic evaluation techniques for investments, non-interest banks are less 
effective than interest banks in managing their assets and liabilities. The sharia board 
needs to introduce explicit and implicit investment appraisal methods so that non- 
interest banks can accurately assess their portfolios. Managers of non-interest banks 
also need further training in Islamic finance to improve their administrative skills and 
knowledge of Islamic banking.
It has been argued that the taxation policy within the host country directly affects 
banking competition (Claessens, Demirgu"9-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998). Foreign 
banking entry increases when financial authorities reduce corporate income taxes. 
Lower tax rates help foreign banks to achieve high profit margins (Demirgii9-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2001). Local banks, whether interest or non-interest banks, also 
respond to the foreign banks' entry by reducing the price of their financial products. 
They do so to avoid large declines in their net profit because of intense competition 
from foreign banks.
The size of the banking network also impacts banking competition in the host 
country. In markets where information technology is less developed, individuals and 
investors prefer to open accounts with banks that have many branches. This gives 
interest banks a competitive advantage because they have sizeable banking networks. 
By contrast, most non-interest banks have a small number of branches, which 
prevents them from attracting new lenders and borrowers.
In a highly competitive environment, local banks tend to extend credit to risky 
projects, which contributes to increased banking losses (Walter and Smith, 1999). 
The failure of existing borrowers to repay their loans regularly causes dramatic
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declines in local banks' profit margins and thus diminishes their ability to compete 
with foreign banks. Reducing the spread between the lending and deposit rates allows 
local banks to boost their efficiency and to recover from their increased losses. 102
Increased banking competition can help develop existing financial services and 
boost investments in the national economy. Removing regulatory constraints forces 
small non-interest banks to specialise in areas where they have competitive 
advantage. Such specialisation helps non-interest banks reduce their operating 
expenses. Focusing on few businesses also allows non-interest banks to reduce risks 
associated with their operations because they have substantial information and 
expertise available about the selected industries. Moreover, specialised banks can 
keep a closer watch over their borrowers (interview notes, 2001).
This chapter has shown that Islamic financial products are only suitable for financing 
medium- and short-term investments (Duncan, 1996). Non-interest banks have a lack 
of experience in equity investment and corporate finance. To improve the non-interest 
investment banking services, scholars suggest converting interest-bearing financial 
instruments into Islamic financial products. Examples of new Islamic financial 
instruments are letters of credit, foreign currency related swaps, futures and letters of 
guarantee (The National Commercial Bank, 2003). However, in short-term financing,
102 Several methods can be used to measure banking efficiency. The first method is to compare bank 
spread before and after financial liberalisation. The second is to contrast bank spreads of different 
countries. The third method compares banking indexes such as total deposits and total assets of 
different banks and markets. It is worth mentioning that those indexes cannot adequately evaluate 
banking services. Valued added can be a good indicator of the size of the bank. For example, banks 
with high valued added provide their services at low cost. Another method of measuring banking 
efficiency is the evaluation of cots, profits and bank margins (Claassen, 1996).
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non-interest banks are required to place emphasis on collateral and to provide 
management assistance to their entrepreneurs. It is also important not to force traders 
to accept contracts.
It has been stated that non-interest banks are tightly restricted in both their 
lending and borrowing. On the lending side, non-interest banks have minimal trust in 
existing products. It is illegitimate under Islamic law for non-interest banks to finance 
companies involved in prohibited activities such as production of wine, tobacco and 
drugs. Islamic financial law also prevents non-interest banks from accessing 
conventional financial markets and central bank funds due to constraints associated 
with interest rates. In addition, speculation and trading highly priced shares are 
unacceptable practices under sharia guidelines. This has resulted in an 
underdeveloped Islamic secondary market for financial products.
Non-interest banks' mode of receiving funds and financing is underdeveloped, as 
reflected by difficulties they face in managing their assets and liabilities. Deposits are 
not guaranteed because of the high credit risk associated with non-interest banks' 
projects. To reduce their amount of bad debts, non-interest banks like interest banks 
are advised to assess their borrowers continuously. On the other hand, entrepreneurs 
are required to disclose costs and revenues associated with the venture (Hamat, 
1994). The accounting standards of non-interest banks are inadequate and this has 
negatively affected market transparency and integration (Baydoun and Willet, 2000). 
Additionally, the absence of a real inter-bank Islamic market and limitations on 
securitisation activities have contributed to a decline in the liquidity of non-interest 
banks. It has been noted that creating a uniform sharia board should harmonise 
Islamic financial rules. On the other hand, adopting good risk management tools
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would help non-interest banks reduce their exposure to uncertain ventures and will 
reduce volatility in financial markets. Finally, non-interest banks are recommended to 
co-operate with interest banks, which have long-term experience in global financial 
markets.
The chapter stressed that the income generated from a business venture is shared 
according to the agreement among non-interest banks, depositors and entrepreneurs. 
However, the amount of cash received from entrepreneurs and the cost of entering 
new markets alter the method used by non-interest banks to distribute their profit. To 
minimise banking costs, non-interest banks need to assess their loan portfolios, to 
identify market risks, to record all transactions, and to improve the quality of credit 
portfolio by making larger provisions for bad debts. Bardfield (1998) also 
recommended offering non-traditional financial instruments to boost non-interest 
banks' profit margins.
The last section of this chapter showed that non-interest banks are facing severe 
competition from interest banks. Interest banks appear to be more competitive than 
non-interest banks in both lending and borrowing because, as mentioned in the 
chapter's first section, depositors' funds are not guaranteed under non-interest 
banking model and Islamic banks have unclear rules governing the allocation of 
profit. Unlike interest banks, non-interest banks have limited financial products and 
this has made them unable to meet the demand of their customers (Ingram, 1985). It 
has also been stressed that tax regulation affects the banking competition between 
interest banks and non-interest banks. Lower tax rates encourage foreign entry and 
increase competition between domestic and foreign players. However, the decline in 
lending and borrowing rates because of the increase in banking competition makes
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banks willing to finance high-risk projects. This can produce financial crises. 
Therefore, non-interest banks are required to improve the quality of their products 
and focus on financing high-yield industries. Cost shifting also enables non-interest 
banks to reduce the price of their products and enhance their competitive position in 
the market.
The next chapter examines the research methodology and problems encountered 
during the survey. Quantitative and qualitative research methods are discussed in 
detail, with reference to the literature on structured interviews and dispatch of 
questionnaires. The link between the questionnaire and the four main questions of the 
research is analysed thoroughly as well.
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This study uses quantitative and qualitative research methods to analyse the effects 
of globalisation of financial services on the banking industry and stock market in 
Algeria. It aims at understanding the cause of banking failures and to outline the 
prerequisites of an efficient banking sector. To do so, we examine factors that 
affect banks and stock market operations either directly or indirectly, during the 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one. We also 
analyse the responses of banks to financial liberalisation, financial innovation and 
the Internet in terms of competition, profitability and efficiency. We do so because 
we believe that these factors explain the success of Algerian integration with 
international markets. They remove many constraints on domestic and foreign 
banks, and also reduce the government's role in the financial sector.
Previous studies such as those of Jbili et al (1997) have been considered in this 
study. They noted that structural reforms and fiscal policies affect savings, 
investments and economic growth. This argument is also based on a study by 
Gurley and Shaw (1960), in which they pointed out that economic development is 
a means to increase the availability of capitals in the financial sector. Jbili et al 
(1997) assessed the quantitative side of financial reforms by measuring the 
relationship between indicators, which are applicable to the process of reform and 
examining the non-government savings rate. They also evaluated each indicator 
before and after the reform. Their aim was to analyse if the reforms had positive
effects on non-government savings, rather than evaluate the country saving rate as 
this was subject to other indicators such as per capita income and demographic 
aspects.
The research methodologies used by Jbili et al (1997) differ from those 
adopted in this study in two main ways. We used structured interviews and 
questionnaires instead of mathematical models to assess the implications of 
financial reforms on the performance of the selected banks. Besides, banks are 
divided into two groups: conventional and Islamic, to determine the operational 
constraints facing each banking model in collecting public savings and financing 
investments.
We have selected fourteen banks for this investigation: six state-owned banks; 
four Algerian private banks; three foreign banks and one non-interest bank. The 
criteria used in this division are: (i) ownership; (ii) mode of financing; and (iii) 
country of origin. We excluded banks that are small in terms of capital assets or 
size. State-owned banks, Algerian private banks and foreign banks are included in 
the same category as interest banks. The purpose of this division is to make 
analytical comparisons between interest and non-interest banks.
The source of quantitative data used in this study consists of banks annual 
reports, central bank monthly review, Office Nationale des Statistics (National 
Statistics Office), government publications and statistics published by 
international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. The aim of statistical analyses is to find relationships between 
variables and then interpret the data. Financial indicators are used to measure 
banks' assets, interest rates and credit allocation. Fielding and Gilbert (2000) said 
that validity and reliability of the indicators are the determinant of the quality of
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the quantitative analyses. Validity reflects to what degree the indicators measure 
the concepts, which are the key components of the theory. Reliability focuses on 
the consistency of the event subject to investigation. Continuous variables are used 
to measure quantities such as profitability.
In the qualitative method we administered questionnaires and conducted 
interviews. "Survey research is a powerful tool for gathering accurate and useful 
information" (Salant and Dillman, 1994: 9). We interviewed senior managers from 
banks and the Algiers stock exchange. Interviews were held face-to-face with each 
respondent in Algeria. Altogether, we dispatched twenty-two questionnaires and 
conducted eighteen interviews. We held six interviews with state-owned banks, 
four with Algerian private banks, four with foreign banks and four with the non- 
interest bank. This gave equal weighting to each banking group. The reason for 
having six interviews with state-owned banks is because the sample included six 
banks from the category as they have the largest market share.
Salant and Dillman (1994) set four requirements to achieve a high level of 
accuracy within the human samples. First, the sample needs to be significant to 
maintain the expected level of accuracy. Second, the researcher must give equal 
chance to people included in the sample. Third, the people selected for the sample 
should answer questions willingly and with a high level of precision. Finally, the 
characteristics of the group selected to answer the question, but which did not 
participate in the survey, are similar to those who answered the questions and did 
participate.
All people selected for the survey were senior managers. The questionnaires 
were given by hand to each respondent. Questions were also translated into French 
and Arabic to help managers understand the exact meaning of each question.
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Confidentiality was assured throughout the survey, but senior mangers were 
encouraged to answer the questions with accuracy. "Any time you ask people to 
participate in a survey, it is your responsibility to respect both their privacy and 
the voluntary nature of their involvement" (Salant and Dillman, 1994: 9).
The answers were recorded in tapes to enable us examine each response. A 
second appointment was also made when the interview with the respondent was 
incomplete. The 'evaluation survey' was adopted to produce useful information 
about the development of the Algerian banking industry and stock market within 
the past five years.
We used face-to-face rather than telephone and mail surveys to avoid problems, 
which can be attributed to the wording of the questions. "Telephone surveys are 
very sensitive to errors caused by interviewers who do not read questions exactly 
as they are worded in the questionnaire" (Salant and Dillman, 1994). On the other 
hand, interviews in-person are suitable for unknown population samples when 
respondents are reluctant to answer questions through the mail or over the 
telephone. Salant and Dillman (1994) also noted that the survey enables 
interviewers to explain the significance of the research and to ensure respondents' 
confidentiality. They concluded that face-to-face interviews produce high response 
rate compared with other survey methods.
Fink (1995) pointed out that questions included in a research survey need to be 
structured in a way that does not influence the respondents' answer pattern. 
Questions should have the same meaning for both the surveyor and the 
respondent. This results in a good communication and also reduces data errors. 
Fink (1995) sets the following points to ensure that questions are properly worded: 
(1) the subject of questions is based on the research aims and objectives; (2)
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questions are clear to respondents; (3) the link between previous and subsequent 
questions is sound; (4) wording of questions is neutral; (5) each question refers to 
a single concept; (6) the concept is measured by the specified question; (7) non- 
substantive responses to questions are minimised; (8) different options for 
answering the questions are available; (9) questions are designed for a specified 
group of respondents; (10) the researcher is able to administer the questionnaire 
without any difficulty; and (11) the codes used for data entry are clear to 
respondents.
Questions need to be short and comprehensive for respondents (Fink, 1995). 
However, the simplified question should not influence the respondent's opinion. 
Response categories should be vast and meaningful to help respondents answer the 
questions without facing difficulties in data input. This can be achieved by using 
visual aids in which each question is divided into small components. Besides, the 
number of options available for each question is reduced. The split question 
technique enables the researcher to cut response categories for each question by 
identifying the question key components. As a result, the responses can be applied 
to different components of the question.
Visual aids were introduced to assist respondents in dealing with scale and 
other forms of estimation. This is obtained by providing a list of options, items 
that facilitate recall, scale of items, an information pack to educate the respondent, 
and a keyword summary to assist respondents in making their opinions and 
priority choices.
The split question technique is used to rank items, which is done by placing 
items in descending order. The criterion used in the ranking can be the importance 
of the item to the topic under investigation. Usually, the researcher asks the
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respondent to make a general ranking and then a specific ranking of the items. 
Fink (1995) said that the ranking appears to be difficult without the use of visual 
aids. The split technique enables respondents to write the ranking in the relevant 
box of the questionnaire.
In the 'funnel technique', questions are also made in descending order from 
general to more specific. Usually, it starts with open-ended questions and ends 
with close-ended multiple choice questions. Concepts introduced in the open- 
ended questions are new to respondents. However, the researcher becomes more 
focused on specific aspects of the subject as the surveyor becomes aware of the 
real context of concepts introduced in the former questions (Fink, 1995).
Inverted funnel techniques are used when respondents cannot express their 
opinions because of lack of knowledge of the concepts introduced in the question. 
This technique aims to make the respondent concentrate more on the topic under 
investigation. General questions are presented after the specific ones to fulfil the 
purpose (Fink, 1995).
Aided recall and bounded recall are applied to improve response accuracy. In 
'aided recall', respondents are asked to select items relevant to a specific event. 
Respondents are also reminded of major events throughout the questionnaire. The 
interviewer also clarifies reference points to the respondents when necessary. 
Another method used in in-person interviews is to show landmark events to enable 
respondents to consider the timing of each event. In 'bounded recall', the 
respondent is also asked for a second interview to cover events that occurred 
during the two interviews.
Fink (1995) emphasised two key criteria in organising questionnaires: (i) the 
order of questions; and (ii) the flexibility of the questionnaire. Moving from one
148
question to another should meet the aims of the interviewer and the respondent. 
The surveyor needs to consider how the order of questions affects the answers of 
the respondent. Good question sequence facilitates the process of conducting 
interviews and reduces errors, which may affect the accuracy of the results 
obtained from the questionnaire and enhance the response rate.
In this study, the average number of visits to each bank was five as some senior 
managers were on holiday and some were reluctant to be part of the survey. Some 
of the senior managers also used my questions to tell their own stories about their 
current or former employer. For example, most senior managers in Algerian 
private banks did not hesitate to say that the working conditions with state-owned 
banks for which they worked were poor, and because of that they had joined a 
private bank. They also noted that their earnings at private banks were higher than 
at state-owned banks.
Table 5.1: Number of appointments made with senior managers in each selected 
bank
Name of the bank
Banque Nationale d 'Algerie
Banque Exterieure d' Algerie
Credit Populaire d' Algerie
Credit Nationale d 'Epargne et de Prevoyance
Banque de 1' Agriculture et de Developpement 
Rural
Banque Algerienne de Developpement
Union Bank
Banque Commerciale et Industrielle d' Algerie
El-Khalifa Bank
Sqfinance
Citibank of Algeria
Societe Generale d' Algerie
Arab Banking Corporation
El-Baraka Bank
Total
Number of Appointments
5
4
4
4
3
2
5
4
4
2
4
3
4
6
54
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The variations in the number of appointments made with each bank's senior 
managers is attributed to the time taken to answer the interview questions and to 
complete the questionnaires. The net total time spent with respondents was 116 
hours; 72 hours for interviews and 44 hours for questionnaires.
The response rate of the survey was 100 per cent. This high response rate was 
achieved by making several appointments with each senior manager so as to 
complete the questionnaires and to conduct the face-to-face interview. 
Respondents were also given enough time to complete the questionnaires. Because 
interviews were held with senior managers who had worked for their banks for 
many years, it is believed that the accuracy of the results obtained in this study is 
significant.
Salant and Dillman (1994) stressed three key steps to reduce sampling errors: 
(1) describe the extent of sample population; (2) receive a complete population 
list; and (3) identify the sample. The source of the information is the sample drawn 
from the population under investigation (Fielding and Gilbert, 2000). However, 
the sample must be representative of the relevant population to achieve sound 
conclusions. Because qualitative research uses open-ended studies, it makes some 
of the conclusions unpredictable by the researcher (Holliday, 2002). In this study 
the sample population included highly ranked managers within each bank. The 
population list was inclusive of at least one senior manager from each bank. 
Finally, the sample was clearly identified in terms of size and knowledge of the 
respondents of the topics under investigation.
1 What are the factors that drive the phenomenon of globalisation of financial 
services in Algeria?
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2. How does globalisation of financial services affect banking competition, 
profitability and efficiency in the Algerian financial market?
3. What obstacles confront banks and stock markets during the transition from a 
centrally planned to a market-based financial system?
4. What are the possible solutions to problems encountered by conventional and 
Islamic banks under the new "free market economy"?
The questionnaires were dispatched on the basis of the research four main 
questions. The order followed in the questionnaire was based on the ownership 
and activities of each banking group. This was done on purpose to examine in- 
depth each component of globalisation of financial services and also to assess the 
performance of all banking groups. In the interviews, senior managers were asked 
further questions in order to make critical assessments of the developments 
achieved within the Algerian banking industry and stock market during and after 
financial liberalisation.
The first three questions of the questionnaire considered banking competition. 
Respondents were first asked to assess the impact of financial liberalisation, which 
is one of the main components of globalisation of financial services, on banking 
competition (open-ended question). The increase in competition in the banking 
sector was said to be 'minimal' when the bank faced competition from banks in 
one banking category, 'small' when the bank faced competition from banks in two 
banking categories, and 'dramatic' when the bank faced competition with all 
banking groups. In the second question, senior managers were asked to identify 
the banking category with which their bank was facing competition. The
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percentages presented in 'Q2, Appendix V reflect the level of competition with 
each banking group. For example, 25 per cent of state-owned banks' senior 
managers believe that they were facing competition with the same banking 
category. Twenty-five per cent believed that state-owned banks were facing 
competition from Algerian private banks. Thirty-one per cent of managers said 
that foreign banks were the main competitors of state-owned banks. The 
remaining nineteen per cent of managers noted that state-owned banks were facing 
competition from the non-interest bank. The third question identified the 
mechanisms used by banks to deal with the new competitors (close-ended 
question). Aided recall was used in this question to select items relevant to the 
event (banking competition). The items were made in descending order from most 
important to least important (split question technique). The same method was 
applied in question four to determine factors affecting banking performance in 
Algeria. Respondents were made aware that new competitors and change in 
banking regulations are caused by the process of financial liberalisation.
To ensure a good order of questions, we started with questions relevant to 
financial liberalisation. In question five, senior managers were asked if the 
removal of financial restrictions had enabled banks to make good lending 
decisions. This was a double choice question: 'yes' or 'no'. For example, 70 per 
cent of state-owned banks' senior managers answered 'yes' to the question and the 
remaining 30 per cent answered 'no'. The same method was applied to other 
banking groups. Then the results were averaged for all banking categories. The 
result was 81 per cent 'yes' and 11 per cent 'no'.
Question six was open-ended. Senior managers were asked to rank five major 
sectors financed by banks. This was then followed with two more specific
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questions. In question seven, senior managers were asked to classify banks' loans 
into three categories: short, medium and long term. In each category, senior 
managers could select between small, medium and large. If fewer than 25 per cent 
of loans were short-term, then the senior manager should tick small. If short-term 
loans account for between 25 and 50 per cent senior managers should tick 
medium. Finally, if more than 50 per cent of loans were short-term, senior 
managers should tick large.
In question eight, senior managers were asked how the bank's market share had 
changed during the previous five years. Three options were given: 'increase', 
'decrease' or 'stagnant'. Under each option, senior managers could select 
between: 'minimal', 'small' or 'dramatic'. The increase or decrease was 
considered to be minimal if market share changed by less than 5 per cent. If the 
market share changed between 5 to 10 per cent, it was considered small. Finally, a 
dramatic increase or decrease occurred when the market share changed by more 
than 10 per cent.
Question nine showed the number of banks involved in the trading of shares 
on the Algiers Stock Exchange. This question was followed by another general 
question (question ten) to assess the growth prospects of the Algerian financial 
market after the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented 
one. Growth prospects were set into five scales: (1) very good; (2) good; (3) 
average; (4) poor; and (5) really poor. The benchmarks used in making this order 
were savings rate, level of intermediation and efficiency of the Algerian financial
market.
The split technique was used in question eleven to show the practical 
constraints that confront banks' activities in Algeria. It was believed that eight
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main factors would influence banking operations after the financial liberalisation: 
(1) financial regulations; (2) market size; (3) economic weakness; (4) cultural 
barriers; (5) certainty; (6) security; (7) accounting standards; and (8) the range of 
financial products. Respondents were asked to select some or all the components 
that applied to the bank.
The funnel technique was used in question twelve. We started with an open- 
ended question, 'yes' or 'no'. If the respondent answered 'yes' then he had to 
select between three different scales: some, many and most. These three scales 
reflected the breadth of the services offered by the bank through Internet channels. 
Finally, respondents were asked to indicate the response to banking services 
offered through the Internet. The split question technique was used in ranking the 
items into high, medium and low.
The inverted funnel technique was applied in question thirteen. This focused 
respondents on the issue of Internet banking. Respondents were asked if the 
Internet helped the bank to strengthen the link with customers, 'internally' and 
'externally'. 'Internally' referred to customers based in the home country and 
'externally' referred to customers based abroad. For each category, respondents 
had three options: 'no', 'yes', and 'I do not know' (open-ended question).
In question fourteen we used the 'aided recall' technique to increase the 
accuracy of the survey. Senior managers were given a list of items that could be 
achieved by Internet banking. These items are: (1) market penetration; (2) low 
costs; (3) high speed; (4) low risk; and (5) large package of services. For each item 
respondents selected between three possibilities: 'yes', 'no' and 'I do not know' 
(open-ended question).
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Question fifteen considered if the opening of the market to both private and 
foreign banks would contribute to the emergence of new products. Visual aids 
were used to enable senior managers to select the appropriate questionnaire box. 
The scale of emerged products was in three categories: 'some', 'many' and 'most'. 
'Some' reflected that only a few products had emerged after the opening of the 
market to new players. 'Many' was used when several new products were created, 
but they were not significant compared with existing ones. Finally, senior 
managers selected 'most' when various new products were offered by the bank.
Visual aids were also used in question sixteen to show if 'going global' had 
changed the financial environment in Algeria. Financial environment reflected the 
scope of intermediation, investments and asset growth of the bank. Respondents 
could choose between 'no' and 'yes', but those who selected 'yes' had to indicate 
the extent of the change: 'minimal', 'small' or 'dramatic'. 'Minimal' change 
meant that there was insignificant increase or decrease in investments, 
intermediation and asset growth. 'Small' change occurred when the three 
components of financial environment experienced a gradual, but not sizeable, 
increase or decrease. Finally, the scale of change was said to be dramatic when the 
bank's assets, investments and its role as intermediary between lenders and 
borrowers had become significant or insignificant within the recent years.
Question seventeen assessed whether there had been an increase in banking 
efficiency in the past five years. Senior managers were allowed to select between 
three options: 'no'; 'yes' and 'I do not know'. If the respondent selected 'yes', 
then he had to indicate if the increase was 'minimal', 'small' or 'dramatic'. The 
benchmarks used to evaluate banking efficiency were 'net interest income' and 
'total assets'. If net interest income and total assets had risen by less 5 per cent
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then the increase was minimal. The increase was considered to be small when net 
interest income and total assets rose between 5 and 10 per cent. Banking 
efficiency was said to have increased dramatically if net interest income and total 
assets rise by more than 10 per cent.
Question eighteen identified any increase in banking profitability in the past 
five years. Senior managers were given three options: 'no', 'yes' and "I do not 
know'. If a senior manager answered 'yes' then he had to choose between three 
categories that indicated the scale of the increase: 'minimal', 'small' and 
'dramatic'. The benchmarks used to measure the banking profitability were 
before-tax profits and earnings. The increase in banking profitability was said to 
be minimal when there had been a rise of less than 5 per cent in both before-tax 
profit and earnings. If the rise in before-tax profit and earnings was more than 5 
per cent, but less than 10 per cent, then the increase in the bank's profitability was 
considered small. Finally, if the rise in before-tax profits and earnings was more 
than 10 per cent, then the bank profitability was said to be dramatic.
Question nineteen compared the number of clients for each banking group. 
Senior managers were asked to choose between five different scales: 'from 1 to 
100'; 'from 101 to 500'; 'from 501 to 1,000'; 'from 1,001 to 10,000' and 'more 
than 10,001. These benchmarks were used because of the small number of clients 
operating with new banks. In question twenty senior managers were asked to 
classify those clients from 1 to 6. The clients comprised six groups: (1) large 
enterprises; (2) medium enterprises; (3) small enterprises; (4) wealthy individuals; 
(5) average income individuals; and (6) small income individuals. The criterion 
used in the classification is the size of the sector rather than the number of clients.
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In questions twenty-one and twenty-two, senior managers were asked to 
declare the total number of their employees and how many of them were entering 
and leaving the bank every year. This was to find the change in banks' 
employment plans after financial liberalisation. Globalisation of financial services 
may contribute to an increase or decrease in the number of employees in each 
banking category. If the number of employees entering the bank was higher than 
those who had left the bank, then globalisation of financial services was said to 
bring more benefits to banks' employment plans.
Questions twenty-three to thirty were designed only for state-owned banks, 
which have the largest market share. In question-twenty three we aimed to find 
evidence about the role of the government in the banking sector after the initiation 
of financial liberalisation. Respondents chose between 'no' and 'yes'. Those who 
believed that the role of the government had declined after financial liberalisation 
had to indicate if the decline was 'minimal', 'small' or 'dramatic'. The 
benchmarks used to assess the decline in the role of the government were: (i) 
lending restrictions; (ii) reserve requirements imposed by the central bank; and 
(iii) the autonomy in selecting financial products.
Another result expected from financial liberalisation is steady improvement in 
state-owned banks' internal and external management. Internal management 
includes the control and making decisions within the branch. External 
management reflects how banks operate in the financial market. Respondents 
chose between 'no' and 'yes', but those who selected 'yes' indicated if the 
improvement was 'minimal', 'little' or 'dramatic'. The benchmarks used to 
evaluate the improvement in banks' internal and external management were 
lending policy and the quality of banking services.
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Question twenty-five aimed to find if foreign banking entry had encouraged 
state-owned banks to promote their services. This was a close ended question, 
with two options, 'no' or 'yes'. In this study, we argue that the entry of foreign 
banks is due to the globalisation of financial services. The current financial 
position of state-owned banks was identified in question twenty-six. The bank's 
financial position could be 'strong', 'moderate' or 'weak'. The volume of bad 
debts, loans granted and service of debts by debtors were the benchmarks used to 
assess the financial position of state-owned banks. Respondent are also asked in 
question twenty-seven to mark the factors that weaken the financial position of 
state-owned banks. These factors were: (1) government interventions; (2) 
mismanagement; (3) poor lending policy; (4) interest rate margin; (5) the range of 
financial products; (6) underdeveloped payment system; and (7) untrained staff.
Practical reasons that make state-owned banks not ready for privatisation were 
included in question twenty-eight. Senior managers were asked to choose between 
three factors that influence the decision of banking privatisation in Algeria: large 
amount of debts, underdeveloped information systems, and management 
complexity of current activities. In the structured interview, senior managers were 
asked how to quicken the process of privatisation. In question twenty-nine, 
respondents were asked if the privatisation of state-owned banks would improve 
the following factors: (1) improve financial resource allocations; (2) develop 
information systems; (3) boost market certainty; (4) ameliorate their financial 
services and strengthen their financial position. This was to find if privatisation of 
state-owned banks was supported by senior managers. All the factors were given 
equal weighting.
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Finally, state-owned bank managers were asked if the liberalisation of interest 
rate had an impact on the bank's earnings (question thirty). They could answer 
'no' or 'yes'. Those who answered 'yes' indicated if the scope of change in bank's 
earnings was 'minimal', 'small' or 'dramatic'. If the change in the bank's 
earnings was less than 5 per cent then it was minimal. The change in banking 
earnings was said to be 'small' when there was rise or decrease in the bank's 
earnings of between 5 and 10 per cent. If the increase or decrease in the bank's 
earnings was above 10 per cent, then the change was considered 'dramatic'.
Questions thirty-one to thirty-three were designed only for foreign banks. 
Question thirty-one asked what were the criteria followed by foreign banks in 
deciding to enter the Algerian financial market. Respondents were given five 
items to select from: (1) market size; (2) the presence of many foreign companies; 
(3) suitable financial regulations; (4) low taxes; and (5) enhance the link with 
customers. These items were equally weighted. The aim of this question was to 
find the driving forces of foreign banking entry into Algeria.
Similarly, in question thirty-two, managers were asked to determine the bank's 
operations in the Algerian financial market. This was because of the positive 
correlation between banking operations and the growth of their market share. 
Respondents were given six factors to choose from: financing large companies; 
financing medium size enterprises; financing small enterprises; financing trade; 
trading of shares in the Algiers Stock Exchange; or receiving funds from the 
public. The six elements were also equally weighted as in question thirty-one.
Question thirty-three aimed to find evidence about the response of savers and 
borrowers to the services provided by foreign banks. Respondents could select 
between three categories: (i) satisfactory; (2) indifferent; or (3) poor. The response
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was said to be 'satisfactory' when the demand for the bank services was 
increasing. If the demand for the existing financial products was stagnant, then the 
response was considered to be 'indifferent'. Finally, decline in demand for the 
bank's services meant that the response was 'poor'.
Questions thirty-four, thirty-five and thirty-six were deliberately posed for the 
senior managers of the non-interest bank. First, they were asked if the response of 
the bank's customers to services provided was 'satisfactory', 'indifferent' or 
'poor'. The benchmark used to assess the response to services provided was the 
demand for the bank's financial products. If the demand for the current services 
was growing, then the response was considered to be 'satisfactory'. The response 
was 'indifferent' when the demand was stagnant. The response was 'poor' when 
the demand was declining. Second, respondents were given a list of items 
reflecting the practical problems that may face the non-interest bank in Algeria. 
The list included the following factors: (1) asset evaluation; (2) risk assessment; 
(3) taxation; (4) liquidity; (5) absence of uniform accounting standards; (6) limited 
financial products; and (7) public trust. These items were equally weighted. If the 
factor was causing negative effects on the bank's operations, then the answer was 
'yes'. If the factor had no direct impact on the bank's activities, then the answer 
was said to be 'no'. Third, senior managers were asked to give an example of how 
the bank distributed the profit generated from its operations between the money 
owner, the entrepreneur and the bank. The money owner under Islamic banking 
does not receive interest, but shares the profit or risk with the bank.
The final question addressed whether globalisation of financial services had 
changed the shape of the Algerian financial market positively or negatively. It was 
a close-ended question with two possible answers: 'positive' or 'negative'. The
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question was designed to assess the overall implications of globalisation on the 
banking industry and stock market. If real progress had been made at both micro- 
and macro-levels of the financial sector, since the initiation of financial 
liberalisation, then the change was said to be positive. This would to be reflected 
by an increase in the quality and number of services offered to savers and 
investors.
The study used Algeria as a case study rather than a group of selected countries. 
This had significant implications on our results as Algeria has distinctive political, 
economic and social conditions. At micro-level, state-owned banks still have the 
monopoly in collecting public savings and financing domestic investment. The 
securities market is also underdeveloped and includes few financial instruments. 
At macro-level, economic growth is more sensitive to the change in oil price 
rather than the development within the financial sector. The hydrocarbon sector 
accounts more than 90 per cent of Algeria's foreign exports.
Classifying banks into interest and non-interest, based on their mode of 
financing, is another factor that has a direct effect on the results achieved in this 
research investigation. In the study of Jbili et al (1997), banks were classified as 
state and non-state, using ownership criteria. The same approach was followed by 
Shaw and McKinnon (1973) to assess the financial repression in developing 
countries before and after the financial reforms. Moving from administrative to 
real interest rates has significant consequences on interest banks rather than on 
non-interest banks, which use profit and loss sharing as a benchmark in the 
allocation of their financial resources.
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Globalisation is defined under the assumption that financial liberalisation, 
financial innovation and the Internet are the main drivers of the phenomenon. The 
Internet is considered as a separate factor to financial innovation because of its 
role in penetrating new financial markets. It enables banks to offer their services in 
foreign markets without a physical presence. Financial innovation refers to new 
products, which help financial institutions expand their market share in domestic 
and foreign markets, but with a physical presence of the bank in the host country.
The study links banking performance with competition, profitability and 
efficiency. The three factors have a common objective, which is to enhance the 
performance of existing banks. The aim of financial reforms initiated by the 
Algerian government is to improve savings and investments through an active 
banking system. The removal of barriers on banking activities and opening the 
domestic market to foreign banks has contributed to an increase in banking 
competition. This has an effect on banking profitability and efficiency as banks are 
developing sound practices in both of their lending and borrowing. The study 
focuses on analysing the changes in lending practices, interest rates, network, 
employment and information technology. These factors have a positive correlation 
with banking competition, profitability and efficiency.
Algeria is still in the process of making the transition from a centrally planned 
to a market-oriented economy. Unclear privatisation plans and concerns about 
social conflicts delayed the selling of state-owned banks' assets to private and 
foreign investors. The relationship between state-owned banks and public 
enterprises also remains strong as large enterprises have not been privatise yet.
The study is based on a sample of fourteen banks categorised on the basis of 
ownership, mode of financing and country of origin. State-owned banks still
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dominate the Algerian banking industry, with a 90 per cent market share. In 
second place, we find private and foreign banks with market share ranging 
between 1 and 9 per cent. The non-interest bank has a market share of less than 1 
per cent. The variation in the market share of each banking group has influenced 
the conclusions reached in this research investigation.
The restructuring of the central bank as part of the financial reforms has been 
excluded from this study. This was done on purpose to focus the analyses on the 
progress made by commercial banks in managing their portfolios and in 
developing their information technology. Analysing the development of 
commercial banks independently from the central bank enabled us to examine the 
factors that drive their performance.
Finally, I excluded non-banking institutions from this study, as they are very 
small compared with banking institutions. Foreign institutions offering similar 
products are also absent in the market. Additionally, the scope of reforms and 
innovation within insurance and pension fund industries is inadequate considering 
that globalisation of financial services is taking place within the sector.
As noted by Jbili et al (1997:23) "the scope for quantitative analysis is severely 
limited by data constraints". This is more apparent when using financial 
indicators, which measure financial market development at the micro-level. For 
example, banks rarely provide continuous data on their net profit, overhead costs 
and interest margins. Therefore, we decided to use qualitative research in parallel 
with quantitative research to explain the impact of financial liberalisation on 
financial sector developments.
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  Most of the interviewees were non-English speakers. Therefore, questions were 
translated into Arabic and French to enable respondents to complete the 
questionnaires with accuracy. We found that the dual-language focus made 
managers comfortable about discussing developments in the Algerian banking 
industry in before and after financial liberalisation.
  Some of the state-owned banks' senior managers were hesitant in giving fully 
detailed answer to the questions. Therefore, we made a second appointment to 
clarify those issues. In general, managers in private and foreign banks were more 
open to questions than managers in state-owned banks.
  Banks failed to provide me with their annual reports for consecutive years. This 
strengthens the argument that the financial reporting system used by banks is 
weak. In the absence of figures about some banks' net profit, total assets, etc., we 
relied on other sources of information such as interview notes and questionnaires.
  Finally, it was very difficult to make face-to-face appointments with senior
managers, as most of them tried to avoid disclosing information about the
financial performance of the bank. We were obliged to stay in the capital, Algiers,
for two months, in the summers 2001 and 2002, to conduct all the interviews and
to administer the questionnaires. This also made the cost of the survey very high.
The next chapter analyses the effects of globalisation of financial services on the
Algerian banking industry and the Algiers Stock Exchange after the financial
liberalisation of the 1990s. Quantitative and qualitative research approaches are used
to examine the changes in banking competition, profitability and efficiency. The
performance of the Algiers Stock Exchange and its role in financial resource
mobilisation are also examined.
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This chapter analyses the responses of the banking industry and the Algiers Stock 
Exchange to the effects of globalisation of financial services in Algeria. To do this, 
we examined the methods used by interest and non-interest banks in the protection of 
their market share from increased banking competition. 103 Banking profitability and 
efficiency are also examined by identifying velocity and quality of financial services, 
employment plans and network expansions of each banking group. Constraints 
inhibiting the development of the Algiers Stock Exchange are analysed to find direct 
or indirect forces that impact market capitalisation, and to determine the cause of the 
market's negative growth. 104
We refer to the interviews conducted and to the questionnaires as they are the 
primary source of the information. Senior managers are quoted when it is necessary 
to strengthen the argument. Interviewees selected for the survey are occupied high- 
ranking positions within their institutions. This improves the reliability of the data 
included in the analyses. Statistical data are also used to show the trends of real
103 Usually, foreign banks use their advanced technology, long-term experience, good worldwide 
reputation and financial strength to increase their market share (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2000). On the 
other hand, state-owned banks rely on government support and on preferential regulations to protect 
themselves from new competitors.
interest rates, inflation, foreign direct investments, etc. These are indicators of the 
developments attained within the financial sector during and after the reforms.
The analyses enable us answer the four research questions. To achieve the desired 
results, we have examined separately the role of financial liberalisation, financial 
innovations and the Internet in the elimination of barriers on each banking group. The 
three factors enable banks to penetrate new markets and to have more autonomy in 
their activities. To answer the second research question, we assessed the impact of the 
removal of various constraints, which is a result of globalisation, on banking 
competition, profitability and efficiency. Banking competition, profitability and 
efficiency are positively correlated with financial liberalisation, the emergence of new 
products and with advances in information technology such as the Internet. To answer 
the third research question, we examined the impact of foreign banking entry on the 
national banking industry and the role of the stock market in the mobilisation of 
financial resources. To answer the final research question, we have analysed the 
alteration in financial regulations which can be attributed to the transition from a 
centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one. The financial reforms are 
having direct effects on the users of the financial system including lenders and 
borrowers.
This chapter is divided into eight sections. The first section measures the 
performance of interest banks including state-owned banks, Algerian private banks 
and foreign banks. (The division of interest banks is made on the basis of three 
criteria: ownership, operations and country of origin. These criteria are endorsed 
because of the difference observed in the investment and savings strategies of state-
104 See Hargis (1998) on the evolution of the stock market in developing countries.
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owned banks, Algerian private banks and foreign banks.) The second section 
evaluates non-interest banks' performance. 105 The third section addresses banking 
competition, which is one of the goals of financial liberalisation (see Nashashibi et al, 
1998). The fourth section assesses the development of Internet banking in Algeria. 
Citibank and El-Khalifa Bank use electronic banking to attract new customers and to 
conduct cross-border financial transactions. The Internet has enabled these banks to 
offer a vast range of services to domestic and foreign investors. It has also helped 
newly emerging banks to attract creditworthy customers. The fifth section examines 
the role of financial innovations in the foreign banking entry into the Algerian 
financial market. The sixth section measures the effects of globalisation on banking 
profitability in Algeria. The seventh section evaluates the performance of the Algiers 
Stock Exchange since 1999, focusing on obstacles that confront stock market 
development. The eighth and final section presents the concluding remarks and 
provides policy recommendations for banking and Algiers Stock Exchange 
restructuring.
The reasoning followed to examine the performance of state-owned banks is based on 
the argument that globalisation of financial services alleviates interest rate ceilings, 
improves credit rationing and allows banks to strengthen their financial position and 
to offer various financial services. The benchmarks used to assess state-owned banks 
performance include: lending policy, number of financial products, information
105 See Chapter 4 for the evaluation of conventional and Islamic banks profitability and competition.
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technology, privatisation and banking network. A similar approach is applied to 
Algerian private banks in section three, foreign banks in section four and non-interest 
bank in section five. The examination focuses on credit allocation, number of clients, 
types of financial products, ownership and payment system as the main areas of 
change under the phenomenon of globalisation of financial services in Algeria.
Chapter 3 showed that the Algerian government nationalised most foreign banks 
during the 1960s (Benissad, 1980), giving the state control over all banking 
operations through the Ministry of Finance. Banks' funds were mainly used to 
finance government expenditures and state-owned enterprises (Rossignoli, 1973). The 
government also obliged households to deposit their funds at CNEP. This bank 
collected savings through a large post office network and its agencies, which were 
established in almost all municipalities; Algerian emigrants could also open an 
account, on the spot or at a distance with CNEP. Savings were mainly used to finance 
housing under three categories: housing funded under mortgage-type schemes; 
housing produced by local investors; and housing built by local groups, by 
individuals or in cooperation with private investors (CNEP Annual Report, 1994). 106
The questionnaire shows that the relationship between state-owned banks and 
state-owned enterprises remained strong even after financial liberalisation (see 
Appendix V, Q.6). 107 This is because the government persisted in protecting state- 
owned enterprises, which remain the main source of employment for the Algerian 
population (IMF, 1998). Algeria's working population increases by four per cent per 
year. Sixty-eight per cent of unemployed workers are considered not to be qualified
106 See Chapter 3 for more explanations about the national financial resources mobilisation during the 
socialist economic regime.
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for employment; this includes fifty-four per cent of people aged 15-24. The 
privatisation programme implemented in the 1990s liquidated thousands of small and 
medium-sized state-owned enterprises between 1995 and 1998, resulting in the loss 
of 450,000 jobs (EU Online, 2002). On the other hand, private and foreign 
investments are small due to the scarcity of domestic capital and high country risk.
"Most of state-owned banks funds are used in financing state-owned enterprises 
and government expenditures. Financial authorities are reluctant to privatise 
state-owned banks because small and medium size state-owned enterprises are 
unable to raise funds outside the national banking sector in order to finance 
their expansion or at list to pay their current employees. The closure of these 
enterprises will result in a large job losses and the unemployment rate is 
already high, around 30 per cent. Therefore, it is preferred to continue using 
state-owned banks' funds in financing the economic programme of the 
government. Labour organisations are also against the idea of selling state- 
owned banks to foreign and private investors. They still believe that protection 
against foreign interests is a means of not losing further jobs and achieving 
high economic growth. There is an agreement that financial liberalisation only 
caused deterioration in the economic performance of state-owned enterprises as 
many of them are struggling under the new financial regulations. Moreover, the 
market potential of Algeria had little influence on the private investments and 
also job creation (senior manager, BEA). "
Table 6.1: Market potential in selected countries in 2000
Country
Morocco
Algeria
Tunisia
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Yemen
Market Potential 
Points out of 500
250 points
229 points
206 points
301 points
382 points
93 points
Market Type
Medium-sized market
Medium-sized market
Small, expanding market
Rich market
Large market
Market in infancy
Source: Nord Sud Export, 2000, cited by Algeria Interface Online, 2000 
The statistical data indicate that commercial banks' assets declined significantly
during financial liberalisation, from USD48,595 million in 1989 to USD28,887 
million in 1999. The balance sheet of state-owned banks shows that the decrease was 
due to declining claims on the government, on the private sector, and on other public 
institutions. This disagrees with Pill and Pradhan's (1995) argument that the sharp
107 See Benhalima (1998) for more details on state-owned banks lending policy in the 1990s.
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increase in the inflation rate was the main reason for banks' declining assets during 
financial liberalisation. Other items such as reserves and foreign assets constitute a 
small proportion of state-owned banks' assets. On the other hand, time and savings 
deposits, demand deposits, and credit from the central bank form the largest 
proportion of commercial banks' liabilities (state-owned banks balance sheet).
Commercial banks' assets are denominated in US dollars rather than the Algerian 
dinar using the current exchange rate. This is done on purpose because the value of 
the Algerian dinar has fallen sharply towards US dollars since the start of trade and 
payment liberalisation. The current exchange rate of domestic currency, which 
considers economic forces, demonstrates the real value of commercial banks' assets 
rather than the nominal counterpart. The following chart shows the Algerian dinar 
exchange rate versus the US dollar from 1989 to 2003.
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Chart 6.1: The Algerian dinar exchange rate with the US dollars,
1989-2003
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Source: International Financial Statistics and Bank of Algeria.
As shown in Q.6 (Appendix V), the mobilisation of financial resources is poor 
because of the persistence in using large amounts of state-owned banks' funds to 
finance state-owned enterprises. As in McKinnon (1973), banks' managers stressed 
that the default rate on expensive loans is significant. The obligatory holding of
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government papers and absence of a developed equity market also contributed to 
scarcity of capital. The result is slow growth in private investments. However, the 
share of total loans in both sectors has grown steadily since 1996. For example, CPA 
lending to the private sector increased from 5.4 per cent in 1990 to 42 per cent in 
2000 (CPA Annual Reports). Trade is ranked third in terms of the volume of loans 
used in funding the sector. Interviewees noted that state-owned banks also extend 
credit to young people under a government programme that helps individuals create 
small enterprises or build their own houses. Many of those loans are not repaid by 
the agreed time and banks cannot take action against the borrowers, who exploit the
I /\O
weakness of the current financial regulations.
"There is no doubt that the government is still intervening within state-owned 
banks activities. For example, we are obliged to co-operate with the 
government in the creation of small enterprises. This, however, does not help us 
to improve our financial position. The financed projects are not productive 
because of lack of investment strategy. The return obtained in the capital 
invested is low because of poor allocation of resources " (senior manager, BEA, 
2001).
The structure of state-owned banks credit shows that short- and medium-term 
loans account for the largest proportion of their lending (see Appendix V, Q.7). For 
example, CPA medium term loans were 81 per cent of total credit in 1999 (CPA 
Annual Report, 1999). The scarcity of capital has prevented banks from extending 
long-term loans. 109 To repay their loans by the agreed time, state-owned banks' 
borrowers must invest in projects with high yields and quick returns. 110
108 The criteria for classification as bad loans are the size and the maturity of the loan. This is because 
medium- and long-term loans tend to be more risky than short-term loans.
109 See Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) for more explanations about the impact of scarcity of 
capitals on bank lending.
110 CNEP and BAD have considerably sizeable medium and long-term loans. BNA also has a sizeable 
volume of medium-term loans (see Appendix V, Q.7).
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"Long and medium term loans make up about one-third of bank portfolios. It is 
true that now concentrating less on attracting financial resources and more on 
investment, which means we are more wary of credit risks. The state has told us 
that once we are back on a sound footing, it will no longer guarantee our loan. 
The problem is that many entrepreneurs submit ill-thought business plans without 
studying the market. They have to understand we are no longer in a supply driven 
economy, but in a demand driven one. A good idea is not enough. Entrepreneurs 
have to prove that their projects are worthwhile for investments. Nevertheless, 
banks and private businesses are now beginning to work together. Some banks 
like SNA, Al-Khalifa Bank and the CPA have created customer advice 
departments and most are now putting in place credit guarantees structures. They 
are setting up consortia for large loans. For example, four state-owned banks 
have been consolidated to finance Orascom's cement business in Algeria" 
(Benkhalfa, the General Secretary of the Association of Banks and Finance 
Establishments, 2002).
The centrally planned economy has substantially influenced state-owned banks' 
savings policy. Low-income individuals constitute the greatest number of state- 
owned banks' clients. 111 On the other hand, CPA is the main provider of banking 
services to middle income and wealthy individuals. In the second place we find 
small and medium enterprises among state-owned banks' clients. As we have seen in 
Chapter 2, this has harmed banking competition considerably because of the limited
business opportunities that are available to state-owned banks. 112
Table 6.2: Distribution of credit to the national economy by sector, 1993-2002
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
In billions of Dinars; end of period
Public sector
Private sector
Local administration
142.0
77.1
1.1
208.0
96.7
1.1
462.0
102.5
1.1
637.8
137.8
1.1
632.6
108.6
1.2
601.9
129.1
0.1
767.1
167.9
0.1
521.0
242.7
0.2
740.3
337.9
0.2
715.5
551.0
0.3
Annual percentage change
Public sector
Private sector
Local administration
-57.2
1.4
-46.6
46.5
25.4
38.9
122.1
6.0
85.0
-0.8
34.4
9.1
38.1
-21.2
-91.7
-0.8
18.9
0.0
27.4
28.9
0.0
-32.1
45.9
100.0
5.5
15.8
0.0
-3.3
63.1
50.0
In per cent of total credits
Public sector
Private sector
Local administration
64.5
35.0
0.5
68.0
31.6
0.4
81.7
18.1
0.2
82.1
17.7
0.2
85.3
14.6
0.0
82.3
17.7
0.0
82.0
18.0
0.0
68.2
31.8
0.0
68.6
31.3
0.0
56.5
43.5
0.0
Source: Bank of Algeria
111 BADR grants a large portion of its loans to farmers.
112 For more explanations on banking specialisation see McKinnon (1973).
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Table 6.2 shows a sharp decline in the amount of credit extended to the public 
sector from 1995 to 1999. This was incurred because of the extensive use of state- 
owned banks' funds in clearing up debts of state-owned enterprises. The privatisation 
of small- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises was accelerated during this 
period under the IMF programme to help the Algerian government in its economic 
reforms. The IMF stabilisation programme helped to curtail monetary and fiscal 
imbalances through exchange rate management, tightened monetary policy, 
depreciation of domestic currency and subsidised cuts. In 2001, however, the credit to 
the private sector rose by almost twofold to reach 31.8 per cent of total credits. This 
was a result of the increase in the number of small-sized private enterprises and slow 
privatisation programme.
CNEP is the leading financial institution in collecting public savings. It generates 
about five billion USD of deposits through a network comprising 200 branches and 
3,000 post offices (CNEP Annual Reports). The savings bank extends on average 
four billion USD to the housing sector; this represents 92 per cent of the housing 
market. The remaining one billion USD goes to the inter-bank market. 113 However, 
large amounts of public funds are still kept outside the national financial market 
(IMF, 2000). The underdeveloped payment systems used by state-owned banks and 
the lack of public trust mean that individuals prefer to keep their savings under 
mattresses. For instance, depositors cannot withdraw their funds during the weekends 
because banks are closed (senior manager, BEA, 2001). Stores do not accept credit 
cards and cash is the only means of payment used in almost all businesses.
See CNEP Annual Reports
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Additionally, there are only a few automated teller machines, many of which are not 
functioning.
One financial manager stressed that after financial liberalisation, state-owned 
banks have de jure autonomy in selecting their own borrowers, public or private. 
State-owned banks have restricted their direct lending to state-owned enterprises and 
improved their credit assessments. This has contributed to a decline in the amount of 
credit extended to bad debtors. 114 Many bankers, however, believe that the 
relationship between state-owned banks and their borrowers differs from bank to 
bank. For example, state-owned banks that were financing foreign trade (BEA) 
gained more autonomy from the state than those (such as BNA) that were funding the 
agricultural sector. BEA senior manager stressed that:
"Before 1990 our credit went mostly to finance state-owned enterprises. 
However, after 1990, we used our loans to finance large enterprises, both 
public and private, without discrimination. Our employees can also be 
granted credit. But, we are obliged to fund certain enterprises to keep social 
peace and because of that we have large deficit. We are obliged to support 
government policies. Nevertheless, in the last two years we have been given 
more autonomy in our lending and borrowing practices. For instance, BEA 
has the right to refuse granting loans to poorly performed SOEs. We can also 
reduce the amount and duration of credit. In general, after 1990, loans 
towards state-owned enterprises that do not have big impact on the national 
economy and society have decreased significantly" (senior manager, BEA, 
2001).
In Q.24 of the questionnaire, eighty-six per cent of state-owned banks' managers 
interviewed believe that financial liberalisation has contributed to a marginal 
improvement in state-owned banks' internal and external management. They noted 
that mismanagement of state-owned enterprises is due to poor lending policies,
114 See IMF (2000)
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underdeveloped telecommunication systems, untrained staff, bureaucracy and direct 
control over investments. 115
Internal management refers to soundness of operations within the bank through 
effective supervision and auditing systems. Comprehensive internal management 
requires adequate risk management tools and advanced information systems. External 
management is used to reflect the relationship between the bank and its clients. Good 
banking practices and well-functioning financial systems improve external 
management and thus allow banks to generate high income on their lending. Internal 
and external management are compatible in making banks capable of producing first- 
class financial services.
It has been claimed that the entry of foreign banks into the national financial 
market stimulated state-owned banks to promote the quality of their services as to 
protect their market share (interview notes, 2001). Usually, foreign banks are more 
effective than state-owned banks in terms of the speed and the high standard of 
services they provide to their customers. State-owned banks have responded 
positively to foreign banks' entry by increasing the number of facilities offered to 
their customers. This supports the argument that globalisation of financial services 
brings more advantages than disadvantages to the national financial market.
In contrast to Oxelheim's (1995) findings, the number of local banks has increased 
steadily since financial liberalisation. 116 The delay in the banking privatisation 
programme has enabled state-owned banks to remain in the market. On the other 
hand, domestic private investors opened several Algerian private banks after the law
115 See Chapter 2, pp. 31-4 for a discussion of the impact of financial liberalisation on lending and 
borrowing mechanisms of developing countries' banks.
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changed on money and credit. Despite this, Algerian private banks still have few 
branches compared with state-owned banks.
The largest proportion of state-owned banks' debts remained unpaid because of 
the failure of state-owned enterprises in servicing their outstanding debts. 117 In 1996, 
for example, they amounted to 69.6 per cent of state-owned banks' total debts (Bank 
of Algeria, 1996). The credit risk on those loans is extremely high because of state- 
owned enterprises' low productivity. State-owned banks' second largest debtor is the 
government. In 1994, for instance, state debts towards state-owned banks amounted 
to AD204,633 million, or 40.10 per cent of state-owned banks' debts (see Chart 6.2). 
The private sector receives a small proportion of state-owned banks' funds  15 per 
cent in 1995 (Bank of Algeria, 1995). Chart 6.2 illustrates state-owned banks' debtors 
by sector from 1994 to 1997.
Chart 6.2 : 
Source: Bank of Algeria
State-owned banks still hold large amounts of non-performing loans in their 
portfolio. This is because their main customers, state-owned enterprises, are unable to 
service their debts regularly. Many state-owned enterprises also went bankrupt in the 
past ten years because of an increase in their losses and a decline in government
116 See Chapter 2, p. 35 for more details about Oxelheim's findings.
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subsidisation. The recapitalisation programme initiated by the government in 1990, 
and the decline in the amount of loans that were granted to poorly performing state- 
owned enterprises, have helped state-owned banks reduce the amount of their non- 
performing loans (interview notes, 2001). However, the amount of capital injected 
into state-owned banks was less than the size of non-performing loans (Nashashibi et
1 1 Q ^^
a/, 1998). The only bad debts removed were those extended by state-owned banks 
to state-owned enterprises or incurred because of devaluation in the national 
currency. It is necessary, therefore, to sever the relationship between state-owned 
banks and the remaining defective state-owned enterprises  this is the only way to 
stop the increase in bad debts. On the other hand, state-owned banks need to be 
cautious in lending to private investors. In the past, several affairs contributed to large 
banking losses because borrowers provided state-owned banks with false documents. 
For example, in 2001 a businessman failed to repay a large amount of his debts to the 
regional development bank, BADR.
"Banks are now much more circumspect and their checks and controls work 
perfectly. The law courts and debt recovery services deal with people who 
fail to pay back their debts. What matter is to modernise rather than 
moralise the banking system. I refute that it is riddled with corruption. Our 
problem is not dud cheques but cheques that still have not been paid after 
three months " (Benkhalfa, the General Secretary of the Association of Banks 
and Finance Establishments, 2002).
Another component of poor finance in Algeria is that there is a long delay in state- 
owned banks' financial transactions. Customers of state-owned bank usually queue 
for two to four hours to conduct their daily banking services (senior manager, BNA,
117 According to the National Economic and Social Council estimate, state-owned banks remaining bad 
debts are between 300 and 500 million Algerian dinars.
118 CNEP has adopted a good approach to banking recapitalisation. It has used its own funds to clean 
its bad debts. To ensure the success of the process, CNEP has also acquired special assistance from 
foreign banks.
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2001). Moreover, many individuals are obliged to travel long distances to have access 
to their funds. It has been noted that increasing banking networks throughout the 
country and establishing automated teller machines services in highly populated areas 
have resulted in increased public savings (senior managers, BEA, 2001).
The General Secretary of the Association des Banques et des Etablissement 
Financier (Association of Banks and Finance Establishments) (2002) stressed that 
modernisation of the national banking industry requires three main initiatives. First, 
the payment system should be computerised by the end of 2005. Second, banks are 
urged to improve their credit risk assessments and investment evaluations. Finally, 
banks are asked to boost managers' information technology skills through training 
and by adopting a good strategy for human resource management.
The range of financial products provided by state-owned banks to their customers 
is limited. The capital market is also underdeveloped; because of this, direct lending 
is a common type of funding investment. In addition, almost all forms of derivatives 
  such as swaps and options contracts   are entirely absent from the market. As a 
result, investors have few options for financing their projects and individuals have 
few options for saving their earnings.
Banks find various problems in obtaining information about the financial position 
of their debtors. 119 The reason is that most borrowers do not regularly display figures 
about their assets and liabilities. As a consequence, state-owned banks need to 
reinforce their relationship with their borrowers to gain a clear picture about how 
those borrowers are using their funds.
See Appendix V, Q.26 on the current financial position of state-owned banks.
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A financial executive pointed out that the actual social costs of the privatisation of 
state-owned banks are high because most state-owned banks branches are overstaffed 
and poorly equipped with computers and direct telephone lines (financial executive, 
BEA, 2001). 120 Privatisation should force state-owned banks to reduce the number of 
their workers and thus pay a high amount in redundancy. 121 State-owned banks also 
use underdeveloped information technology. Therefore, state-owned banks require 
substantial investment in computerisation. However, the crucial factor that makes 
banking privatisation in Algeria expensive is the large amount non-performing loans 
from state-owned banks. Accordingly, the Algerian government is obliged to sacrifice 
a large proportion of its budget to bail out the bad debts of state-owned banks. Table 
6.3 presents BEA and BAD long- and medium-term debts from 1997 to 1999. 
Table 6.3: BEA and BAD long and medium-term debts, 1997-1999
BEA
BAD
1997
522,524,462.20
na
1998
458,59,285.70
2,104,833.98
1999
299,068,129.80
1,830,782.90
Source: BEA and BAD annual reports
It has been agreed that gradual privatisation of state-owned banks is more effective
than quick privatisation. 122 In Poland, for example, the government has successfully 
implemented step-by-step banking privatisation (see Bonin and Wachtel, 1999). 
Financial authorities have focused on promoting the financial position of state-owned 
banks by eliminating their bad debts and improving their internal management before
120 BEA senior managers stressed that privatisation will enhance the financial position of state-owned 
banks. This allows privatised banks to keep their existing staff.
121 See Appendix V, Q.28 on the practical reasons that make state-owned banks not ready for 
privatisation.
122 See Kornai (2000)
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opening their capital to private ownership. 123 Foreign partners have also been invited 
to take a stake in the capital of state-owned banks.
On the other hand, the experience of countries such as Hungary124 shows that a 
shock-therapy privatisation is more effective than a gradual one (Bonin and Wachtel, 
1999). In such a mass privatisation, assets of state-owned banks are sold at a low 
price, which helps the government easily find private and foreign bidders. The new 
owners focus on improving the internal management of privatised banks and 
enhancing their financial position. The result is an increase in the liquidity and 
profitability of state-owned banks.
Selling the assets of state-owned banks to foreign banks usually facilitates the 
process of privatisation because foreign banks have sufficient funds to remove the 
debts of state-owned banks and to develop their information technology. Foreign 
banks also have the expertise to restructure privatised banks quickly and effectively. 
However, the decision to sell state-owned banks' assets to foreigners is motivated 
more by political than by economic considerations (senior manager, BEA, 2001). The 
Algerian government is still not convinced that it should sell state-owned banks to 
foreign investors because policymakers think that state-owned banks are not ready for 
privatisation.
A 'big bang' banking privatisation cannot be successful in Algeria because of the 
absence of large domestic investors who could purchase the assets of state-owned 
banks (senior manager, CNEP, 2001). Likewise, state-owned banks have many
123 See Appendix V, Q.24 on the impact of financial liberalisation on state-owned banks internal and 
external management.
124 We presented the case of Hungary's banking sector privatisation because Hungary is another former 
socialist country that implemented a successful programme of banking privatisation.
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difficulties in finding foreign partners because of high political risk and the absence 
of a clear privatisation plan by the government. Algeria requires technical assistance 
from international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank to ensure the 
success of the banking privatisation programme. This technical assistance includes 
ensuring that banks are solvent, evaluating the market value of state-owned banks' 
book assets, and selecting the privatisation plan.
Bank managers believe that banking privatisation will help state-owned banks to 
develop their information systems by investing in computerisation, Internet banking, 
telephone banking and other technological tools. It will also assist state-owned banks 
to improve their current services by introducing new financial instruments into the 
market and finding new ways to assess their borrowers. The most important point is 
that state-owned banks become more aware of the profitability of the projects they 
finance   in particular, state-owned banks should not concern themselves with 
protecting unproductive state-owned enterprises (see: Appendix V, Q.29 on the 
benefits of banking privatisation). BADR's financial manager noted that 'The 
privatisation of state-owned banks is the best way to accelerate the development of 
the Algerian economy'. However, policymakers believe that privatisation will reduce 
the number of workers employed at banking branches. Staff at state-owned banks also 
oppose banking privatisation because of the fear of large job losses (interview notes,
2001).
CPA is a leading state-owned bank searching for foreign partners. It plans to sell 
40 per cent of its shares to SGA, with the objective of benefiting from foreign funds 
and improving current services. CPA also aims to develop its management and 
information systems, and to boost its profitability (financial manager, CPA, 2001).
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CPA senior managers noted that foreign banks will bring high technology, first-class 
management mechanisms and capital into the Algerian financial market. An example 
is Poland, where foreign banks have helped state-owned banks to develop their 
information technology and to create new financial instruments.
At the same time, high unemployment (more than 30 per cent nationally and 50 
per cent among young people) has put great pressure on the government to privatise 
either state-owned banks or state-owned enterprises. Hamid Temmar, Minister of 
Participation and Co-ordinator of Reforms, stated that 'Our objective is to save our 
enterprises, whether they remain public or private, our aim is obviously to maintain 
our productive capacity and modernise it. If a state company can fly on its own, or 
with a bank, then no problem, the company may remain public' (Arab 
Communication Consult Online, 2002).
The new privatisation code gives foreign and local investors many incentives to 
purchase the assets of state-owned enterprises. These comprise exemption from VAT 
payments on goods and services purchased domestically or abroad for three years, 
cuts in the amount paid to social security, no corporate income tax payments for two 
to five years, and exemption from property tax (Ministry of Finance, 2000). The 
government has also created the Promotional and Surveillance Investment Agency, 
Agence de Promotion de Soutien et de Suivi des Investissements, whose role is to 
collect information about state-owned enterprises subject to privatisation in order to 
assist foreign and private investors who have an interest in those enterprises. This 
assistance includes setting the rules that regulate the relationship between foreign 
investors and state-owned enterprises (Ministry of Finance, 2000).
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During the 1990s, the Algerian government focused on privatising small and 
medium state-owned enterprises because of fear of social conflict. A BEA senior 
manager noted that selling assets of state-owned enterprises to private investors must 
be gradual to assure the success of their privatisation. The government is responsible 
for ensuring that the new owners are capable of enhancing profitability of privatised 
state-owned enterprises.
To facilitate the process of privatisation, assets of state-owned enterprises are 
governed by legislation issued in August 2001. Joint ventures were created between 
state-owned enterprises and private or foreign partners. State equity management 
entities were also established to hasten the opening of state-owned enterprises' capital 
to private and foreign investors and to reduce their overall debt burden (Temlali, 
2002b). On the other hand, the state has stopped subsidising commercially oriented 
state enterprises. Many enterprises are sold to employees to avoid large job losses.
In 2002, the government used three criteria to determine state-owned enterprises 
for privatisation: financial health, market position and size (Temlali, 2002b). 125 
Enterprises operating in constructions, hotels and textiles were considered to be in a 
bad financial position and, hence, had to be privatised in the first instance. Boukrouh, 
Minister of Privatisation and Planning, noted that financial authorities are preparing 
to sell companies operating in less profitable sectors such as the chemical, 
pharmaceutical and cement industries (Temlali, 2002b). Nevertheless, the 
government is still unclear about what type of companies will be privatised in the first
125 It is predicted that 250,000 state-owned enterprises will be affected because of the privatisation 
process.
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place. In fact, the government has given no indication how many enterprises fulfil its 
criteria for 'size', 'financial health' or 'market position'.
The Algerian government has obtained substantial technical and financial 
assistance from its foreign partners, such as the European Union. A management unit 
has been established between the government and the European Union to control the 
process of privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Financially, the European Union 
decided to extend 38 million Euros to privatise Algerian industry during 2001-2004, 
to clear the debts of state-owned enterprises and to modernise their operations 
(Temlali, 2002a).
Another important way to improve banking performance during the transition 
from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one is to improve the banking 
delivery system. Managers of state-owned banks noted that the branch remains the 
main delivery channel. This study examines the structure of the Algerian banking 
network in rural and urban areas to discover regions with less representation of state- 
owned banks. State-owned banks inherited a large network of more than 1,000 
branches nationwide, and have a network of numerous corresponding banks in 
Europe, America, Asia and the Middle East. The banking network was based on the 
administrative division of the country. 126 In 1993, 14 counties situated in northern 
Algeria had 492 state-owned bank branches (Bank of Algeria, 1993). By contrast, 
there were 25 branches in five counties in the south, where only seven per cent of the 
Algerian population lives.
126 In 1984 the national territory divided into 48 counties, and 1,541 municipalities.
127 CPA is totally absent in 4 counties in southern of Algeria.
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Taking into account the number of inhabitants per branch, Algeria has too few 
banks, both in large cities and in municipalities. Eighty per cent of municipalities are 
not covered by the national banking network (Bank of Algeria, 1993). On the other 
hand, there are 306 banking branches in 20 counties with more than 100,000 
inhabitants; this represents 33 per cent of the banking network. The two largest cities 
in the south have 15 branches and this represents one branch per 19,012 inhabitants.
Chart 6.3 : Nurrber of inhabitants per branch in ten large cities in Algeria
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000
Source: Bank of Algeria
The number of state-owned banks' branches in highly urbanised counties was 379, 
or 41 per cent of the national banking network (Bank of Algeria, 1995). On the other 
hand, there were 544 branches in counties dominated by rural activities, 59 per cent 
of the national banking network. This indicates that rural regions account for the 
largest part of the national territory covered by the national banking network.
185
Therefore, it is essential to increase the banking network in urban regions, where 
most financial activities take place.
Chart 6.4: Bank branches in urban and rural counties
I Bank Branches in Highly Rural 
Counties
I Bank Branches in Highly 
Urbanised Counties
BAD.R C.N.E.P B.D.L B.N.A C.P.A B.EA
Source: Bank of Algeria
There is still a high concentration of operations in the Algerian banking 
industry. 128 BEA collects 40 per cent of deposits, followed by CNEP with 24 per cent 
of the market share (see Table 6.4). BNA is ranked third, with 11 per cent of the total 
financial resources. BADR and CPA share fourth place with 10 per cent of the market 
(Bank of Algeria, 1999). The high banking specialisation has caused a direct impact 
on each of the banks' market share of financial resources. For example, BEA is the
only state-owned bank that deals with companies in the hydrocarbon sector. 129
Consequently, earnings of state-owned banks are highly sensitive to the development 
of each economic sector they finance.
There is a negative correlation between the number of branches and the amount of 
financial resources collected by state-owned banks (see Table 6.4). For example, 
BADR collects only 10 per cent of resources despite its large (28 per cent) share of
128 See McKinnon, 1973: 69 for more details on market concentration.
129 Oil constitutes more than 80 per cent of Algerian foreign exports.
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the network (BADR Annual Reports). Public savings depend on the disposable 
personal income and consumption rather than on the size of the banking network. 
Table 6.4 shows the share of the market of state-owned banks in terms of network 
and financial resources.
Table 6.4: State-owned banks' share of network and financial resources
BADR
CNEP
BNA
BDL
CPA
BEA
Share of the Network
28,0%
18,0%
17,5%
16,0%
12,5%
8,0%
Resources in billions AD
47.88
113.68
53.57
24.30
45.57
192.00
Share of the Financial Resources
10%
24%
11%
5%
10%
40%
Source: Bank of Algeria
During the socialist economic regime, mobilisation by state-owned banks of 
financial resources, collection of funds and credit allocation was based on their 
network organisation. 130 The differentiation in the form of the banking network was 
due to the nature of state-owned banks' activities and the number of their customers. 
Banks such as BADR that specialised in funding the agricultural sector had more 
branches than banks such as BEA and CPA that specialised in financing commerce 
(state-owned banks' Annual Reports).
To meet the challenge of the globalisation of financial services, state-owned 
banks should upgrade their network organisation by promoting links between their 
branches. This can be achieved by using advanced information technology. State- 
owned banks' network expansion should also be in line with developments in the 
national economy, characteristics of financial products offered by the bank, financial 
resources capacity, and social and political features of the country.
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Table 6.5: 
Source: 

The number of financial products offered by the saving bank is very limited. 
This does not allow us to diversify our portfolios. Our customers want cheap 
mortgage rates with possibility of long-term repayments. The current 
mortgage products, unfortunately, do not offer this option. Therefore, we 
need to learn lessons from countries, which have already established a 
developed mortgage markets (Marketing Direct, CNEP, 2001). "
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El-Khalifa 
After having strengthened its skills in the market, Union Bank become 
involved in creating a diversified and complementary of subsidiaries 
including Union Peche, Union Immobilier, Union Bank Brokerage, Air 
Fret Services, Algeria Aviation Services, Union Sante and Union Li 
Industry. The brokerage house deals with corporation valuation, 
privatisation, stock exchange introductions, specialising training, 
portfolio management, secondary market operations, etc. Union Bank 
also participates in developing the Algerian trade relations with China
El-Khalifa 
and the USA. For example, Union Sante is built in partnership with 
Adam and Associates based in Boston. China Trading is another 
subsidiary created to promote trade with Chinese investors 
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"Directors viewed the increased 
private activity and the rise in foreign direct investment as welcome signs that past 
reforms are bearing fruits...Directors therefore urged the authorities to redouble 
their reform efforts, with special emphasis on privatization and public sector 
restructuring, and steps to further open up the economy and improve the business 
environment" 
Chart 6.6: 
Source: 
Citibank Algeria offers its clients many advantages, including a highly 
trained staff that can help find creative financing solutions, solve 
problems and reduce the costs to our customers. These services reinforce 
the quality image of our Algerian clients in the international 
marketplace...Citibank's approach is focused on trade, foreign 
investment, cash management and treasury services, all of which involve 
close collaboration with Algeria's leading banks.... Citibank offers a 
range of banking services to companies, notably in the following areas: 
commercial finance, inter-bank transactions, investment services, 
deposits, cash management and electronic banking... It makes available 
and assortment of services to help its customers better manage their 
budgets, increase the value of their investments, and finance their 
projects. The excellent quality of Citibank's services can compete with 
the services offered by any bank anywhere in the world (Managing 
Director, Citibank, 2001).
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El-Bar-aha 
El Baraka 
We have many restrictions from the central 
bank. We need more freedom to perform effectively in our lending and borrowing 
activities. The support we need from the government has to be in the form of technical
assistance and establishing co-operation with foreign financial institutions' 
El-Khalifa Bank 
El-Baraka 
El-Baraka 
El-Baraka 
sharia 
El-Baraka 
El-Baraka 
El-Baraka 
'halaV 
'halaV 
sharia 
El-Baraka 
El-Baraka 
El-Baraka 
El-Baraka 
El-Baraka 
(El-Baraka 
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20
92 95
-CPA 43.93 5.32 0.74 0.82 5.38 24.98
1.52 0.24 0.03 0.38
2.36 2.81 2.37






































































Questions 23 to 30 are designed only for state-owned banks.

These questions are for foreign banks only
These questions are for non-interest bank only:
El-Baraka 
